United States v. Porter ( 1995 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-60163
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JAMES PORTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Mississippi
(3:93 CV 196 (1:92 CR 131))
( August 30, 1995 )
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
BACKGROUND
James J. Porter pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
which provided that Porter would waive indictment, plead guilty to
one count of conspiracy to possess 19 grams of crack cocaine with
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases
on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
intent to distribute, and provide truthful information and
testimony. The government agreed not to prosecute Porter for any
related or similar offenses. The agreement expressly provided that
there was no agreement as to what punishment or sentence the court
may impose and that both parties agreed that punishment would be
entirely in the court's discretion.
At the guilty plea hearing, the government filed a one-count
information charging that "from about June 1992 to August 7 of
1992" Porter conspired with "other persons known and unknown to
possess with intent to distribute approximately 19 grams of cocaine
base which is crack cocaine". Porter waived a formal reading of
the information. The court asked Porter if he had in fact
committed the offense, and Porter replied that he had. The court
then asked the government to state the factual basis for the
charge. The government stated that:
[B]eginning around June 1992 James Porter
negotiated to supply Joe Smith[,] Jr., a drug
dealer in Columbus, Mississippi, with
approximately 19 grams of cocaine base for
distribution in the Columbus, Mississippi[,]
area.
Smith placed telephone calls to Mr. Porter,
who is located in Meridian. Called from a
place in the Columbus, Mississippi[,] area to
negotiate the purchase. Later Smith agreed to
cooperate with the agent, and on August 7,
1992, a controlled purchase of 19 grams of
cocaine base was made from Mr. Porter. . . .
The court determined that the factual basis was sufficient,
and Porter pleaded guilty. The court informed Porter that a
presentence report (PSR) would be prepared and that he would be
afforded the opportunity to read the PSR. The court released
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Porter with the government's concurrence. The prosecutor advised
the court that Porter had been cooperating "in what we think is
going to be some significant investigations".
At the sentencing hearing, the court asked Porter's counsel
whether he had the opportunity to read the PSR and review it with
his client. Porter's counsel responded that he had. The court
asked whether there were any unresolved questions, and counsel
stated that there were none. The court also asked Porter whether
he had anything to say to mitigate his punishment. Porter's answer
was: "No, sir, Your honor."
Porter's counsel argued to the court for leniency in
sentencing Porter, stating that Porter had taken it upon himself to
cooperate. The government confirmed that Porter had cooperated,
but indicated that his cooperation had not "risen to the level of
substantial assistance". The prosecutor suggested that there might
be an opportunity for a Rule 35 motion after sentencing if the
court allowed Porter to report voluntarily. The court explained to
Porter that if the government was not in a position to make a
departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, the court was bound by the
mandatory minimum sentence. The court added that the government
could make a Rule 35 motion within one year for substantial
assistance rendered during that period. After sentencing Porter,
the court allowed him sixty days to report "to give him an
opportunity to complete the matter of cooperation with the
authorities".
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Porter did not appeal, but filed the instant motion pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Porter alleged that the plea agreement was
not supported by a sufficient factual basis in violation of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(f). Specifically, he asserted that because a
government informant cannot be a coconspirator, he could not be
guilty of the offense charged. He also alleged that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to
investigate whether Smith was an informant, and failed to inform
Porter that the coconspirator argument was an affirmative defense.
Last, Porter alleged that the government breached the plea
agreement. According to Porter, he had an oral agreement with the
government that it would seek a downward departure if he
cooperated, and he fulfilled his end of the bargain but the
government did not.
The district court denied the motion. After Porter filed
notice of appeal, the court granted his motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP).
OPINION
In reviewing the denial of a § 2255 motion, this Court reviews
the district court's factual findings for clear error, and
questions of law are reviewed de novo. United States v. Gipson,
985 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1993).
Porter raises his district-court argument that the guilty plea
was not supported by a factual basis in violation of Rule 11(f).
The district court, in rejecting this claim, determined that:
the factual basis presented both at the plea
hearing and in the presentence report -- to
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which Porter never objected -- "was
sufficiently specific to allow the court to
determine that [Porter's] conduct was within
the ambit of that defined as criminal," United
States v. Oberski, 734 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th
Cir. 1984), and reveals that the charged
conspiratorial conduct occurred before the co-
conspirator began cooperating with the
government, not after. . . .
Porter argues that he was not presented with the PSR until
after he was incarcerated and that, had he seen it before, he would
have objected to it. He raises whether, because he did not object
to the PSR, the district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.
Porter also maintains that the PSR could not supply a factual basis
because it contained only hearsay statements by Smith, and there
was no evidence showing that the conspiracy was underway before
Smith began cooperating with the government.
A defendant who has plead guilty or has been convicted and has
exhausted his right to appeal is presumed to have been "`fairly and
finally convicted'". United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 231-32
(5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1076 (1992). "[A] `collateral challenge may not do service
for an appeal.'" Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 165 (1982)). Therefore, a defendant who raises a
constitutional or jurisdictional issue for the first time on
collateral review must show "both `cause' for his procedural
default, and `actual prejudice' resulting from the error". Id. at
232 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 168). The only exception to the
cause and prejudice test is the "extraordinary case . . . in which
a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction
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of one who is actually innocent". Id. at 232 (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
Allegations of error which are not of constitutional or
jurisdictional magnitude which could have been raised on direct
appeal may not be asserted on collateral review in a § 2255 motion.
United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981). Such
errors will be considered only if they could not have been raised
on direct appeal, and if condoned, would result in a complete
miscarriage of justice. Shaid, 937 F.2d at 232 n.7.
Although a failure to comply with the formal requirements of
Rule 11 is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional and can and
should be raised on direct appeal, in some cases Rule 11 violations
can have a constitutional dimension bearing on the knowing and
voluntary nature of the guilty plea. Therefore, to be cognizable
on § 2255, the movant must show that the alleged error resulted in
a "complete miscarriage of justice" or in a proceeding
"inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure".
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979); United
States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 932 (1989).
Porter submits no reason why the Rule 11 issue was not raised
on direct appeal. The plea colloquy shows that both the
information and the government's recitation of the factual basis
for the plea argument stated that the conspiracy began in June.
The factual basis specifically provided that Smith began
cooperating after he and Porter began negotiations. Porter did not
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object to either the information or the government's factual basis.
Thus, he does not make the requisite showing of a miscarriage of
justice which would entitle him to § 2255 relief on this claim.
Porter's argument that the district court violated Rule 32
because the court did not permit him to comment on the PSR was not
raised in the district court. "[I]ssues raised for the first time
on appeal are not reviewable by this court unless they involve
purely legal questions and failure to consider them would result in
manifest injustice." Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th
Cir. 1991) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Whether the
court permitted Porter to comment on the PSR is not a purely legal
issue, and this Court will not consider it.
Porter also argues that the district court did not apply the
sentencing guidelines correctly because he was sentenced to 60
months of imprisonment when his base offense level and criminal
history category called for 46 to 57 months of imprisonment.
Porter did not raise this argument in the district court. As noted
above, "[I]ssues raised for the first time on appeal are not
reviewable by this court unless they involve purely legal questions
and failure to consider them would result in manifest injustice."
Varnado, 920 F.2d at 321.
Whether the district court correctly sentenced Porter is a
legal question. See United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1018
(5th Cir. 1990) (the district court's purely legal application of
the guidelines is subject to de novo review). No miscarriage of
justice will occur, however, if the court does not review this
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argument. Porter was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment, the
statutory minimum. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 (West 1981 & Supp.
1995). The guidelines provide that "[w]here a statutorily required
minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable
guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be
the guideline sentence". § 5G1.1(b); see United States v.
Schmeltzer, 960 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir.) ("statutorily mandated
sentences are incorporated into the Sentencing Guidelines and
prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict"), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 609 (1992).
Porter asserts that the plea agreement led him to believe that
he was entitled to a downward departure and that the government
breached the agreement. In rejecting this claim, the district
court reasoned that under § 5K1.1, the government has the power,
but not the duty, to file a motion for a downward departure when a
defendant has "`substantially assisted'". Further, the court noted
that the written plea agreement contained no such agreement and
that Porter repeatedly advised the court that the terms of the plea
were encompassed by the written agreement.
In his reply brief, Porter points out that at sentencing the
government stated that his assistance "hasn't risen to the level of
substantial assistance". Porter argues that the government, in
this statement, alludes to its oral promise that it would seek a
departure. Porter also argues that the government's statement
regarding his release on bond that he had been "assisting the FBI
and the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics in what was going to be
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significant investigations" is evidence that there was an oral
agreement for a departure.
Porter contends that he attempted to provide "substantial
assistance," but that the federal agents repeatedly cancelled
prearranged meetings, and that he did not have the means to
coordinate his assistance because his car had been seized as a
result of his arrest. He further maintains that in spite of these
obstacles, he nevertheless provided information that led to the
arrest of two suspects.
"[W]hen a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled." United States v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir.
1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Porter, as the
party alleging a breach of the plea agreement, bears the burden of
proving the underlying facts establishing a breach by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11
F.3d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1993). To determine whether the government
breached the plea agreement, the court must consider "whether the
government's conduct is consistent with the parties' reasonable
understanding of the agreement". Id. (internal quotations
omitted). This inquiry is a question of law to be reviewed de
novo. Id.The written plea agreement contained no provision for the
government to file a downward departure. Porter assured the court
that no promises, other than what was contained in the written
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agreement, were made to him. The government's statements do not
indicate that it was bound to file a § 5K1.1 motion. Thus, the
government's conduct in not moving for a § 5K1.1 departure is
consistent with the parties' reasonable understanding of the
agreement. There was no breach.
Porter raises his district court argument that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, but states for the first time on
appeal that his lawyer was ineffective because he did not present
and discuss the PSR with him. He questions whether his lawyer even
looked at the PSR, but acknowledges that he has no way of knowing.
Porter further argues for the first time on appeal that his lawyer
was ineffective for not objecting to the court's sentence of 60
months when the Guidelines called for less and for not objecting to
the PSR. He adds that his lawyer was ineffective for advising him
to waive his Fifth Amendment right to be indicted by a grand jury
which would have revealed the fact that "the conspiracy began in
June as well as the bases [sic] of the negotiations".
As noted above, this Court will not address issues not
considered by the district court. "[I]ssues raised for the first
time on appeal are not reviewable by this court unless they involve
purely legal questions and failure to consider them would result in
manifest injustice." Varnado, 920 F.2d at 321. These issues are
not purely legal. See United States v. Faubion, 19 F.3d 226, 228
(5th Cir. 1994) (ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law
and fact). Thus, this Court will not consider them for the first
time on appeal.
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Porter raises his district-court arguments that his sentence
would have been different had counsel been more diligent in his
investigation. In his reply brief, Porter expounds on this
allegation, asserting that if his lawyer had investigated the
circumstances of the case, he would have discovered the affirmative
defense that one cannot conspire with a government informant or
that a buyer-seller relationship does not constitute a conspiracy.
Porter also argues that his lawyer was ineffective for "failing to
secure the plea agreement in regards of both substantial assistance
and guideline versus statutory application, and for failing to file
any pretrial motions that may have aided in his defense's remaining
arguments". Construing his pleadings broadly, Porter raised these
allegations in rebuttal to the government's answer to his
complaint.
This Court reviews conclusions regarding mixed questions of
fact and law such as ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de
novo. Faubion, 19 F.3d at 228. The district court's factual
findings are reviewed for clear error.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show: (1) that his counsel's performance was
deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced
his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94
(1984). To show Strickland prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate
that counsel's errors were so serious as to "render[] the result of
the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair".
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Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1993). "Unreliability
or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel
does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural
right to which the law entitles him." Id. at 844. In evaluating
such claims, the court indulges in "a strong presumption" that
counsel's representation fell "within the wide range of reasonable
professional competence, or that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy'".
Bridge v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation
omitted). "A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A failure
to establish either deficient performance or prejudice defeats the
claim. Id. at 697.
The two-part Strickland test applies to guilty pleas in which
ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged. Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). To satisfy the prejudice requirement, "the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial". Id. at 60.
The district court determined that Porter's counsel was not
ineffective for failing to assert the defense that one cannot
conspire with a government informant. Although Porter is correct
in asserting that a confidential informant or government agent
could not be a coconspirator, and a conspiracy cannot exist between
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a defendant and a confidential informant or a government agent, see
United States v. Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d 360, 365 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 957 (1987), as noted by the district court, the
factual basis established that the charged conspiratorial conduct
occurred before the coconspirator began cooperating with the
government, not after. Thus, Porter fails to establish that his
counsel was deficient for not asserting this defense.
The district court determined that because Porter was not
entitled to a downward departure, this ground of ineffective
assistance was meritless. As discussed above, Porter was not so
entitled. Therefore, counsel was not deficient in this regard.
The district court noted that counsel was not deficient for
failing to file pretrial motions because the case did not follow
the standard procedures associated with formal indictment. Porter
has not stated what motions should have been filed or what
information was forfeited as a result of the failure to file the
motions. Consequently, he cannot establish prejudice. See
Lockhart, 113 S. Ct. at 844.
Porter has filed a motion to proceed IFP in this Court. The
motion is denied as moot inasmuch as the district court granted
Porter's motion to proceed IFP on appeal.
Porter filed a motion to expedite appeal arguing that, unless
his appeal is expedited, he might have served the amount of time he
should have been sentenced to. This Court grants such motions only
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for "good cause shown". 5th Cir. R. 27.5. Inasmuch as Porter has
failed to show good cause, this motion is denied.
AFFIRMED
opin\95-60163.opn
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