Manes v. City of Shavano ( 1996 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-50935
Summary Calendar
RONNIE F. MANES, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
City of Shavano Park Police Dep’t, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
(SA-95-CV-1155)
July 17, 1996
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ronnie F. Manes, Jr., filed suit pro se against the City of
Shavano Park Police Department, Police Captain Orlando Rivera
Torres, Patrolman P. Mendez, Bexar County Sheriff’s Office, Deputy
Sabino Gutierrez, Deputy R. Vijil, the San Antonio Police
Department, John Does 1-10, and Jane Does 1-10, alleging violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1988 under the Fourth, Fifth, and
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants were sued in their
individual as well as their respective official capacities.
Manes alleged that on September 26, 1995, he was arrested
without a warrant and his property illegally searched and seized
while driving in the City of Shavano Park, County of Bexar.
On November 21, 1995, the district court issued its standard
“Order for Scheduling Recommendations” requiring Manes to submit a
proposed scheduling order. On December 8, 1995, Manes filed a
“Notice of Status by Affidavit/Judicial Notice.” The district
court, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(h)(3), finding that Manes’ affidavit “clearly [indicated] an
intent not to be subject to the rules and laws which govern this
Court.” Manes filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
Manes argues that the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing the action without discovery or a hearing for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, because he established a “prima facie”
case of a civil rights violation. He argues that the court
erroneously relied on the affidavit he filed in determining that
the court lacked jurisdiction.
This court reviews de novo a dismissal for want of subject
matter jurisdiction. Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir.
1992). “Because there is no presumption in favor of federal court
jurisdiction and that jurisdiction is limited, the basis for
jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown.” Kirkland Masonry, Inc.
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v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 532, 533 (5th Cir. 1980). Manes’
complaint asserted jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1342.
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1343 is the
jurisdictional basis for civil rights cases under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985. 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
“Whether a federal court has jurisdiction to decide a case and
whether a plaintiff has a cause of action under a federal statute
are distinct inquiries that must be addressed separately.” Daigle
v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1346 (5th Cir.
1985)(footnote omitted). If the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint
is drawn to seek recovery under a federal statute, then the
district court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1348.
To obtain relief under § 1983 a plaintiff must prove that he
was deprived of a right under the Constitution or laws of the
United States and that the person depriving him of that right acted
under color of state law. Resident Council of Allen Parkway
Village v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1050
(5th cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 75 (1993). Individuals are
acting under color of state law “only when it can be said that the
State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the
plaintiff complains.” Daigle, 774 F.2d at 1349 (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
A court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
any of three grounds: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint
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supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s
resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,
413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). Here, the
district court sua sponte dismissed the action pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), after considering Manes’ affidavit. The
district court found that the affidavit expressed Manes’ clear
“intent not to be subject to the rules and laws which govern this
Court.” The court determined that if Manes “does not recognize
the laws of the United States and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to which this Court is bound, then the Court has no jurisdiction to
determine Plaintiff’s claims and the case may be dismissed.”
Manes alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by persons acting under color of law when he was
arrested while driving in Bexar County. Manes’ district court
pleadings are drawn to seek recovery under § 1983, which prohibits
the deprivation of Constitutional rights by persons acting under
color of any state law. Manes’ affidavit did not divest the
district court of jurisdiction. Although disrespectful, the
affidavit does not clearly demonstrate contumacious conduct or a
“clear record of delay” sufficient to warrant dismissal without
consideration of other sanctions. See Price McGlathery, 792 F.2d
472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986). Therefore, the district court erred by
dismissing Manes’ action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND the district court’s
dismissal of Manes’ complaint.
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