Trevillion v. TX Rehab Comm ( 1996 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 95-50684
Summary Calendar
_______________________
KIM YVONNE TREVILLION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TEXAS REHABILITATION COMMISSION, ET AL.
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(SA-94-CV-642)
_________________________________________________________________
April 17, 1996
Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:*
Kim Yvonne Trevillion ("Trevillion") appeals the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her employer, Texas
Rehabilitation Commission (“TRC”), on Trevillion's claims that she
was sexually harassed and that TRC terminated her employment in
unlawful retaliation for her reporting this alleged harassment.
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
Trevillion, this court affirms.
BACKGROUND
Trevillion transferred to the San Antonio-North Field
Office of the TRC early in 1993.* On March 17, 1993, Trevillion
was admonished by her supervisor, Eliseo Smith (“Smith”), for
complaints of rudeness filed against her by a TRC client, John
Buckley. The very next day, Trevillion complained to the regional
director of the TRC that she had been sexually harassed by Smith in
January and February of 1993. As soon as a formal complaint of
sexual harassment was completed by Trevillion, the complaint was
immediately investigated by the area manager for TRC, Jerry Crain
(“Crain”). Smith denied all allegations of sexual harassment and
Crain concluded that there was no evidence of such harassment.
Besides the alleged incidents of harassment in January and February
of 1993, Trevillion alleged no further sexual harassment.
Because complaints from co-workers and clients about
Trevillion had grown steadily, Smith and Crain discussed these
complaints with her. On May 12, 1993, Trevillion was given a
written warning urging her to rectify the recurring complaints.
Since the complaints continued, on July 2, 1993, Trevillion was
placed on conditional employment. On August 26, 1993, she was
notified that TRC was considering action adverse to her continued
employment and, on August 31, 1993, Trevillion was terminated.
*
Trevillion was transferred to the San Antonio branch of
the TRC from the Austin office as part of a mediated settlement
agreement of a prior lawsuit filed by Trevillion that alleged
racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.
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After unsuccessfully seeking relief with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Trevillion was issued a right to
sue letter and the instant lawsuit followed. In this lawsuit,
Trevillion complains that she was sexually harassed at TRC and was
unlawfully terminated after she reported this alleged harassment.
DISCUSSION
This court reviews the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, employing the same criteria used in that court.
Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 588 (5th Cir.
1995). Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Factual
questions and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272
(5th Cir. 1994).
Although Rule 56(c) requires the moving party to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, a
dispute about a material fact is genuine only if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmovant. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.
Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). If the moving party
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, then
the nonmovant is burdened with establishing the existence of a
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genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). This
burden requires the nonmovant to do more than merely raise some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1355.
A. Sexual Harassment
In order to state a prima facie claim under Title VII for
unlawful sexual harassment in a hostile work environment,
Trevillion must demonstrate the following:
(1) membership in a protected group; (2)
subjection to unprovoked sexual advances, or
request for sexual favors, or other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature; (3) but
for her sex, the plaintiff would not have been
the object of harassment; (4) the harassment
was sufficiently pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive
or hostile working environment; and (5) the
employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial
action.
Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 198-99 (5th Cir.
1992). See also Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th
Cir. 1986).
As the district court correctly explained, TRC can only
be liable under Title VII for the sexual harassment allegedly
committed by Smith if it knew or should have known of the
harassment and if it failed to take prompt remedial action. See
Cortes, 977 F.2d at 198-99. Of course, it is Trevillion’s burden
to demonstrate that TRC both knew or should have known of the
harassment and that it failed to effectuate an appropriate remedy.
Carmen v. Lubrizol Corp., 17 F.3d 791, 794-95 (5th Cir. 1994) (per
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curiam).
Because Trevillion cannot satisfy this burden, the
district court properly awarded summary judgment to TRC on
Trevillion’s claim of sexual harassment. Upon careful review, the
record demonstrates that TRC began an investigation immediately
upon receiving Trevillion’s complaint; that it interviewed both
parties the same day that the complaint was filed; that it
counseled Smith about the alleged harassment; and that no further
instances of sexual harassment were reported by Trevillion. Since
TRC took prompt remedial action to investigate and address
Trevillion’s complaint of sexual harassment, she cannot state a
prima facie case for unlawful sexual harassment in a hostile work
environment and summary judgment was properly granted to TRC on
this claim.
B. Retaliatory Discharge
Similarly, in order to state a prima facie case of
unlawful retaliation, Trevillion must establish
(1) that she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity; (2) that she experienced
an adverse employment action following the
protected activity; and (3) that a causal link
exists between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.
Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 507 (5th Cir. 1994).
A rebuttable presumption of discrimination arise only if Trevillion
proves these elements. See Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., 5
F.3d 995 (5th Cir. 1993).
Of course, even if a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination arises, TRC can rebut this presumption by
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articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
decision to terminate Trevillion. Wilson v. Belmont Homes, 970
F.2d 53, 57 (5th Cir. 1992). If such a reason is articulated by
TRC, Trevillion must demonstrate that the reason was merely
pretextual and that retaliation was the actual cause for her
termination. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, ___ U.S. ___, 113
S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993).
The record unambiguously chronicles that TRC had received
numerous complaints about Trevillion and that, as a result, TRC had
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to terminate her
employment. Trevillion, by contrast, can offer nothing short of
mere conjecture to refute this reasoning and to prove
discrimination. Of course, such conjecture is not sufficient to
withstand summary judgment for TRC. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
586, 106 S. Ct. at 1355; Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93,
96 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that “a plaintiff’s subjective
belief of discrimination, however genuine, cannot alone be the
basis for judicial relief.”). As a result, summary judgment was
also appropriate for TRC on Trevillion’s claim of unlawful
retaliation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court AFFIRMS the
district court's judgment granting TRC summary judgment against
Trevillion's claims of sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge.
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