United States v. Suarez ( 1999 )


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  •                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ____________________
    No. 98-21141
    Summary Calendar
    ____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LUIS ENRIQUE SUAREZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    (H-97-CR-50-1)
    _________________________________________________________________
    October 26, 1999
    Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Luis   Enrique   Suarez   contends   that   his    72-month   sentence
    (increased on remand from 60 months) for possession of cocaine with
    intent to distribute is the product of judicial vindictiveness and
    based on attorney-client communications; that his counsel was
    ineffective by disclosing to the court that Suarez refused to
    identify his coconspirators for fear of retaliation; and that the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Government      committed     prosecutorial         misconduct     during     his
    arraignment.
    Because,    at    sentencing,    Suarez      did   not   object   regarding
    judicial vindictiveness, our review is limited to plain error. See
    United States v. Calverley, 
    37 F.3d 160
    , 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
    banc).      Although Suarez’s sentence on remand was higher than his
    original sentence, thus raising a presumption of vindictiveness,
    “objective information in the record justif[ied] the increased
    sentence”.     United States v. Campbell, 
    106 F.3d 64
    , 67 (5th Cir.
    1997) (quoting Wasman v. United States, 
    468 U.S. 559
    , 565 (1984)).
    Nor   was    Suarez’s    sentence     based   on    counsel’s    disclosure    of
    attorney-client communications.          In sum, there was no plain error.
    Generally, we decline, on direct appeal, to review ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims, see, United States v. Gibson, 
    55 F.3d 173
    , 179 (5th Cir. 1995); the exception is “in rare cases where the
    record allow[s]” a fair evaluation of the merits. United States v.
    Higdon, 
    832 F.2d 312
    , 314 (5th Cir. 1987).               Here, no further facts
    need to be developed for the claim to be suitable for review.
    Because the district court did not arrive at the sentence by
    relying on counsel’s disclosure of attorney-client communications,
    Suarez has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the disclosure.
    See Spriggs v. Collins, 
    993 F.2d 85
    , 88 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Finally,     Suarez’s    prosecutorial-misconduct            claim,    also
    reviewed for plain error because he did not make a contemporaneous
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    objection, see United States v. Binker, 
    795 F.2d 1218
    , 1227 (5th
    Cir. 1986), fails because it is not supported by the record.   See
    United States v. Rocha, 
    916 F.2d 219
    , 234 (5th Cir. 1990).
    AFFIRMED
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