Hansen v. Williams ( 1996 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ___________________
    No. 96-60450
    Cons. w/ No. 96-60452
    Summary Calendar
    TRACY A. HANSEN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    OFFICER WILLIAMS; GEANIE COLE;
    J.J. STREETER; ROGER COOK;
    EDWARD HARGETT; EDDIE LUCAS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ************************
    TRACY A. HANSEN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    DONALD MOORE; JERRY BARBER;
    OFFICER JOHN HAYWOOD;
    EDWARD HARGETT; EDDIE LUCAS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Mississippi
    ________________________________________________
    December 4, 1996
    Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.*
    *
    Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiff-appellant Tracy Hansen (Hansen), an inmate at the
    Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi, proceeding
    pro se, brought these two separate civil rights suits in the
    district court below against various prison officers and a fellow
    inmate.   A magistrate judge ordered that Hansen’s suits be stayed,
    and required Hansen to make a good faith effort to exhaust his
    administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Because the
    prison’s Administrative Remedy Program allows a prisoner to process
    only one claim at a time, Hansen was unable to process his cases.
    Despite Hansen’s efforts, the district court ordered that the cases
    be dismissed.   Hansen appeals in each case.      We have sua sponte
    consolidated these cases for appellate disposition only.      We now
    vacate and remand in each case.
    Facts and Proceedings Below
    Hansen filed a civil suit in the district court below on April
    7, 1994, claiming that various prison officers violated his civil
    rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Hansen v. Moore; our No. 96-60452).
    Hansen alleges that on March 25, 1994, while returning to his cell
    after completing outdoor recreation, Officers Jerry Barber and John
    Haywood physically assaulted him. Hansen claims that Sergeant John
    Moore refused to investigate the alleged assault, and that all
    three prison officers threatened Hansen with future assaults if he
    under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
    2
    attempted to go to the inmate hospital.   Hansen also alleges that
    Superintendent Edward Hargett and Commissioner Eddie Lucas failed
    to carry out their administrative responsibilities by showing
    deliberate indifference and willful neglect when Hansen complained
    of the March 25 assault and prior assaults.
    On June 6, 1994, Hansen filed in the district court below (in
    the same division as the April 7 suit) another section 1983 suit
    against other officers of the same prison and an inmate, Geanie
    Cole (Hansen v. Williams; our No. 96-60450). Hansen complains that
    the officers named as defendants in his suit failed to protect him
    from attacks by Cole and other inmates.   Hansen also asserts that
    he had attempted to use the prison’s Administrative Remedy Program
    (Program) to resolve his claim, but that the prison administrators
    process only one inmate grievance at a time and that the procedure
    takes several months.
    On November 4, 1994, a magistrate judge entered identical
    orders in each suit, directing that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
    1997e(a)(1), the case be stayed for 90 days and that during the 90-
    day period, Hansen make a good faith attempt to exhaust the
    available administrative remedies found in the Program.   Moreover,
    the orders each provided that Hansen file, within 150 days, a
    certificate from the Program stating that he had exhausted his
    administrative remedies or a statement that he had attempted to
    obtain such a certificate but had not been furnished with one.
    3
    Each order further provided that failure to file a certificate or
    a statement within 150 days would result in dismissal of the case
    with prejudice.
    Soon thereafter, Hansen claims to have begun taking steps
    towards complying with the orders.      On November 8, 1994, he
    allegedly wrote the director of the Program notifying the director
    of the magistrate judge’s orders and requesting the director——as
    the cases could not be processed——to issue a certificate indicating
    that he had exhausted his administrative remedies.   Hansen sent a
    follow-up letter to the director on December 19, 1994, asking for
    a status update on his cases. A Program administrator responded on
    January 6, 1995, informing Hansen that only one request could be
    processed through the Program at a time, and because he had other
    grievances pending in the Program, the administrator would not
    entertain either of the two cases.
    On March 6, 1995, Hansen filed a motion to lift the 90-day
    stay in the second filed of his two cases, Hansen v. Williams.   In
    the motion, Hansen described his correspondence with the Program
    administrator and stated that, despite his good faith efforts, he
    was having difficulties obtaining administrative relief in both
    cases.   The magistrate judge denied the motion on March 8, 1995.
    Nothing further transpired in either case until on May 31,
    1995, the district court, sua sponte, and without prior notice to
    Hansen, entered orders in each case finding that Hansen had failed
    4
    to comply with the magistrate judge’s order and dismissed each case
    without prejudice for failure to comply with an order of the court
    and for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
    Hansen timely appeals in each case.1
    Discussion
    A district court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure
    to comply with a court order.   Long v. Simmons, 
    77 F.3d 878
    , 879
    (5th Cir. 1996).    A sua sponte dismissal by the district court
    pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) will normally be upheld on appeal
    unless the court determines that the district court abused its
    discretion.   
    Long, 77 F.3d at 879
    .
    Although section 1983 does not impose any general exhaustion
    requirement upon litigants, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e of the Civil
    Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, district courts have
    discretion to require an inmate to exhaust prison administrative
    remedies prior to having his case heard in federal court.2       Rocky
    1
    Hansen filed timely motions for reconsideration in each case
    on June 8, 1995. He filed his notice of appeal in each on June 25,
    1995. The district court denied the motions in each case on July
    8, 1996. Hansen did not file a new notice of appeal in either
    case. The notices of appeal became effective on the denial of the
    motions for reconsideration. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).
    2
    On April 26, 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
    (Act) became law. See Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
    Section 803(d) of the Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to now read:
    “No action shall be brought with respect to prison
    conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
    5
    v. Vittorie, 
    813 F.2d 734
    , 736 (5th Cir. 1987).      Section 1997e
    provides district courts with the power to dismiss suits, following
    a section 1997e continuance, if a prisoner fails to pursue his
    administrative remedies in good faith.     Id.; see also Marsh v.
    Jones, 
    53 F.3d 707
    , 710 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995).
    The record tends to show that, at the very least, Hansen has
    attempted to comply with the magistrate judge’s order. In addition
    to attempting to process his cases with the Program, Hansen wrote
    two letters to the director of the Program fully informing the
    director of the order’s exhaustion requirements and expressing his
    (Hansen’s) desire to satisfy those requirements.   Moreover, in his
    motion to lift the 90-day stay, Hansen stated that he had made an
    effort to resolve his cases through the Program, but that he was
    unable to do so because of the Program’s prohibition on accepting
    more than one claim at a time from the same prisoner.3      Hansen
    repeated this information in his Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to
    Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
    or other correctional facility until such administrative
    remedies as are available are exhausted.”
    42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).     On remand, the district court should
    consider to what extent, if any, the Act affects Hansen’s cases.
    3
    We note that Hansen filed this motion only in his suit against
    Officer Williams et al.    However, because the motion discusses
    Hansen’s efforts to comply with the order with regards to both
    cases, we believe that Hansen’s failure to file a motion in his
    suit against Moore et al. is not necessarily controlling under the
    present facts. The suits were in the same division and identical
    orders in each were entered by the same magistrate judge and
    district judge.
    6
    alter or amend the judgment.
    In dismissing Hansen’s cases without prejudice, however, the
    district court apparently did not take into consideration any of
    Hansen’s efforts to comply with the order.          In its May 31, 1995
    opinion and final judgment, the court made no mention of Hansen’s
    motion to lift the 90 day stay or any of Hansen’s efforts described
    in the motion.    Likewise, in its order rejecting Hansen’s Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 59(e) motion, the court summarily denied the motion without
    offering any explanation for its decision.
    For the above reasons, we conclude that the district court
    erred in dismissing Hansen’s civil suits without addressing or
    apparently considering whether he had reasonably and in good faith
    complied with the order.       The record indicates that, at minimum,
    Hansen   had   taken   some   steps   towards   fulfilling   the   order’s
    requirements.    On remand, the district court should consider the
    evidence which Hansen claims supports his contention that he made
    a good faith attempt to comply with the order, and in particular,
    those efforts mentioned in his motion to lift the 90-day stay.
    Conclusion
    The district court’s orders dismissing Hansen’s civil cases
    are each VACATED and each cause is REMANDED.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-60450

Filed Date: 12/16/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021