United States v. Alonzo Escalon ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 18-10354      Document: 00514745845         Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/03/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 18-10354                            FILED
    Summary Calendar                   December 3, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ALONZO ESCALON,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:17-CR-167-1
    Before SMITH, WIENER, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Defendant-Appellant Alonzo Escalon was convicted in a bench trial of
    being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he raises issues
    related to his suppression hearing. “When reviewing a district court’s grant or
    denial of a motion to suppress evidence as obtained in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment, we review a district court’s factual determinations for clear error
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-10354     Document: 00514745845     Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/03/2018
    No. 18-10354
    and its ultimate Fourth Amendment conclusions de novo.” United States v.
    Gonzalez, 
    328 F.3d 755
    , 758 (5th Cir. 2003).
    Escalon contends that he was seized in violation of the Fourth
    Amendment.      He claims that his detention began when police officers
    approached him in their patrol car and walked toward him prior to observing
    signs that gave them probable cause to believe that he was intoxicated in
    public. Escalon argues that, because the information supporting the probable
    cause determination was developed after his illegal detention, the warrantless
    search of his person was unlawful and the firearms evidence must be
    suppressed.
    “Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a
    particular individual,” a person is not detained as long as the officers “do not
    induce cooperation by coercive means.” United States v. Drayton, 
    536 U.S. 194
    ,
    201 (2002). A detention thus occurs when the officer’s conduct is sufficiently
    coercive that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or to terminate
    the encounter. 
    Id. Here, the
    district court’s factual findings support a determination that
    police officers approached Escalon and had a consensual encounter with him,
    during which they developed probable cause to arrest him for public
    intoxication based on his unsteady gait, slurred speech, red eyes, and the odor
    of alcohol. The district court’s factual determinations are plausible in light of
    the record as a whole and therefore are not clearly erroneous. See United
    States v. Rounds, 
    749 F.3d 326
    , 337-38 (5th Cir. 2014). It follows that Escalon
    has not shown error in the district court’s determination that there was no
    constitutional violation, as “[l]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
    Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching
    individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to
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    Case: 18-10354    Document: 00514745845     Page: 3   Date Filed: 12/03/2018
    No. 18-10354
    them if they are willing to listen.” 
    Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200
    . Escalon has
    waived any other issues pertaining to the district court’s Fourth Amendment
    determinations by failing to brief them. See United States v. Pompa, 
    434 F.3d 800
    , 806 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Escalon’s contention that the district court erred at the suppression
    hearing by placing undue weight on hearsay evidence lacks merit.            The
    evidence in question was not offered for the truth of the matter and therefore
    was not hearsay. See United States v. Sosa, 
    897 F.3d 615
    , 623 (5th Cir. 2018).
    In any event, hearsay is admissible at a suppression hearing. See United
    States v. Matlock, 
    415 U.S. 164
    , 175 (1974).
    Finally, Escalon insists that his due process rights were violated by a
    police officer’s failure to preserve the footage from his body camera. Although
    Escalon did not raise a due process claim in the district court, we consider the
    issue preserved since Escalon placed the “essential substance” of his objection
    to the destruction of the body camera video before the district court by raising
    a claim based on spoliation of evidence. See United States v. Mendiola, 
    42 F.3d 259
    , 261 (5th Cir. 1994).
    The exculpatory value of the evidence in question is undetermined, but
    may be “potentially useful” to the defense. To prevail, Escalon must show that
    the evidence was destroyed in bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 
    488 U.S. 51
    , 58 (1988). The district court addressed the substance of this claim by
    noting that there was no evidence that Officer Vazquez had deliberately
    destroyed or suppressed the video of the incident. Escalon’s claim fails because
    he has not shown that the district court’s implicit determination that there was
    no bad faith was clearly erroneous. See United States v. McNealy, 
    625 F.3d 858
    , 869-70 (5th Cir. 2010).
    AFFIRMED.
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