James Moss v. UNUM Group , 638 F. App'x 347 ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 15-30341      Document: 00513367001         Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/03/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-30341                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    JAMES L. MOSS,                                                           February 3, 2016
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Plaintiff - Appellant                                             Clerk
    v.
    UNUM GROUP; PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; NEW
    YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 5:13-CV-3152
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant James L. Moss alleges that Defendants-Appellees
    (collectively “Unum”) unlawfully denied his claim for total disability benefits
    under two insurance policies governed by the Employment Retirement Income
    Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). The district court dismissed Moss’s claims with
    prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We affirm.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 15-30341    Document: 00513367001     Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/03/2016
    No. 15-30341
    I.
    Unum issued two disability insurance policies to Moss, a urologist. Moss
    suffers from osteoarthritis. He alleges that his condition prevents him from
    performing urological surgery.
    Moss filed a claim with Unum for total disability benefits under the
    policies. Unum denied the claim on June 5, 2009. Unum’s denial letter notified
    Moss that, if he wanted to appeal Unum’s denial of his claim, he was required
    to submit a written appeal within 180 days.
    On June 30, 2009, Moss’s attorney called an Unum representative and
    verbally informed him that he disagreed with Unum’s decision. Then, on July
    16, 2009, Moss’s attorney mailed copies of Moss’s paychecks to Unum.
    However, Moss did not file a formal written appeal.
    On December 10, 2009, Unum sent Moss another letter reiterating its
    denial of his claim for benefits. The December 10, 2009 denial letter again
    informed Moss that he had 180 days to file a written administrative appeal.
    Moss never filed an administrative appeal. Instead, Moss filed a lawsuit
    against Unum, in which he argued that attempting to exhaust his
    administrative remedies would be futile. The district court rejected Moss’s
    futility argument and dismissed the case without prejudice.
    On April 16, 2013, after the district court dismissed his first suit, Moss
    asked Unum to allow him to file an administrative appeal. Unum responded
    that it was unable to review the claim because Moss submitted his appeal
    request far beyond the 180-day deadline.
    Moss filed a second suit against Unum on October 21, 2013. The district
    court ruled that Moss had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by
    failing to file a timely administrative appeal. Because Moss failed to
    demonstrate that he would be able to timely exhaust his administrative
    remedies in the future, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice.
    2
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    No. 15-30341
    Moss now appeals the district court’s order dismissing his second suit
    against Unum.
    II.
    This appeal presents only legal questions, so our standard of review is
    de novo. 1
    III.
    Moss’s disability insurance policies are governed by ERISA. ERISA
    authorizes a civil action by a participant “to recover benefits due to him under
    the terms of his plan.” 2 However, “claimants seeking benefits from an ERISA
    plan must first exhaust available administrative remedies under the plan
    before bringing suit to recover benefits.” 3 This includes, inter alia, filing a
    timely administrative appeal. 4
    Moss did not file a timely administrative appeal. Thus, the district court
    properly dismissed the case.
    IV.
    Moss nonetheless argues that we should excuse his failure to appeal. As
    we explain below, none of Moss’s arguments have merit.
    1 Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 
    39 F.3d 594
    , 601 (5th Cir. 1994).
    2 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
    3 Bourgeois v. Pension Plan for Emps. of Santa Fe Int’l Corps., 
    215 F.3d 475
    , 479 (5th
    Cir. 2000) (citing Denton v. First Int’l Bank of Waco, 
    765 F.2d 1295
    , 1300 (5th Cir. 1985)).
    “This court has recognized an exception to the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust
    administrative remedies when such attempts would be futile.” 
    Id. (citing Hall
    v. Nat’l
    Gypsum Co., 
    105 F.3d 225
    , 232 (5th Cir. 1997)). Moss argued in his first case against Unum
    that exhaustion would be futile, but the district court rejected that argument. Moss does not
    pursue his futility argument in the instant case, nor could he.
    4 See Lacy v. Fulbright & Jaworski, 
    405 F.3d 254
    , 257 (5th Cir. 2005).
    3
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    No. 15-30341
    A.
    Moss first relies on the following statement from Unum’s December 10,
    2009 denial letter: “Unless there are special circumstances, the administrative
    appeal process must be completed before you begin any legal action regarding
    your claim.” Moss claims that Unum’s alleged bad faith in denying his claim
    for disability benefits constitutes a “special circumstance” that excuses him
    from his obligation to file an administrative appeal.
    Because Unum’s denial letter does not define the term “special
    circumstances,” Moss analogizes to the principle that courts should construe
    ambiguous provisions in insurance contracts in the insured’s favor and against
    the drafter. 5 According to Moss, “[c]onstruing this ambiguous term in favor of
    Dr. Moss requires findings [sic] that a ‘special circumstance’ did exist when
    Defendants-Appellees acted in bad faith, and, therefore, Dr. Moss had
    exhausted his administrative remedies.”
    We doubt that a denial letter is analogous to an insurance contract that
    must be construed in Moss’s favor. But even if that were so, Moss’s
    interpretation of “special circumstances” is meritless. As the district court
    correctly reasoned, if a claimant could avoid the exhaustion requirement
    simply by alleging in his complaint that the plan administrator denied his
    claim in bad faith, then no claimant would ever be required to exhaust
    administrative        remedies       before    filing    suit.     Interpreting     “special
    circumstances” as Moss proposes would render the administrative appeal
    requirement completely toothless. An exception to the appeal requirement that
    is potentially available to every claimant is hardly a “special” circumstance.
    5   See Johnston & Johnston v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 
    732 F.3d 555
    , 562 (5th Cir. 2013).
    4
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    Because Moss’s interpretation of “special circumstances” is implausible,
    we hold that Moss was indeed required to file a written administrative appeal
    within 180 days.
    B.
    Moss next argues that even though he did not file a formal written
    appeal, he “effectively exhausted” his administrative remedies by taking
    informal actions that fulfilled “the underlying purpose of the exhaustion
    requirement.” According to Moss, it is sufficient that he telephonically
    informed Unum that he disagreed with its decision and mailed Unum copies of
    his paychecks. Thus, claims Moss, “in substance, Dr. Moss did appeal [Unum]’s
    denial of benefits.”
    This argument is also meritless. “[A]llowing informal attempts to
    substitute for the formal claims procedure would frustrate the primary
    purposes of the exhaustion requirement.” 6 Unum clearly informed Moss that,
    if he “want[ed] to appeal [its] claim decision,” he was required to submit “a
    written appeal.” He nonetheless failed to file one. He has therefore failed to
    exhaust his administrative remedies. 7
    6 
    Bourgeois, 215 F.3d at 480
    n.14.
    7Moss cites two district court cases, Stormont-Vail Regional Medical Center v. Kansas
    Building Trades Open-End Health & Welfare Fund Uninsured Benefit Plan, CIV. A. No. 88-
    4146, 
    1990 WL 11377
    , at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 1990) and Keel v. Group Hospitalization Medical
    Services, Inc., 
    695 F. Supp. 223
    , 227-28 (E.D. Va. 1988), for the proposition that a claimant
    need not file a formal appeal if he takes informal actions that “are the functional equivalent
    of the appeals process.” We do not read Stormont-Vail or Keel to stand for such a broad
    proposition. In any event, we are bound by our published opinion in Bourgeois, which states
    that “allowing informal attempts to substitute for the formal claims procedure would
    frustrate the primary purposes of the exhaustion 
    requirement.” 215 F.3d at 480
    n.14.
    5
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    No. 15-30341
    C.
    Moss’s final argument is based on Louisiana Civil Code art. 3462, which
    provides that “[p]rescription is interrupted when the owner commences action
    against the possessor, or when the obligee commences action against the
    obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue.” Moss argues that, by
    filing his first suit against Unum on December 3, 2009, he tolled the 180-day
    deadline for filing an administrative appeal. He asserts that “[t]he 180-day
    ‘statute of limitations’ began to run again on March 14, 2013, when the District
    Court dismissed Dr. Moss’s lawsuit without prejudice.” Because Moss
    requested an administrative appeal 33 days after the district court dismissed
    his first suit, he claims that he timely filed an appeal and thereby exhausted
    his administrative remedies.
    Moss’s tolling argument is meritless. ERISA requires the claimant to
    exhaust his administrative remedies within the time period specified in the
    plan, which in this case was 180 days after denial. Moss offers no persuasive
    reason why the Louisiana Civil Code would govern this purely federal ERISA
    suit. 8 In any event, at least one other court in this Circuit has rejected an
    identical tolling argument, and we find that court’s reasoning persuasive. 9
    8 Moss cites Swanson v. Hearst Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 
    586 F.3d 1016
    (5th
    Cir. 2009) for the proposition that an ERISA plan’s internal appeal deadlines are to be
    followed “just as any statute of limitations,” but that language does not appear anywhere in
    Swanson. Swanson does not stand for the proposition that state statutes of limitation apply
    in federal ERISA cases.
    9 See Poch v. Unum Grp., Civil Action No. 12-1878, 
    2013 WL 4404183
    , at *2 (W.D. La.
    Aug. 15, 2013) (“This Court therefore finds that its decision to dismiss the first case without
    prejudice did not extend Poch’s deadline to appeal his denial of benefits.”).
    6
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    V.
    Because Moss did not timely file an administrative appeal, the district
    court correctly dismissed his ERISA claim for failure to exhaust administrative
    remedies.
    AFFIRMED.
    7