Arredondo v. Southwestern Bell ( 1997 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-40304
_____________________
SIXTO ARREDONDO and AURORA ARREDONDO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas
(B-91-CV-51)
_______________________________________________________
January 28, 1997
Before REAVLEY, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:*
Sixto Arredondo appeals the district court’s order granting
Southwestern Bell Telephone’s motion for summary judgment.1
Arredondo argues that the district court erred by: (1) not
remanding the action to state court; (2) denying Arredondo leave to
amend his complaint; (3) granting summary judgment on his wrongful
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
1
Arredondo’s wife, Aurora Arredondo, is also an appellant in
this action but, for the sake of convenience, will not be referred
to in this opinion.
termination claim when there existed a genuine fact issue; and (4)
applying the wrong legal standard. We hold that the district court
did not err and affirm.
On March 8, 1987, Sixto Arredondo, an employee of Southwestern
Bell, suffered an injury while riding a bus to a training seminar.
Arredondo received disability benefits under Southwestern Bell’s
Sickness and Accident Disability Benefit Plan, supplemented by
workers’ compensation benefits, until May 20, 1987 when Arredondo
returned to work on light duty status. On August 24, 1988,
Arredondo claimed a relapse of the original injury and ceased
working. Southwestern Bell’s Employee Benefit Committee received
some medical information from Arredondo’s doctor regarding his
injury, but this information indicated that Arredondo was not
totally disabled and could engage in light duties. Southwestern
Bell repeatedly requested a second medical opinion, but the benefit
committee never received sufficient medical substantiation of
Arredondo’s inability to work as required by the company’s benefit
plan.
On June 15, 1989, the Employee Benefit Committee denied
Arredondo disability benefits for the alleged relapse because he
failed to comply with its requests for additional medical
information and because the medical information available indicated
that Arredondo could perform certain duties. Arredondo’s
supervisor advised him to return to work, which Arredondo did, but
the supervisor sent him home because he seemed unable to work.
2
Arredondo was informed that he could still get a second medical
opinion regarding his injury, but he never did. Arredondo was
given a final opportunity to return to work, but his lawyer called
to inform the company that his client was suffering from chest
pains and would not be able to return. After Arredondo failed to
appear for work, Southwestern Bell terminated his employment.
Arredondo was notified of his termination on September 25, 1989,
effective as of February 21, 1989.
Arredondo filed suit is state court alleging that Southwestern
Bell had wrongfully terminated his employment in retaliation for
filing a workers’ compensation claim in violation of Article 8307c
of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act.2 Arredondo also alleged
that Southwestern Bell had “breached the agreement” and wrongfully
discharged him “in violation of the contract.” In addition to
actual and exemplary damages, Arredondo sought reimbursement of
employee benefits which would have accrued, including pension and
retirement benefits. Southwestern Bell removed the action to
federal court based upon federal question jurisdiction, and
diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
On appeal, Arredondo contends that his sole cause of action
arose under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act and, because the
claim was non-removable, the district court erroneously retained
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, a cause of action arising under state
2
Formerly Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307c § 1 (Vernon
1992); now codified at Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 451.001 (Vernon 1993).
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workers’ compensation laws cannot be removed to federal court. 28
U.S.C. § 1445(c). However, Arredondo’s complaint combined
intertwined federal claims with the otherwise non-removable cause
of action, and the cause must either go to state or federal court.
We conclude that the federal district court could determine all
issues contained there. In his original pleading, Arredondo
asserted a claim against Southwestern Bell for violating the terms
of the “agreement.” This portion of Arredondo’s petition clearly
refers to the company’s collective bargaining agreement with the
Communications Workers of America, Arredondo’s Union. Breach of
contract claims with respect to collective bargaining agreements
are automatically preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Parham v. Carrier Corp.,
9 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1993).
Arredondo also sought damages in the form of pension and
retirement benefits for the alleged breach of contract. In order
to calculate the amount of these damages, the court would
necessarily have to refer to Southwestern Bell’s employee benefit
plan. A claim is preempted by § 514(a) of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), if it
relates to an employee benefit plan. A claim relates to an ERISA
plan if it has some connection with or reference to such a plan.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990). Where
a court must refer to an ERISA plan to determine retirement
benefits and calculate damages in accordance therewith, the claim
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relates to an ERISA plan and is preempted. See Christopher v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1218-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 68 (1992); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290,
1294 (5th Cir. 1989).
Arredondo contends that the district court erred by denying
him leave to amend his complaint so as to delete any references to
the collective bargaining agreement or the employee benefit plan.
Whether a party should be allowed to amend his pleadings is a
decision left to the sound discretion of the district court and
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Moody v. FMC Corp., 995 F.2d 63,
65 (5th Cir. 1993). Arredondo did not seek leave to amend his
complaint until three years after the action had been filed. By
that time, discovery had closed, the deadline for dispositive
motions had passed, and summary judgment had been granted. In
light of the excessive delay and the potential prejudice to
Southwestern Bell, we find that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Arredondo leave to amend.
Arredondo argues that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment to Southwestern Bell on his wrongful termination
claim. Arredondo contends that he presented sufficient
circumstantial evidence to raise a genuine fact issue as to whether
Southwestern Bell terminated his employment in retaliation for
filing a workers’ compensation claim. In pursuing an article 8307c
claim, the plaintiff has the burden of “establishing a causal nexus
between his filing of a workers’ compensation claim and his
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discharge by his employer.” Parham, 9 F.3d at 386. Arredondo
failed to present evidence linking his filing of a workers’
compensation claim and his termination.
Arredondo argues that Southwestern Bell’s repeated requests
for medical substantiation constitute “discriminatory and excessive
demands” and are proof of retaliation. Arredondo states that “[i]f
he had not filed the claim, Defendant would not have required the
additional documentation and exhaustive medical opinions.”
Arredondo presents no evidence to support this assertion, and the
undisputed evidence shows that medical substantiation is required
by the terms of the employee benefit plan. Arredondo contends that
the requests were excessive. However, there is no evidence that
these requests were inordinate in light of the benefit plan’s
requirements or the particulars of the situation. Arredondo
asserts that other employees were not subjected to the same demands
for medical information, but he fails to show that other employees
in his position, namely employees suffering an alleged relapse
after fifteen months, were not required to provide similar
documentation. Furthermore, Arredondo presents no support for the
contention that Southwestern Bell only required extensive
documentation from employees who filed workers’ compensation
claims. Finally, Arredondo claims that he complied with
Southwestern Bell’s requests for medical substantiation, yet the
record clearly shows that Southwestern Bell never received adequate
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documentation of a total inability to work as required by the
benefit plan.
Arredondo asserts that he presented sufficient circumstantial
evidence to survive summary judgment. We disagree. Viewing all
evidence in the light most favorable to Arredondo, and making all
reasonable inferences therefrom, there is simply no evidence of a
causal connection between Arredondo’s termination and his filing a
workers’ compensation claim over two years earlier.
Finally, Arredondo contends that the district court applied
the wrong legal standard in granting Southwestern Bells’ motion for
summary judgment. Arredondo argues that the district court
erroneously applied an “arbitrary and capricious” standard to his
sole claim of retaliation. This argument is without merit. The
district court properly applied an “arbitrary and capricious”
standard in upholding Southwestern Bell’s denial of disability
benefits. See Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1305 (5th Cir.
1994)(holding that where a plan administrator is given full and
final authority with respect to claims for employee benefits, final
decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion or “arbitrary
and capricious” standard). This determination, however, had no
relation to Arredondo’s wrongful termination claim.
AFFIRMED.
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