United States v. Shaw ( 2001 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 00-30231
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
CINDY SHAW, A.K.A. CYNDIA SHAW,
AND
WALTER SHAW,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(98-CR-119-1)
_________________________
April 4, 2001
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, Walter Shaw and his wife, Cyndia Shaw,
HIGGINBOTHAM, and SMITH, were convicted of conspiracy to manufacture
Circuit Judges. and possession of methamphetamine. They
appeal the denial of their motion to suppress
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:* evidence discovered in a search of their trailer.
They contend that the warrant was issued im-
properly. Cyndia Shaw also appeals the suf-
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has ficiency of the evidence to support her
determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the
*
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. (...continued)
(continued...) 47.5.4.
conviction of conspiracy. Finding no error, we room 105, a search of which revealed a
affirm. m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e l a b o r a t o r y,
methamphetamine, and chemicals.
I.
C h r is Watson overdosed on Shaw and Crowell informed on each other,
methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin and revealing that the two couples had worked to-
was admitted to Riverview Hospital. In gether to produce methamphetamine. They fi-
investigating the overdose, the sheriff’s de- nanced the operation through shoplifting sup-
partment gathered enough information from plies and cameras that they returned to the
Watson and his friend Stephen Lauret to stores for money.
obtain a search warrant for “a white trailer
located at the end of O.W. Brown Road, on Neither defendant contests that he was in
the left side of the roadway.” Sergeant C.J. possession of methamphetamine, but Cyndia
Matthews and other law enforcement officials contests the sufficiency of the evidence to
searched what they believed was the trailer de- prove her role in the conspiracy. The main
scribed in the warrant but soon realized they question on appeal is whether the evidence
had entered the wrong residence. The found during the search of the trailer should
occupants of that residence pointed out the have been suppressed.
correct trailer to the officers, and Matthews
wrote down the numerical address. II.
We review the factual findings in a
Matthews left Trooper Matt Sinanan on the suppression hearing for clear error and the
scene and returned to the sheriff’s office to legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
find Lauret to identify the Shaws’ residence. Ceniceros, 204 F.3d 581, 584 (5th Cir. 2000).
He obtained from the judge a corrected We review the denial of a motion to suppress
warrant, which specified the numerical address when a search warrant is involved using a two-
of the trailer. The officers then searched the step process. United States v. Cherna, 184
Shaws’ trailer and discovered chemicals and F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
equipment used in the production of 529 U.S. 1065 (2000).
methamphetamine.
First, we determine whether the good-faith
During the search, the Shaws returned exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See
home in their car. The police apprehended United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14
them and searched the car, finding syringes, (1984) (giving “great deference” to a mag-
plastic baggies, coffee filters, lye, and jars istrate’s determination of probable cause). If
filled with a clear liquid. this exception applies, we affirm. If not, we
examine whether the magistrate had a
After being advised of his rights, Walter substantial basis for concluding that probable
Shaw informed the officers that his friends cause existed. Cherna, 184 F.3d at 407
Stanley Crowell and Marian Wright were (internal citations omitted).
making methamphetamine at a motel. Agents
used the motel phone records to determine the In Leon, the Court held that even if a
room number, then obtained a warrant for the warrant is invalidated, the Fourth Amendment
2
does not require suppression of the evidence if returned to the Shaws’ trailer for the search.
the officers reasonably relied on the warrant. Sinanan testified at the suppression hearing
Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). This good- that about twenty minutes elapsed from the
faith exception does not apply when (1) “the time Matthews left the scene with Lauret until
magistrate or judge issuing the warrant was the time he returned with the warrant.2
misled by information in an affidavit that the
affiant knew was false or would have known Shaw challenges this finding, arguing that
was false except for his reckless disregard of Matthews did not have enough time to drop
the truth”; (2) “the issuing magistrate ‘wholly off Lauret and visit the judge.3 Thus, Shaw
abandoned his judicial role’”; or (3) the officer claims, Matthews must have gone to the
“relie[d] on a warrant so lacking in probable judge’s house earlier. If he did, then he falsely
cause as to render belief in its existence swore in the affidavit that the informant had
entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 407-08 (internal identified the residence.
citations omitted). Walter Shaw attacks the
warrant on the first two grounds; Cyndia Shaw The government responds that Matthews
utilizes the third. was traveling at approximately eighty miles per
hour over a five-mile radius in scant traffic.
A. The distance between O.W. Brown Road and
Walter Shaw contends that Matthews the hospital was four to five miles. The
knowingly made a false statement in his af- sheriff’s office was about a mile and a half
fidavit. If material in the affidavit is false, then from the trailer and one to two miles from the
that material should be set aside, and we must judge’s residence.4 From the time Matthews
determine whether the remaining material
passes constitutional muster. See Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); United States 2
Sinanan stated that Matthews brought Lauret
v. Dickey, 102 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 1996).
to the trailer at 12:33 a.m., left, and returned at
Even if the affidavit contains false statements, 12:50 a.m. These times reflect testimony in the
the fruits of the search are admissible if the second evidentiary hearing. In the first hearing,
affidavit, when stripped of its false or Matthews made several mistakes in his testimony
inaccurate statements, supports a finding of about the sequence of events, and the court found
probable cause. United States v. Wake, 948 that he had furnished incorrect information. Before
F.2d 1422, 1429 (5th Cir. 1991). his testimony in the second hearing, Matthews
reviewed the recorded police radio communications
After Matthews executed the first warrant and telephone conversations to construct a timeline.
on the wrong trailer, he returned to the 3
sheriff’s office to draft a second one. The Shaw notes that Matthews promised the judge,
district court found that Matthews returned to in an 11:48 p.m. phone call, that he would arrive in
fifteen to twenty minutes, which places Matthews’s
the hospital to retrieve Lauret, took Lauret to
arrival at somewhat earlier than the timeline
O.W. Brown Road where he identified the allows. The judge testified that Matthews may
correct trailer, dropped Lauret off at the have taken longer than twenty minutes to arrive at
sheriff’s office where another deputy returned his house.
him to the hospital, went to the judge’s
residence for approval of the warrant, then 4
Lt. Webb testified that it took only five
(continued...)
3
left the sheriff’s office until the time he describes the trailer’s location with sufficient
presented the affidavit to the judge, about particularity.
twenty minutes elapsed. Deputy Brad Spill-
man testified that Matthews left Lauret with B.
him at the sheriff’s office, and Spillman Walter Shaw argues that the judge did not
returned Lauret to the hospital. Spillman also act as a detached and neutral officer in signing
stated that he overheard a conversation that the warrant. He bases his contention on the
Lauret identified the trailer. transcript of the conversation between
Matthews and the judge, in which the judge
The district court held a suppression said:
hearing and determined that Matthews’s
version of the facts was correct. When If you want to go . . . based on the new
reviewing a suppression hearing, we “must information [the corrected address], do
give credence to the credibility choices and another [warrant], bring it, I’ll be glad
findings of fact of the district court unless to sign it. I think you have probable
clearly erroneous.” United States v. Raymer, cause and then go out and if he points
876 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1989). A finding out a different one and it’s the same one
is clearly erroneous only if we are left with the in your search warrant, search it.
“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” Anderson v. City of Shaw suggests that the judge instructed
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Matthews to bring the search warrant to his
house before Matthews took Lauret to identify
The district court has made a credibility the residence. Shaw believes that this conduct
determination supported by the evidence. Al- indicated a lack of neutrality and detachment,
though Shaw presents a plausible argument to qualities critical to the constitutionality of a
the contrary, we decline to overturn the warrant. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
findings. 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979). The judge
explained before the district court that he
Because we uphold the finding that advised Matthews to obtain the second
Matthews took Lauret to identify the trailer warrant even though he might have been able
before he presented his affidavit to the judge, to use the first one. He indicated that he
we conclude that Matthews did not knowingly thought Matthews had probable cause, but he
make a false statement. Thus, we need not ad- wanted Matthews to bring a warrant stating
dress Shaw’s further contention that the the additional information. He said he had no
warrant, when stripped of its support in the problems with Matthews’s using the informant
allegedly false affidavit statement, no longer to identify the residence so that the police did
not repeat their earlier mistake.
4
(...continued) In Lo-Ji Sales, the Court found that a town
minutes to go from the hospital to O.W. Brown justice abandoned his neutrality by signing an
Road while observing the speed limit. He also open-ended warrant to search for items not yet
stated that one could make the trip from the listed, then assisted in the execution of the
sheriff’s office to the judge’s residence in a couple warrant, “becom[ing] a member, if not the
of minutes.
4
leader, of the search party which was Amendment violations.”).
essentially a police operation. Once in the
store, he conducted a generalized search under This is such a case. Matthews reasonably
the authority of an invalid warrant; he was not asked the judge whether he needed a second
acting as a judicial officer but as an adjunct warrant and followed the judge’s advice in ob-
law-enforcement officer.” Id. at 325-36. taining it. Assuming again that the affidavit
Here, t he judge did not come close to was true, Matthews had no reason to doubt
participating in the seizure of evidence; his the judge’s neutrality. He acted in sufficient
actions do not rise to that level of involvement good faith to entitle him to rely on the warrant.
with the law enforcement process. Cf. Cher-
na, 184 F.3d at 408. C.
Cyndia Shaw challenges the sufficiency of
Shaw further avers that the judge’s the evidence in the affidavit to show probable
willingness to sign the warrant without reading cause to issue the warrant. “An officer may
the affidavit is a “rubber-stamping” of the rely in good faith upon a warrant so long as
warrant that negates neutrality and the warrant is supported by more than a ‘bare
detachment. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914; bones’ affidavit,” which is “so deficient in
United States v. Breckenridge, 782 F.2d 1317, demonstrating probable cause that it renders
1321 (5th Cir. 1986). In Breckenridge, the the officer’s belief in its existence completely
court found that a judge “rubber-stamped” a unreasonable.” See United States v. Cisneros,
warrant because he did not read the affidavit 112 F.3d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1997).
carefully and did not know the grounds on
which he issued the warrant. Id. Here, by The affidavit attached to the second
contrast, the judge discussed the basis for the warrant requested authorization to search for
warrant with the officer and knew what the methamphetamine and equipment used to pro-
affidavit would say when he suggested that the duce it. The affidavit contained (1) a report
officers had probable cause to search the from the hospital that Watson had overdosed
trailer. As explained above, we adopt the on methamphetamine; (2) the identity of the
district court’s determination that the affidavit informant Lauret; (3) a statement by Lauret
was true. Thus, the judge did not rubber- that he had seen Watson in possession of
stamp the warrant. methamphetamine two days earlier and that
Watson had told him that he had gotten it from
Even if he had done so, the warrant is valid the trailer to be searched; (4) Lauret’s
if the officer may reasonably rely on the admission that he had gone with Watson to
judge’s neutrality. Breckenridge held that Shaw’s trailer to purchase methamphetamine;
where law enforcement officers in good faith and (5) Lauret’s statement that he believed
have done everything reasonably necessary to methamphetamine was manufactured at the
obtain a warrant, suppressing the evidence trailer. The officers reasonably relied on the
would not further the purposes of the exclu- sufficiency of the affidavit in executing the
sionary rule. Id. at 1320 (citing Leon, 468 search warrant. Cf. Cisneros, 112 F.3d at
U.S. at 921 (“Penalizing the officer for the 1279 (upholding the sufficiency of an affidavit
magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot based on the statement of an informant with
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth personal knowledge of a drug operation).
5
Therefore, the Shaws have not equipment used in the manufacturing process
demonstrated that the good-faith exception to in her car and home. Viewed in the light most
the exclusionary rule should not apply. favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence is
Because the law enforcement officials acted in sufficient to find that Cyndia Wright
good faith, we need not reach the question of knowingly and voluntarily participated in the
probable cause. conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
III. AFFIRMED.
Cyndia Shaw contends that the
government’s evidence shows only that she
had a serious drug problem. She submits that
Walter Shaw was primarily responsible for the
manufacturing activity and that the evidence
against her was insufficient to support the
conspiracy verdict.
We review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and it is sufficient if
the trier of fact could have found that the evi-
dence est ablished guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Martinez, 190 F.3d
673, 676 (5th Cir. 1999). To prove
conspiracy, the government must show (1) the
existence of an agreement; (2) knowledge of
and intent to join it; and (3) voluntary
participation in it. Id. “A jury may find
knowledgeable, voluntary participation from
presence when it would be unreasonable for
anyone other than a knowledgeable participant
to be present.” Id.Shaw weighed the chemicals, gassed the
methamphetamine, and wrung used filters.5
She furnished tools and supplies. She urged
Crowell to help her husband manufacture the
drug and let him live in her house to do so.
She raised money to purchase materials and
chemicals through shoplifting and returning
stolen goods. She had ingredients and
5
“Wringing” is a process by which
methamphetamine powder is extracted from the
filters using water and evaporation.
6