United States v. Scott ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-50964
Summary Calendar
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DARRYL WAYNE SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. W-98-CR-22-1
June 9, 1999
Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Darryl Wayne Scott was convicted of one count of conspiracy to
possess crack cocaine with intent to distribute and four counts of
aiding and abetting in distribution of crack cocaine. On appeal,
he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
conspiracy; that the evidence was sufficient to prove he was
entrapped; and that the district court erred in denying his
challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
- 1 -
As for Scott’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his
conspiracy conviction, the evidence was sufficient to permit a
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Bell, 678
F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc), aff’d, 462 U.S. 356 (1983).
Regarding entrapment vel non, we “accept every fact in the
light most favorable to [the] jury’s guilty verdict, and ...
reverse only if no rational jury could have found predisposition
beyond a reasonable doubt”. United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329,
1335 (5th Cir. 1994); see United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117,
126 (5th Cir. 1995)(when entrapment instruction was given,
applicable standard of review is that which applies to sufficiency
of the evidence). Viewing the evidence in that light, a rational
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Scott was
predisposed to commit the offense.
As for the Batson claim, the district court held that the
prosecutor’s reason for striking the only minority juror — that he
had been sleeping during voir dire — was sufficiently race-neutral.
This decision was not clearly erroneous. See United States v.
Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1465-66 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1991).
AFFIRMED
- 2 -