Lindsay v. City of Beeville ( 2008 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 19, 2008
    No. 08-40202                     Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Summary Calendar                           Clerk
    JOHN BASS LINDSAY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF BEEVILLE, ROY HINDS, and ROBERT REAGAN SCOTT,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    No. 2:07-cv-00068
    Before DAVIS, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant John Bass Lindsay appeals the dismissal of his § 1983
    claims against the defendants on summary judgment on the issue of qualified
    immunity. We affirm.
    I.
    In February 2005, Lindsay presented two $100 bills for the purchase of a
    money order at the Pantry North convenience store in Beeville, Texas. The
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 08-40202
    cashier marked the money with a counterfeit detection marker. The color of the
    ink on the bills indicated that the bills were “suspect. The cashier took the
    money to a back office of the store. The manager came out and told Lindsay that
    the money was fake and they were calling the police.
    Officer Hinds arrived, asked Lindsay for identification and did a patdown
    search.   On request by Hinds, Lindsay indicated that his home was in
    Jacksonville, Florida. His driver’s license has a Kansas address. Hinds seized
    the two $100 bills.   Officer Scott arrived on the scene and took over the
    investigation. He took the bills to State Bank and Trust for evaluation. There
    is a factual dispute as to whether the money was retested with another
    counterfeit detection pen. The bank could not tell whether or not the bills were
    counterfeit.
    Scott called his supervisor, Lieutenant Joe Trevino, and explained what
    had happened. Trevino contacted Hinds and told him to arrest Lindsay for
    forgery for attempting to pass counterfeit bills. Hinds located Lindsay and made
    the arrest. In addition to the two $100 bills previously seized, the cash in
    Lindsay’s pockets was logged as evidence.
    The cash seized from Lindsay was later sent to the Secret Service. In
    February 2006, Scott received notice from the Secret Service that the bills were
    genuine. Charges against Lindsay were dropped and Scott made arrangements
    with Lindsay’s attorney to have the money returned to him.
    Lindsay filed this suit against the City of Beeville, the Beeville Police
    Department, Officer Hinds and Detective Scott, individually and in their official
    capacities, and State Bank and Trust.         The suit alleged an objectively
    unreasonable arrest and search and the objectively unreasonable seizure of his
    property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Lindsay also brought a
    negligence claim against State Bank and Trust. State Bank and the Beeville
    Police Department were dismissed with Lindsay’s consent.
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    No. 08-40202
    The defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking inter alia
    qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims.             The district court
    granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed Lindsay’s Fourth Amendment
    claims. Lindsay appeals.
    II.
    Lindsay argues that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
    because his arrest was without probable cause and the officers made multiple
    misrepresentations to support his arrest. Lindsay makes similar arguments to
    argue against qualified immunity on the claims related to the seizure of his
    property.
    The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from liability
    for civil damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
    or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.”
    Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818 (1982). “[E]ven if a defendant’s conduct
    actually violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the defendant is entitled to
    qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable.” Pfannstiel v. City
    of Marion, 
    918 F.2d 1178
    , 1183 (5th Cir. 1990). “Qualified immunity ‘gives ample
    room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or
    those who knowingly violate the law.’” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 500 F3d.
    401, 409 (5th Cir. 2007), citing Malley v. Briggs, 
    475 U.S. 335
    , 343 (1986).
    The arrest and search of Lindsay and seizure of his property without a
    warrant must be based on probable cause to avoid a constitutional violation.
    United States v. Castro, 
    166 F.3d 728
    , 733 (5th Cir. 1999). “Probable cause exists
    when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s
    knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to
    conclude that the suspect had committed, or was in the process of committing,
    an offense.” 
    Id. 3 No.
    08-40202
    We agree with the district court that probable cause existed in this case.
    The bills Lindsay attempted to pass were tested by an employee of the Pantry
    North convenience store and deemed “suspect.” None of the bank employees
    were able to authenticate the bills. Probable cause does not require proof, but
    rather only a probability of criminal activity. United States v. Daniels, 
    982 F.2d 146
    , 151 (5th Cir. 1993). The results of the test with the counterfeit detection pen
    established the probability that Lindsay was committing a crime. Lindsay and
    his vehicle were searched after his arrest and are justified as searches “incident
    to arrest.” United States v. Johnson, 
    846 F.2d 279
    , 281 (5th Cir. 1988).
    Lindsay also claims that the seizure and retention of his money for over
    a year constituted an unlawful seizure. As the initial seizure was supported by
    probable cause, it was lawful. The continued seizure of the funds was supported
    by probable cause and Officer Scott’s actions in withholding the money were not
    unreasonable under the circumstances. See Wren v. Towe, 
    130 F.3d 1154
    , 1159-
    60 (5th Cir. 1997)(withholding property for several months after owner’s
    legitimate claim to it had been established did not expose officers to liability);
    and Bigford v. Taylor, 
    896 F.2d 972
    , 975 (5th Cir. 1990) and 
    834 F.2d 1213
    (5th
    Cir. 1988)(officer entitled to qualified immunity despite continued seizure of
    vehicle that lasted over three years without probable cause for the initial
    seizure).
    Because Lindsay cannot establish the violation of his constitutional rights
    related to his arrest, search and seizure, the district court properly granted
    summary judgment to Officers Hinds and Scott on the issue of qualified
    immunity.
    III.
    Lindsay’s claims against the City of Beeville also fail. To establish a claim
    under § 1983 against a municipality, the plaintiff must, among other things,
    establish a constitutional violation. Meadowbriar Home for Children v. Gunn,
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    No. 08-40202
    
    81 F.3d 521
    , 533 (5th Cir. Tex. 1996).      As Lindsay has not established a
    constitutional violation, the district court properly granted summary judgment
    to the city on the issue of qualified immunity.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
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