United States v. Mark Martinez ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 09-50026      Document: 00512498495         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/13/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-50026
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 13, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                       Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    MARK MARTINEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC 3:08-CR-1319-ALL
    Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Mark Martinez was convicted in 1991 in a Texas court of aggravated
    sexual assault of a child; he was required by Texas law to register as a sex
    offender for life and verify his registration annually. In 2008, Martinez was
    charged with violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 2250
     by knowingly failing to register as a
    sex offender after traveling in interstate commerce, a violation of the Sex
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 09-50026      Document: 00512498495     Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/13/2014
    No. 09-50026
    Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). Following a bench
    trial, the district court found Martinez guilty as charged. Martinez appealed.
    The Government filed a motion for summary affirmance, asserting that
    the issues raised by Martinez on appeal have been fully resolved by a recent
    Supreme Court decision and by recent decisions by this court. See United
    States v. Kebodeaux, 
    133 S. Ct. 2496
     (2013); United States v. Heth, 
    596 F.3d 255
     (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Whaley, 
    577 F.3d 254
     (5th Cir. 2009).
    Summary affirmance is proper when “the position of one of the parties is
    clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as
    to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 
    406 F.2d 1158
    ,
    1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
    Martinez’s first contention on appeal is that Congress lacked authority
    under the commerce clause to enact SORNA. We have already determined
    that it was within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to forbid sex
    offenders from using the channels of interstate commerce to evade registration
    requirements. Whaley, 
    577 F.3d at 258
    .
    Martinez also makes two due process arguments on appeal. First, he
    points out that no Texas statute implements SORNA. He argues, then, that
    he had no duty to register, it would be impossible to do so, and he could have
    no liability for failing to do so. We have already rejected a similar argument
    by holding that “nothing in SORNA’s statutory scheme indicates that an
    individual’s   registration   obligations   are   contingent    upon    a   state’s
    implementation of SORNA’s administrative requirements.” Heth, 
    596 F.3d at 259
    . Heth’s due process challenge was without merit, 
    id.,
     and so is Martinez’s.
    Martinez argues a separate due process violation based on his failure to
    receive any notice of SORNA or its registration requirements. This court has
    rejected the argument that ignorance of SORNA’s requirements serves as a
    defense to prosecution: “notice of a duty to register under state law is sufficient
    2
    Case: 09-50026    Document: 00512498495     Page: 3   Date Filed: 01/13/2014
    No. 09-50026
    to satisfy the Due Process Clause.” Whaley, 
    577 F.3d at 262
    . Martinez was
    aware that he was required to register under Texas law, signed documents to
    that effect, and in fact did register in Texas. Martinez’s due process claims
    have been addressed and rejected by this court. See Heth, 
    596 F.3d at 259
    ;
    Whaley, 
    577 F.3d at 262
    .
    Finally, Martinez argues that actual knowledge of SORNA is a
    requirement for conviction under Section 2250 for “knowingly failing to
    register . . . .” To the contrary, “SORNA’s criminal provision is not a specific
    intent law . . . . There is no language requiring specific intent or a willful
    failure to register such that he must know his failure to register violated
    federal law.” Whaley, 
    577 F.3d at
    262 n.6 (quoting United States v. Gould, 
    568 F.3d 459
    , 468 (4th Cir. 2009)). A conviction under Section 2250 does not
    require notice of SORNA but only “notice of a duty to register under state law.”
    Whaley, 
    577 F.3d at 262
    .
    Because there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the
    case, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED and the
    judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Government’s
    alternative motion for an extension of time to file a responsive brief on the
    merits is DENIED as moot.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-50026

Judges: Davis, Southwick, Higginson

Filed Date: 1/13/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024