United States v. Akomolafe ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-10485
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ABAYOMI CHARLES AKOMOLAFE,
also known as Carlos Lnu,
also known as Carlos,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:98-CR-208-1-Y
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December 2, 1999
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Akomolafe appeals following his guilty-plea conviction of one
count of Conspiracy to Engage in Financial Transactions Involving
Criminally Derived Property in Excess of $10,000, a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h). He raises two related arguments on appeal. His
first argument is that the “jurisdictional element” of § 1956(h)
was not met and that the district court thus did not have subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear his case.
Whether the “interstate commerce” requirement found in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-10485
-2-
§§ 1956 and 1957 is a jurisdictional requirement or an element of
a conspiracy under § 1956(h) has not been determined in this
circuit. There is no need, however, to decide that issue now. If
it is assumed without deciding that the “interstate commerce”
requirement is jurisdictional in nature, that requirement is met in
this case. Akomolafe “affected interstate commerce” by stealing
mail during the course of the conspiracy, as the United States Post
Office is a facility of interstate commerce. See United States v.
Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, any
“jurisdictional nexus” requirement of § 1956(h) is met.
Akomolafe also argues that this “jurisdictional nexus” can be
met only by a completed financial transaction, which is absent from
his case. This argument is misplaced. In interpreting a statute,
the court must look to the whole act, and interpret provisions
consistently with each other and in reference to the statute as a
whole. 2A, Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, §
46.05 (5th ed. 1992). Because §§ 1956(a)(1),(h) and 1957(a)
provide for the inchoate crimes of conspiracy and attempt, it is
inconsistent to interpret the “jurisdictional nexus” as being
satisfied by a completed transaction only. Thus, the more
consistent interpretation is that the nexus can be provided by an
effect on interstate commerce that came about as a result of the
conspiracy to perform the illegal transaction. As noted above,
this nexus is provided by Akomolafe’s mail theft, which was
committed during the course of the conspiracy and which affected
interstate commerce.
Akomolafe’s second argument is that there was an insufficient
No. 99-10485
-3-
factual basis for the district court to accept his plea. Akomolafe
does not, however, argue that those facts were false or otherwise
incorrect. Rather, he contends that the factual basis was
incomplete because there was no completed transaction.
This argument is unavailing. The district court’s acceptance
of a guilty plea is a factual finding reviewable under the clearly
erroneous standard. Id. at 509. The elements of a conspiracy
under § 1956(h) are: 1) a conspiracy entered into by two or more
persons and 2) that the defendant knew of and deliberately joined
the conspiracy. United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 163-
164 (5th Cir. 1998). Whether there must be an overt act in
furtherance of a § 1956(h) conspiracy has not been decided in this
circuit. Id. at 164.
There is no need to reach that issue now. Again, if it is
assumed without deciding that § 1156(h) requires an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, Akomolafe’s theft of checks from
the mail constitutes a such an act. The factual resume establishes
that all three elements of the conspiracy were met. The district
court did not clearly err in accepting the plea. Because Akomolafe
has failed to demonstrate either the district court’s lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction or an insufficient factual basis for
the acceptance of his plea, this case is
AFFIRMED.