United States v. Benedicto Lazaro-Lopez ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 18-50230      Document: 00514925622         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/22/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 18-50230
    c/w 18-50251
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 22, 2019
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                       Clerk
    Plaintiff–Appellee
    v.
    BENEDICTO LAZARO-LOPEZ,
    Defendant–Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:14-CR-485-1
    USDC No. 2:17-CR-745-1
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Defendant-Appellant Benedicto Lazaro-Lopez contends that the district
    court erred in failing to give him an opportunity to allocute before it rendered
    a 48-month sentence. So Lazaro-Lopez now appeals his consecutive sentences
    for (1) illegal reentry and (2) violation of terms of supervised release arising
    from a prior illegal reentry conviction. The Government concedes that the
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-50230      Document: 00514925622     Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/22/2019
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    c/w 18-50251
    district court erred by not providing Lazaro-Lopez an opportunity to allocute.
    The parties, however, dispute whether on plain error review we should exercise
    our discretion to correct this error by remanding this case for resentencing.
    After reviewing the record and relevant law, we vacate the sentence and
    remand this case for resentencing.
    I.
    On June 15, 2017, Lazaro-Lopez—who was then on supervised release
    arising from a 2014 illegal reentry conviction—was indicted for a separate
    crime of illegal reentry into the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
    He later pled guilty.
    On March 14, 2018, Lazaro-Lopez appeared before the district court for
    sentencing. Lazaro-Lopez was represented by counsel from the Federal Public
    Defender’s Office, who indicated that Lazaro-Lopez was pleading true to the
    revocation allegations. The court then revoked his supervised release. Defense
    counsel agreed that the sentencing guidelines range for the new illegal reentry
    conviction was 24 to 30 months of imprisonment and that the guidelines range
    for the revocation and violation of terms of supervised release was 18 to 24
    months of imprisonment.
    The court then asked defense counsel, “Do you have anything you’d like
    to say prior to sentencing, or would [the defendant] like to make a statement?”
    The following exchange occurred:
    DEFENSE COUNSEL:         Your Honor, Mr. Lazaro-Lopez came
    back to the United States because his work has
    been here. In his country, in the area in which he
    lives, he has suffered by being accosted by the
    police. He’s been handcuffed, he’s been harassed,
    making [] finding work a lot more difficult. His
    brother was murdered in June of 2017. And
    there’s been issues regarding some property that
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    he owned. Mr. Lazaro needs to go home as soon
    as possible to address those issues. He’s the eldest
    of the family. He is unmarried and does not
    support any minor children.
    He indicates that he needs to go home, of
    course, to deal with his brother’s property but,
    also, that his mom needs him. He’s the one that
    provides for her care and support and especially
    now that she’s grieving over the loss of her son.
    He’d like to go home, collect his mother, and move
    to a place which is safer, and he would like to do
    that as quickly as possible.
    So he’s asking for a sentence as lenient as
    possible and to run the sentences [con]currently.
    THE COURT:      Counsel for the government.
    THE GOVERNMENT:         Your Honor, the defendant standing
    before you has 46 aliases, eight alternative IDs.
    He was a quick return. He was deported on April
    14th. He was back June 15th of that year, around
    two-month interim. And then, he has, by my
    count, eight uncounted criminal convictions: One
    for breaking and entering, one for attempted
    larceny, 1998, the sale of cocaine and then, for
    criminal trespass.
    And then, going into his immigration history,
    this will be his fifth conviction for illegal reentry,
    your Honor. He got 42 months last time he was
    sentenced. That was insufficient to deter him
    from coming back to the United States.
    So the government would request a guideline
    range sentence to run consecutive to his
    revocation sentence.
    Immediately after hearing from counsel, the district court imposed a
    sentence of 30 months for the new illegal reentry and 18 months for violation
    of terms of supervised release, to run consecutively, for a total of 48 months.
    3
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    The court stated: “[M]y reasons [for the sentence] are as stated by the
    government as to [Defendant’s] prior history.”
    Lazaro-Lopez did not make any statement at the hearing.                       He now
    appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court committed reversible plain
    error by depriving him of the right to allocute.
    II.
    We apply plain error review because Lazaro-Lopez failed to raise any
    objection at his sentencing hearing. 1 Plain error doctrine provides:
    An appellate court may not correct an error the
    defendant failed to raise in the district court unless
    there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
    substantial rights. If all three conditions are met an
    appellate court may then exercise its discretion to
    notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error
    seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings. 2
    III.
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) provides: “Before
    imposing sentence, the court must . . . address the defendant personally in
    order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate
    the sentence[.]” 3 The Government concedes that the district court erred by
    1  United States v. Reyna, 
    358 F.3d 344
    , 353 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
    2  United States v. Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
    , 520 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and
    citations omitted); see also Olano v. United States, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993).
    3 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). We have held that a sentencing court “‘should leave
    no room for doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak prior to
    sentencing.’” United States v. Avila-Cortez, 
    582 F.3d 602
    , 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Green
    v. United States, 
    365 U.S. 301
    , 305 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality)). That is, we provide a
    defendant with an opportunity to “ask for mercy, explain his or her conduct, apologize for the
    crime, or say anything else in an effort to lessen the impending sentence.” BLACK’S LAW
    DICTIONARY 88 (9th ed. 2009). “[I]t is not enough” that the court “affords counsel the right
    to speak.” United States v. Echegollen-Barrueta, 
    195 F.3d 786
    , 789 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation
    4
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    failing to directly invite Lazaro-Lopez to allocute and that such error was plain
    and affected his substantial rights. 4            In such case, where the first three
    elements of plain error review are satisfied, we “will ordinarily remand for
    resentencing.” 5 “In a limited class of cases,” however, we recognize that the
    failure to provide allocution rights will not affect “the fairness, integrity or
    public reputation of judicial proceedings,” thereby obviating the need for
    reversal. 6 “Whether a case falls within this limited class is a ‘highly fact-
    specific inquiry.’” 7
    After “conduct[ing] a thorough review of the record,” 8 we hold that
    remand is appropriate because Lazaro-Lopez’s case does not fall within the
    limited class of cases where we have recognized that resentencing would
    clearly be a fruitless exercise. In United States v. Reyna, for example, it was
    Reyna’s “third appearance before this district judge, his second for violations
    of the terms of his supervised release.” 9 When the district judge sentenced
    Reyna for his first violation of the supervised-release terms, the judge gave
    Reyna an option: six months in prison or twelve additional months of
    omitted). The court must instead unambiguously address the defendant and offer him the
    opportunity to allocute. 
    Green, 365 U.S. at 305
    .
    4 Though the district court announced his sentence immediately after the
    Government’s response, the court did previously ask defense counsel whether Lazaro-Lopez
    “would [] like to make a statement.” We make no determination whether this statement
    satisfies a defendant’s right to allocute because the Government concedes that “[t]his
    invitation fell short of the required direct, personal inquiry to the defendant, as to whether
    he wanted to make a statement.”
    5 
    Reyna, 358 F.3d at 353
    .
    6 United States v. Gonzalez-Reyes, 582 F. App’x 302, 304 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing 
    Reyna, 358 F.3d at 353
    ). While our unpublished opinions are not controlling precedent, they may be
    persuasive authority. See Ballard v. Burton, 
    444 F.3d 391
    , 401 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation
    omitted).
    7 Gonzalez-Reyes, 582 F. App’x at 304 (citation omitted).
    8 
    Reyna, 358 F.3d at 353
    .
    9 
    Id. at 352.
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    supervised release. 10 The latter option came with an important condition: If
    Reyna violated his supervised-release terms again, he would automatically get
    twelve months in prison. 11         At this prior hearing, Reyna was given an
    opportunity to allocute, and he chose the twelve-month supervised-release
    option, accepting the warning against further violations of the supervised-
    release terms.     Nevertheless, Reyna violated the terms of his supervised
    release by testing positive for drugs. 12 The judge therefore imposed the twelve-
    month sentence without giving Reyna another opportunity to allocute. 13 It was
    on these “particular facts”—“unusual facts,” we emphasized—that we held that
    the denial of allocution rights did not affect “the fairness, integrity or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings,” as required by plain-error review. 14
    Also, in United States v. Chavez-Perez, we concluded that the defendant
    failed to meet the fourth plain-error review requirement because he did not
    provide significant new mitigating information that would have moved the
    court to grant a lower sentence. 15 The defendant in that case argued on appeal
    that, given the opportunity, he would have elaborated on three topics, all of
    which his attorney had already explained to the sentencing court. 16 Because
    the defendant “offer[ed] no specific facts or additional details that he would
    include in his elaboration of these topics,” he failed to meet the fourth
    requirement of plain-error review. 17
    10 
    Id. at 352–53
    & n.7.
    11 
    Id. at 353.
          12 
    Id. 13 Id.
          14 
    Id. 15 United
    States v. Chavez-Perez, 
    844 F.3d 540
    , 545 (5th Cir. 2016).
    16 
    Id. 17 Id.
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    Here, Lazaro-Lopez argues that, if permitted to speak, he would have
    elaborated on the statements his counsel made and would have apologized.
    The district court explained that its reasons for Lazaro-Lopez’s 48-month
    sentence “are as stated by the government as to [Defendant’s] prior [criminal]
    history.” In this regard, Lazaro-Lopez says on appeal that despite his past
    criminal offenses, 18 he would have explained that “his offenses since 2001 were
    primarily illegal reentry offenses” and that those offenses reflected “his need
    for work so that he can help support his mother, and brother Julio, who has
    Down[] syndrome.” Though the Government points out that this information
    was in the presentence report, the Government does not indicate that the
    district court had before it the complete story that Lazaro-Lopez wanted to tell.
    It is unclear whether the presentence report “present[ed] to the court the same
    quantity or quality of mitigating evidence that [the defendant] would have
    given had he been able to allocute.” 19 Lazaro-Lopez’s proffered statements
    could have weaved these facts together in a manner both logically convincing
    and personally sincere, which may have potentially led to a lower sentence.
    The Government also argues that Lazaro-Lopez previously had an
    opportunity to allocute in the district court during his sentencing hearing in
    2014, which arose from a separate illegal reentry conviction.                     But that
    allocution was before a different district judge than the one who sentenced him
    in this case. So his statements made in 2014 are irrelevant for purposes of his
    current allocution and sentencing—because this was his first time before the
    sentencing judge.       Furthermore, Lazaro-Lopez claims that he would have
    apologized for his illegal-reentry offense. Such personal apology is important
    18 Lazaro-Lopez’s presentence investigation report reveals criminal convictions dating
    back to 1993, including, inter alia, multiple misdemeanor larceny and theft, felony possession
    and sale of cocaine, and more relevant here, five convictions for illegal reentry.
    19 
    Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 606
    .
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    in a sentencing hearing because “the most persuasive counsel may not be able
    to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak
    for himself.” 20     Accordingly, we exercise our discretion and remand for
    resentencing. 21
    *      *       *
    Based on the above reasons, we VACATE the sentence and REMAND
    this case for resentencing.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    
    20Green, 365 U.S. at 304
    .
    21See 
    Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 606
    –07; see also Gonzalez-Reyes, 582 F. App’x at 304
    (reversing under fourth plain-error prong in part due to no prior allocution); United States v.
    Perez, 460 F. App’x 294, 300–01 (5th Cir. 2012) (same).
    8