United States v. King ( 2000 )


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  •                   IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-50357
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    GARY LYNN KING,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. W-97-CR-53-1
    _____________________________________________
    September 22, 2000
    Before POLITZ, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Gary Lynn King appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute
    methamphetamine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). The conviction was based on
    a conditional guilty plea. King asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
    published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    to suppress and by enhancing his sentence two-levels for possession of a firearm.
    Finding no error, we affirm.
    King contends that police lacked probable cause and a valid consent to search
    his pickup truck where the subject drugs were found. Considering the totality of the
    circumstances, including the officers' observations, knowledge, and training, we
    conclude that the information provided by the confidential informant gave the officers
    probable cause to believe that methamphetamine was located in King’s pickup truck.1
    This conclusion obviates the necessity of addressing whether King gave valid consent
    to the search of the vehicle.2 Nor do we need address whether the police had probable
    cause for King's arrest3.
    King also contends that his written consent for the search of his home was
    involuntary.      Based on the six factors which we have found relevant to the
    voluntariness issue, we conclude that King's consent was voluntary.4 Although King
    was in custody at the time he gave written consent for the search of his home, he had
    received Miranda warnings prior thereto, and the record is devoid of evidence that the
    officers used threats or coercion to induce the consent. King contends that he was
    1
    Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
     (1983); United States v. McSween, 
    53 F.3d 684
     (5th Cir.
    1995).
    2
    United States v. Sutton, 
    850 F.2d 1083
    , 1085 (5th Cir. 1988)("Consent and probable
    cause are alternative grounds justifying warrantless vehicle searches.").
    3
    Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
     (5th Cir. 1993)(issues must be properly briefed to be
    preserved for appeal).
    4
    United States v. Jenkins, 
    46 F.3d 447
     (5th Cir. 1995).
    2
    never informed of his right to refuse consent, but a showing of voluntariness does not
    require proof of knowledge of the right to refuse.5
    Finally, King maintains that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence two
    levels for possession of a firearm, asserting that there was no evidence that he actively
    employed a firearm as required by Bailey v. United States.6 This argument is not
    persuasive; Bailey did not involve enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. We
    have not required the active use of a firearm for enhancement of a sentence.7 A review
    of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing demonstrates that the district court
    did not err in assessing King with possession of a firearm during related relevant
    conduct.8
    The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
    5
    Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
     (1973).
    6
    
    516 U.S. 137
     (1995).
    7
    United States v. Marmolejo, 
    106 F.3d 1213
     (5th Cir. 1997).
    8
    United States v. Vaquero, 
    997 F.2d 78
     (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Eastland, 
    989 F.2d 760
     (5th Cir. 1993).
    3