U.S. v. Shannon ( 1993 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 92-7294
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TERRY LEE SHANNON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
_______________________________________________________
(January 12, 1993)
Before WILLIAMS, HIGGINBOTHAM and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
Terry Lee Shannon appeals his conviction for firearm
possession. Shannon pleaded insanity at his trial, and the
district court instructed the jury on the insanity defense. The
court, however, refused to instruct the jury about the mandatory
commitment procedures that accompany a jury verdict of "not
guilty only by reason of insanity" ("NGI"). Shannon contends
that the court's refusal to reveal the required disposition of a
defendant acquitted because of his insanity was error in light of
the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247("IDRA" or "Act"). We affirm the district court's decision. We
agree that district courts possess no discretion to offer such
instructions.
I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The principal facts are uncontroverted and largely stipulated.
At about 4:00 a.m. on the morning of August 25, 1990, Sergeant
Marvin Brown of the Tupelo Police Department was on roving patrol
and stopped Shannon as he walked down a Tupelo street. The officer
told Shannon that a detective wanted to speak with him and asked
Shannon to accompany him back to the station. Shannon then told
Sergeant Brown that he did not want to live anymore, whereupon he
walked across the street, pulled a pistol from his coat or shirt,
and shot himself in the chest. The wound was not fatal.
Shannon had acquired the gun the day before from his son, with
whom Shannon had ridden to the Tupelo Airport where the son was
catching a return flight to New York. When Shannon learned his son
was planning to board the plane with the pistol, he retrieved it
because he knew it was unlawful to go through airport security with
a firearm. Shannon also knew as a prior convicted felon that he
could not lawfully possess a firearm himself, and he later stated
that he had planned to carry the gun to his mother's house until he
could deliver it to his parole officer.
In the early morning hours of August 25, Shannon had left his
girlfriend's house and began walking to his mother's house,
2
purportedly to leave the gun with her. Before he reached the
house, he had been stopped and questioned by Sergeant Brown, and
this led to Shannon shooting himself. He was indicted for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Before trial, the defense moved to have Shannon declared
mentally incompetent to stand trial.1 The court scheduled a
competency hearing, heard expert testimony regarding Shannon's
ability to participate in his trial, and concluded that he was able
"to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him and to assist properly in his defense." The case
proceeded to trial on the defense of insanity. Shannon concedes
that the Government presented evidence at trial that, if believed
by the jury, was sufficient to prove the essential elements of the
crime charged. The jury's role then became the consideration of
Shannon's insanity defense.
Shannon concedes he "unquestionably knew as an abstract
proposition that it was unlawful for him to possess a firearm." He
urges, however, that the question remains whether he appreciated
the wrongfulness of his acts under the circumstances prevailing at
1
18 U.S.C. § 4241, Determination of mental competency to
stand trial, establishes the procedure for evaluating whether a
defendant is "suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against
him or to assist properly in his defense."
3
the time of the offense. Dr. Richard G. Ellis, a psychologist with
the Bureau of Prisons, and Dr. Michael D. Roberts, a local clinical
psychologist, testified at Shannon's trial regarding his mental
condition at that time. The precise nature of their diagnoses
differed, but they both agreed that Shannon suffered from mental
illness at the time of trial and possibly at the time of the
shooting. Despite their acknowledgment of Shannon's chronic mental
problems, however, the experts agreed that Shannon's mental illness
was not so severe as to render him legally insane at the time of
the offense and thus unable to appreciate the nature, quality, and
wrongfulness of his actions.
The court properly instructed the jury on the insanity
defense.2 It refused Shannon's request to inform the jury that an
NGI verdict would result in Shannon's involuntary commitment in
accordance with § 4243(e) of the IDRA.3 The jury rejected
2
The district court defined "insanity" as follows: "The
defendant was insane as the law defines that term only if, as a
result of a severe mental disease or defect, the defendant was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness
of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise
constitute a defense." This definition comports with the
statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 17.
3
Section 4243(e) ensures that a federal criminal defendant
found not guilty by reason of insanity will not be released onto
the streets. It provides that "the Attorney General shall
hospitalize the person for treatment in a suitable facility"
until a State assumes responsibility for the defendant's care and
treatment or until it can be certified that his release will not
pose a substantial danger to others or to property.
Shannon's counsel attempted to make this mandatory
confinement known to the jurors. During a jury instruction
conference, counsel suggested two alternative instructions: (1)
"In the event it is your verdict that the defendant is not guilty
4
Shannon's insanity defense and returned a guilty verdict. Because
Shannon already had three previous convictions, the district court
sentenced him to serve fifteen years without the possibility of
probation or parole pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Shannon's
appeal is timely.
II. DISCUSSION
This case presents a single issue: did the district court err
in refusing to instruct the jury that Shannon would be committed
until he was no longer dangerous if the jury found him "not guilty
only by reason of insanity"? The issue arises because it is urged
that the established law was changed by the IDRA of 1984.
A. The Law Before the 1984 Act
The well-established general principle is that a jury has no
concern with the consequences of its verdict. As the Supreme Court
stated succinctly in Rogers v. United States, "the jury [has] no
sentencing function and should reach its verdict without regard to
what sentence might be imposed." 422 U.S. 35, 40, 95 S.Ct. 2091,
2095, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). This Circuit has long recognized that
punishment and sentencing are matters entrusted exclusively to the
trial judge. We have held specifically that juries should not
only by reason of insanity, it is required that the Court commit
the defendant," or (2) "[Y]ou should know that it is required
that the Court commit defendant to a suitable hospital facility
until such time as the defendant does not pose a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another or serious danger to the property of
another." The trial judge rejected both versions.
5
ordinarily be informed about the consequences of an NGI verdict.
See United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 423 (5th Cir.
1974)("Except where a special provision mandates a jury role in
assessment or determination of penalty, the punishment provided by
law for offenses charged is a matter exclusively for the court and
should not be considered by the jury in arriving at a verdict as to
guilt or innocence.").
McCracken, a pre-IDRA case, posed an issue similar to the one
we face today. We reversed the defendant's murder conviction
because the trial court instructed the jury that if it returned an
NGI verdict, the defendant would be freed. The jury charge
embodied a then-accurate statement of the law; no federal statutory
scheme yet provided for the disposition of defendants acquitted due
to insanity. We recognized, however, that the court's instruction
possibly served to coerce or induce a guilty verdict since jurors
at that time were assumed to be fearful of those with mental
illness and might convict insane defendants based upon a perceived
need to protect society rather than face the risks resulting from
their immediate release onto the streets. We lamented that the
absence of federal commitment procedures led to heavy reliance upon
state authorities to institute commitment proceedings against those
acquitted by reason of insanity. We labelled such dependence one
of the "the harsh effects of the federal statutory silence."
6
In the McCracken opinion, we noted the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 728
(D.C. Cir. 1957)(en banc), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961, 78 S.Ct.
997, 2 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1958). In Lyles, a divided court held that a
jury should be informed that such an NGI verdict would result in
defendant's involuntary commitment. But a key feature
distinguished Lyles. The case arose under the D.C. Code, which
Congress had amended to provide for mandatory commitment of a
defendant who asserted a successful insanity defense.4 Despite our
apparent appreciation for such a statute, we noted that the absence
of comparable federal legislation made the D.C. Circuit's approach
inapposite for other circuits. McCracken, 488 F.2d at 422. We
therefore concluded in McCracken that, absent an explicit statutory
directive mandating an enhanced jury role, it was inappropriate for
jurors to consider possible post-trial punishments. Id. at 423.
McCracken was a natural descendant of our earlier decision in
Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 941, 85 S.Ct. 1776, 14 L.Ed.2d 704 (1965). In Pope, we
affirmed the trial court's refusal to inform the jury about what
would occur if they found Pope "not guilty only by reason of
insanity." There too, we expressly rejected the Lyles approach,
holding that "[d]ifferent rules and different statutes apply to the
Courts of the District of Columbia." Id. at 509. Emphasizing our
4
The Code provision did not by its own terms mandate the
giving of such an instruction. See Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728-29.
7
long-standing focus on the unique duties of judges and juries, we
said:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, it is the duty of
the court to impose sentence, or make such other
disposition of the case as required by law, after the
facts have been decided by the jury. To inform the jury
that the court may impose minimum or maximum sentence,
will or will not grant probation, when a defendant will
be eligible for a parole, or other matters relating to
disposition of the defendant, tend to draw the attention
of the jury away from their chief function as sole judges
of the facts, open the door to compromise verdicts and to
confuse the issue or issues to be decided. In a case of
this nature what they were to decide was whether the
defendant was guilty or not.
Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
B. The IDRA's Impact
Shannon argues strongly that the trial court's ruling left the
jury with no guidance as to the actual implications of its verdict.
As a result, the confused jury fell captive to the misconception
that only two real options existed -- guilty (go to jail) or not
guilty/NGI (go free). Because they feared that a dangerous,
mentally-ill person would be released if they returned an NGI
verdict, they were induced to reject his insanity defense, however
meritorious it may have been.5 Appealing to the McCracken court's
concern that uninformed and frightened juries might convict while
5
Shannon has not shown that in deliberating, the jury in
this case actually entertained these misconceptions, failed to
follow the judge's instructions, or considered extraneous factors
that colored its verdict.
8
still questioning a defendant's sanity, Shannon urges us to apply
"common sense and justice".6
Shannon asserts that Congress's passage of the IDRA
constitutes a statutory change that mandates, or at least
authorizes, the instruction he seeks. Because the justification
for a different rule in different parts of the federal system has
now been removed, Shannon argues, the practice announced in Lyles
must now be applied nationwide. We must disagree that the IDRA
alters the calculus. The statute enacted a comprehensive scheme
for dealing with insanity in federal criminal cases. Yet it has no
provision expanding the jury's role. It has no wording that even
touches upon this role. It leaves the jury solely with its
customary determination of guilt or innocence.
For support, Shannon cites the Eighth Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir.), vacated, reh'g
en banc granted, 877 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 886
6
The instruction Shannon desires could actually work to his
disadvantage and cause him more harm than good. As the Third
Circuit perceptively noted in Government of V.I. v. Fredericks:
"A juror who is convinced that a defendant is dangerous, but who
believes [the defendant] did not . . . commit the [offense]
charged, might be willing to compromise on a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity rather than insist on an acquittal."
578 F.2d 927, 936 (3d Cir. 1978). Moreover, a jury could assume
that due to overcrowded mental hospitals, strapped social
services budgets, sympathetic judges, etc., a defendant will be
released after only a short period of commitment. To combat the
prospect of early release, the jury could simply opt to find him
guilty. The mandatory instruction Shannon seeks, therefore,
seems to be fraught with the same prejudice and jury confusion he
wants to avoid.
9
F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1989). In Neavill, the panel found that the
IDRA permitted it to re-examine former precedent, in which the
court had joined this Circuit and others in rejecting the Lyles
rationale. In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on
a Senate Committee report that endorsed the D.C. Circuit's
rationale:
The [Senate] Committee endorses the procedure used in the
District of Columbia whereby the jury, in a case in which
the insanity defense has been raised, may be instructed
on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity. If a defendant requests that the instruction
not be given, it is within the discretion of the court
whether to give it or not.
S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 240, reprinted in 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3422 (footnotes omitted).
Neavill, however, has no current precedential value. As the
citation makes clear, it was vacated by operation of law when
rehearing en banc was granted and then was dismissed at Neavill's
request prior to reconsideration by the full Circuit.
Shannon likewise emphasizes the Act's legislative history and
insists that it illustrates Congress's intentions. We agree,
however, with the Ninth Circuit's refusal to disregard the
statute's clarity by embracing the committee report:
This statement does not have the force of law nor does it
purport to interpret or explain ambiguous language in the
statute regarding instructions. See International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 474 v.
NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987)("While a
committee report may ordinarily be used to interpret
unclear language contained in a statute, a committee
report cannot serve as an independent source having the
force of law. . . . [C]ourts have no authority to enforce
principles gleaned solely from legislative history that
10
has no statutory reference point." (emphasis in
original)(citations omitted)).
United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, -- U.S. --, 113 S.Ct. 363, 121 L.Ed.2d 276 (1992).7
In McCracken, 488 F.2d at 423, we said that a specific
statutory provision was required to justify an enhanced jury role.
We do not have it here. The IDRA does not expressly provide that
a jury be instructed regarding mandatory commitment procedures. In
contrast, Congress explicitly dealt with what juries should be told
by way of instruction when a psychiatric defense is raised. 18
U.S.C. § 4242(b) provides:
If the issue of insanity is raised . . . the jury shall
be instructed to find, or, in the event of a nonjury
trial, the court shall find the defendant --
(1) guilty;
(2) not guilty; or
(3) not guilty only by reason of insanity.
(emphasis added)
It is noteworthy that Congress was explicit in directing what
issues should be raised, yet said nothing about informing juries of
the consequences of any of the three choices. Courts may not
properly attempt to discern what Congress, while remaining quiet,
assumed would happen. Absent an affirmative statutory requirement
that juries be granted a sentencing role, we adhere to the
7
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion "respecting the denial"
of the writ of certiorari in Frank. He stated that the rule
should be that the district court must give the disputed
instruction to the jury.
11
established axiom that it is inappropriate for a jury to consider
or be informed about the consequences of its verdict.
Finally, the other peripheral sources that Shannon cites for
support are likewise devoid of statutory anchors and do not compel
a different result. Specifically, Shannon notes that the ABA
Standards address the issue and recommend that the proposed
instruction be given. II ABA Standards for Criminal Justice No. 7-
6.8 (2d ed. 1986). Moreover, he insists that the prevailing trend
among the states favors requiring or authorizing the instruction.
Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Instructions in State Criminal Case
in which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in
Event of Acquittal, 81 A.L.R. 4th 659, 667 (1990). These sources
are no authority to abandon our long-standing precedents without
congressional mandate. Our decision today is grounded upon the
traditional roles of judges and juries and rooted in the Act's
plain language.
Three other circuits have examined the issue. None has taken
the passage of the Act to mandate such an instruction. Frank, 956
F.2d at 881; United States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir.
1992); United States v. Barnett, 968 F.2d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir.
1992). Two of the Circuits permit judges to provide such
information, one in narrow and possibly justifiable circumstances
and the other more broadly.
12
In Frank, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's refusal to instruct the jury on the effect of an
NGI verdict, holding that the IDRA fails to enlarge the jury's role
beyond the traditional guilt/innocence determination. But the
Court qualified its holding, concluding that "prosecutorial
misconduct" which suggests that those persons found innocent by
reason of insanity are released into society properly may warrant
a curative instruction to correct the error and abate jury anxiety
or confusion. 956 F.2d at 881. In Barnett, the Eleventh Circuit
followed the holdings of Rogers and McCracken: "Punishment, or the
lack thereof, is a matter entrusted to the trial judge." 968 F.2d
at 1192. The opinion does not expressly discuss whether
instructional discretion exists in certain cases, but seems to
intimate that it does not. A recent panel of the Second Circuit
was also divided on the issue. Blume, 967 F.2d at 50. Judge
Lumbard, writing for the Court, stated that the Senate Committee
report's language leaves the instructional decision to the district
court's discretion; Judge Newman, writing separately, urges that
the instruction should always be given unless the defendant
requests its omission, but he adjusted his position to join Judge
Lumbard and give the Court a majority position in favor of the
discretionary approach. Judge Winter, also concurring separately
in the result but disagreeing with the NGI analysis, seems to adopt
a variety of the Frank rationale, urging that the instruction
typically should not be given unless the jury has evinced a belief
that those acquitted NGI usually go free.
13
We adhere to our established precedents since there is no
statutory directive that opens up to juries a role in the
assessment or determination of penalties. We properly are
concerned about possible unfortunate consequences of any alteration
of the traditional role of the jury. We are convinced that a
carefully limited and precise statutory mandate must be required.
There is none here.
III. CONCLUSION
We find the established law unchanged by the 1984 Insanity
Defense Reform Act. The district court acted properly in refusing
an instruction stating the consequences of finding the accused not
guilty only by reason of insanity.
AFFIRMED.
14