Sullivan v. Arcadian Corporation ( 1998 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________
No. 97-31127
____________
CURTIS LAURENTS, ET AL
Plaintiffs
CURTIS LAURENTS; MICKEY SULLIVAN; RICHARD
LANDRENEAU; RICHARD PERRY; JOHN ACKERS; JOHN
CHADDICK; RONALD QUARLES; L T BARROW; R J
RICHARDS; M A TAYLOR; R G MARCANTEL; D J
VICTORIAN; R C SCHEXNEIDER; L BELLARD; G W
BURCH; A V ARDOIN; W D JOHNSON; J R MCCOY; F
GUIDRY; M K MILLER; H R LOFASO; C D LAFARGUE;
J M LABOVE; R R CHALINE; A D HARTSTINE; M
FONTENOT; C J HARRIS; E BODIN; W H BRUNKHARDT;
T M CHAPMAN; E FAUL; M TRAHAN; D RICHARDSON; J
R SMITH; C T MOORE; J L SMITH; R C WILLIAMSON;
E BERRY; K W HEBERT; D L FRYE; W P MCCREADY; F
R ANTOINE; C RECHY; J S GUILLORY; J JOSEPH; B
D PHILLIPS; J R COLEMAN; J ENGEL; ERNEST
WILEY; CARLTON BOUDREAUX; RICK DAVIS; IDA
REED; LAKE CHARLES METAL TRADES COUNCIL, on
behalf of Members Employed by Arcadian
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
ARCADIAN CORPORATION; ERNEST ELSBURY; DANA
BAHAM
Defendants - Appellants.
____________
No. 97-31147
____________
MICKEY SULLIVAN; ET AL
Plaintiffs
MICKEY SULLIVAN; CURTIS LAURENTS; RICHARD
LANDRENEAU; JOHN R AKERS; CARL BOUDREAUX;
MICHAEL TRAHAN; E FAUL; RICHARD PERRY; JOHN
CHADDICK; RONALD QUARLES; L T BARROW; R J
RICHARDS; M A TAYLOR; R G MARCANTEL; WILLIAM J
BRUNKHARDT; D J VICTORIAN; R C SCHEXNEIDER; L
BELLARD; G W BURCH; A V ARDOIN; W D JOHNSON; J
R MCCOY; F GUIDRY; M K MILLER; H R LOFASO; C D
LAFARGUE; J M LABOVE; R R CHALINE; A D
HARTSTINE; M FONTENOT; C J HARRIS; E BODIN; W
H BRUNKHARDT; T M CHAPMAN; D RICHARDSON; J R
SMITH; C T MOORE; J L SMITH; R C WILLIAMSON; E
BERRY; K W HEBERT; D L FRYE; W P MCCREADY; F R
ANTOINE; C RECHY; J S GUILLORY; J JOSEPH;
MILTON L TAYLOR; B D PHILLIPS; J R COLEMAN; J
ENGEL; ERNEST WILEY; RICK DAVIS; IDA REED;
LAKE CHARLES METAL TRADES COUNCIL, on behalf
of Members Employed by Arcadian; DAVID A BAHAM
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
ARCADIAN CORPORATION; ERNEST ELSBURY; DANA
BAHAM
Defendants - Appellants.
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No. 97-31166
____________
MICKEY SULLIVAN, ET AL
Plaintiffs
MICKEY SULLIVAN; CURTIS LAURENTS; RICHARD
LANDRENEAU; RICHARD PERRY; JOHN ACKERS; JOHN
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CHADDICK; RONALD QUARLES; L T BARROW; R J
RICHARDS; M A TAYLOR; R G MARCANTEL; D J
VICTORIAN; WILLIAM J BRUNKHARDT; R C
SCHEXNEIDER; L BELLARD; G W BURCH; A V ARDOIN;
W D JOHNSON; J R MCCOY; F GUIDRY; M K MILLER;
H R LOFASO; C D LAFARGUE; J M LABOVE; R R
CHALINE; A D HARTSTINE; M FONTENOT; C J
HARRIS; E BODIN; W H BRUNKHARDT; T M CHAPMAN;
D RICHARDSON; J R SMITH; C T MOORE; J L SMITH;
R C WILLIAMSON; E BERRY; K W HEBERT; D L FRYE;
W P MCCREADY; F R ANTOINE; C RECHY; J S
GUILLORY; J JOSEPH; MILTON L TAYLOR; B D
PHILLIPS; J R COLEMAN; J ENGEL; ERNEST WILEY;
CARLTON BOUDREAUX; RICK DAVIS; IDA REED; DAVID
A BAHAM; LAKE CHARLES METAL TRADES COUNCIL, on
behalf of Members Employed by Arcadian;
MICHAEL TRAHAN; E FAUL
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
ARCADIAN CORPORATION; ERNEST ELSBURY; DANA
BAHAM
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
(93-CV-1475)
August 11, 1998
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
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Arcadian Corporation and its officers (collectively,
“Arcadian”) appeal the district court’s order remanding several
unspecified state law claims to state court.1 We reverse and
render judgment in favor of Arcadian, dismissing the plaintiffs
claims as preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
I.
This appeal arises out of three companion cases brought by the
Lake Charles Metal Trades Council (“the Union”) and fifty-five
employees of Arcadian (“the employees”) based on the explosion and
subsequent closing of Arcadian’s Lake Charles plant following a
reactor failure.2 In their amended petitions, the employees and
the Union alleged numerous state and federal claims against
Arcadian.3 The district court ultimately dismissed all of the
federal claims, and the employees do not challenge that dismissal
1
The plaintiffs contend that they have set forth the
following state law claims: (1) strict liability for custody of the
defective reactor; (2) absolute liability for engaging in an
ultrahazardous activity; (3) punitive damages for the reckless
handling of a toxic substance; (4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and (5) an intentional tort. Although
plaintiffs also brought an unfair trade practices claim, counsel
for plaintiffs abandoned this claim at oral argument. The district
court did not specify which of these claims it was remanding to
state court.
2
Counsel for plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that the
Union must be dismissed as a plaintiff.
3
There were also several personal injury class-action
suits brought against Arcadian as a result of the explosion.
Notably, none of these employees joined the personal injury suits.
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here. Without specifically identifying the remaining claims, the
court then ordered that “the plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims
be remanded to state court.”
II.
On appeal, Arcadian argues that the district court erred in
failing to dismiss the state-law claims as preempted by section 301
of the LMRA. We agree.
We have explained that “[a] state tort claim is preempted by
section 301 if ‘evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably
intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.”
Baker v. Farmers Elec. Co-Op, Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir.
1994) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212,
105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985)). Here, the
plaintiffs have not alleged any physical or serious emotional
injuries. Instead, the employees’ claims stem from the closing of
the plant and their subsequent loss of employment. These injuries
relate directly to the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) and
the parties’ employment contracts. Thus, we hold that the
employees’ state law claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the
terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. See IBEW v.
Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 95 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1987);
Baker, 34 F.3d at 279. The plaintiffs conceded as much in their
response to an interrogatory, stating that “[w]hen Arcadian
knowingly, willingly and intentionally allowed the reactor to
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explode, it verified their intent to breach the collective
bargaining agreement with the Lake Charles Metal Trades Council.”
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by section 301 of
the LMRA and they should have been dismissed rather than remanded
by the district court.
The plaintiffs, however, assert that at least five employees
have claims that are not preempted by section 301 because these
employees have suffered physical or emotional injuries. In support
of this contention, the plaintiffs note that they responded to
Arcadian’s motion for summary judgment by producing evidence that
one employee))Dennis Smith))suffered physical injuries from the
explosion, and that four employees))Cleveland Harris, Mickey
Sullivan, Freddy Guidry, and Edward Faul))suffered pre-explosion
anxiety and distress based on their knowledge of the leak and fear
that the plant would explode.
Although the plaintiffs assert that Dennis Smith’s claim for
an intentional tort and the remaining four plaintiffs’ claims for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress are not preempted,
they have failed to plead sufficiently these two intentional tort
claims in their petitions. With respect to the plaintiffs’
purported pleading of an intentional tort claim for physical
injuries, we note that the plaintiffs’ petitions, although not
models of clarity, set forth identifiable claims in separate
paragraphs. Significantly, no paragraph within the petitions
references an intentional tort that caused physical injuries. More
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importantly for the purposes of notice pleading under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8, nowhere in the petitions do the plaintiffs
claim that they suffered physical injuries. To the contrary, the
petitions refer only to emotional damages and injuries flowing from
the plant’s closing. This is consistent with the fact that there
was a separate state court tort action to recover traditional tort
damages flowing from the explosion and the fact that the plaintiffs
first contended that they had pleaded claims for an intentional
tort leading to physical injuries in response to Arcadian’s motion
for summary judgment. Thus, Dennis Smith’s intentional tort claim
for his physical injuries was not before the district court.
The intentional infliction of emotional distress claims made
by Cleveland Harris, Mickey Sullivan, Freddy Guidry, or Edward Faul
in response to Arcadian’s motion for summary judgment are also not
set forth in the petitions. In Paragraph 26, which is one of the
two paragraphs in the petitions discussing emotional distress, the
plaintiffs allege that this distress flowed from Arcadian’s OSHA
violation, rather than the continuing operation of the reactor in
the face of a known leak. Likewise, in the first half of Paragraph
27, which is the other paragraph in the petitions referencing
emotional distress damages, the plaintiffs claim that this distress
was caused, not by Arcadian, but by defendants Elsbury and Baham’s
“tortious interference” with the CBA. This claim is clearly
preempted.
In the second half of Paragraph 27, the plaintiffs raise an
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additional blunderbuss claim against Elsbury and Baham, but fail to
aver specifically that they suffered any emotional distress as a
result of the failure of these two defendants “to stop production
when it was known that the reactor was leaking.” Instead, the
plaintiffs claim that Elsbury and Baham are liable for “all damages
as set forth herein.” Because we have construed the plaintiffs’
petitions as seeking damages from Arcadian for economic losses
flowing from the closing of the plant, this blanket reference to
“all damages” suggests that the plaintiffs are also seeking to
recover their economic damages from these two individual
defendants. This interpretation of the petitions is bolstered by
the fact that the wrongful conduct attributed to Elsbury and Baham
in Paragraph 27 is alleged to have “led to the explosion at the
Arcadian plant,” which of course led to the closing of the plant
and the economic injuries for which the plaintiffs are seeking
redress. Thus, the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims of these four plaintiffs were also not before the district
court.
In conclusion, our review of the petitions indicates that
there were no non-preempted state-law claims for the district court
to remand to state court. Accordingly, each suit should have been
dismissed in its entirety and we may render judgment in favor of
Arcadian.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s
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decision to remand the plaintiffs’ state-law claims to state court
and RENDER judgment in favor of Arcadian.
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EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
While I agree that the state law claims of fifty of the
plaintiffs are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), I would reach a different
result for the five plaintiffs who have presented some evidence of
physical or severe emotional injury related to the explosion))the
intentional tort claim by plaintiff Dennis Smith, and the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims by plaintiffs
Cleveland Harris, Mickey Sullivan, Freddy Guidry, and Edward Faul.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, however, these five claims
have been pled against only the individual defendants, Ernest
Elsbury and Dana Baham. Accordingly, I would remand the five
plaintiffs’ tort claims against the individual defendants for a
determination by the district court as to whether such claims are
precluded by the related class action personal injury suits.
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