Payne v. CIR ( 2000 )

Revised August 22, 2000
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60074
JERRY S. PAYNE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent-Appellee.
_____________
Appeal from the Decision of the
United States Tax Court
_____________
August 17, 2000
Before JONES, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner-Appellant Jerry S. Payne appeals an adverse
decision of the Tax Court, which awarded Respondent-Appellee
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“the government” or “the IRS”)
$438,722 in delinquent income taxes and penalties for tax years
1987 and 1988, plus interest. As a general rule, the IRS must
assess taxes within three years following the date that the return
is filed. Here, the IRS did not send Payne a notice of deficiency
(an event that tolls the statute of limitations pending assessment)
until more than three years after he had filed his return for each
of those years. The Tax Court found, nevertheless, that the IRS’s
collection action was timely under the statutory fraud exception to
the three-year statute of limitations.1 As it had to if it were to
determine taxpayer fraud, the Tax Court found the government’s
evidence of fraud to be clear and convincing. But in our clear
error review, we see that evidence as weak and equivocal, so that
disregarding the statute of limitations cannot be justified on
grounds of tax fraud. The judgment of the Tax Court is therefore
reversed and judgment rendered in favor of Payne, granting his
petition for redetermination of income taxes, penalties, and
interest for 1987 and 1988 and holding that the government is
barred by the statute of limitations from collecting anything from
Payne for those tax years.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Payne is a lawyer. During the years at issue he practiced
law, concentrating in litigation. Payne provided extensive legal
representation to, and eventually came to own, a corporation called
2618, Inc. (“2618") which, as sole proprietor, operated Caligula
XXI, a topless dance club (the “club”) in Houston, Texas. Payne
also represented Gerard Helmle, one of 2618's two equal
1
26 U.S.C. § 6501(c). Unless otherwise noted, all statutory
citations under Title 26, United States Code, are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
2
shareholders and the club’s manager. Among other things, Payne
defended Helmle against a criminal charge for possession of illegal
drugs. Most of the operable facts of this case arise out of these
professional representations.
At the beginning of 1987, Helmle and Leo Kalantzakis each
owned one-half of the stock of 2618. As prerequisites to operating
a topless dance club in Houston, 2618 needed both (1) a liquor
license, technically a Mixed Beverage Permit, from the Texas
Alcoholic Beverage Commission (the “TABC”), and (2) a Sexually
Oriented Business Permit (“SOB permit”) from the City of Houston
(“the City”). The SOB permit was required by a Houston ordinance
passed in 1986 which provides, inter alia, that one topless dance
club cannot operate within 1,000 feet of another. The ordinance
also specifies that if two such dance clubs seeking SOB permits are
located within 1000 feet of each other, a permit can be issued only
to the club that has been in operation longer. As part of his
representation of 2618, Payne helped it apply for an SOB permit.
The club was located within 1000 feet of a competing topless dance
establishment, however, so 2618's application for an SOB permit was
denied. The Tax Court recognized that without an SOB permit the
club’s viability was in serious doubt.
Payne filed suit against the City to force issuance of an SOB
permit to 2618. The primary issue in the suit was which club had
been in operation longer.
While that suit was proceeding in state district court, Helmle
3
and Kalantzakis, had a falling out. Their dispute resulted in
litigation between 2618 and Kalantzakis, in which Payne represented
the corporation. Ultimately this matter was settled by Helmle’s
agreeing to purchase Kalantzakis’s stock in 2618, which would leave
Helmle as the corporation’s sole stockholder.
By this time, Payne had amassed substantial unpaid accounts
receivable resulting from his criminal defense of Helmle and his
representation of 2618 in several matters. Helmle did not have the
financial wherewithal either to fund his purchase of Kalantzakis’s
stock or to pay Payne’s account. The club was Helmle’s sole
source of income, and his dispute and eventual settlement with
Kalantzakis threatened the continued existence of the club. Payne
was aware that the club’s survival represented his only realistic
possibility of ever recovering his fees for legal services rendered
to Helmle and to 2618. As neither Helmle nor 2618 was
creditworthy, Payne borrowed $275,000 from Texas Guaranty National
Bank then lent that same sum to Helmle, who used these funds to
purchase Kalantzakis’s stock in 2618.
Payne and Helmle agreed that Helmle would cause 2618 to make
monthly payments to Payne so that he, in turn, could make periodic
payments of principal and interest on the bank loan. In essence,
Payne acted as an intermediary, first in borrowing from the bank
and passing the loan proceeds through to his client, and then in
receiving funds from his client and immediately disbursing those
funds to the bank that had made the loan.
4
Helmle also agreed to compensate Payne for his increased
involvement in the club’s operations during this period by paying
him a management fee. Payne reported the management fee on his
income tax returns for the years in question. He did not, however,
report the sums that he received from his clients and then
immediately remitted to the lender bank. As to these he took the
position that he was a mere accommodation borrower and conduit
through which the loan proceeds and repayments passed, not a party
in interest to an income-producing transaction.
During the time that Kalantzakis owned one-half of the stock
of 2618, he had handled the renewals of the corporation’s mixed-
beverage permit from the TABC. Kalantzakis had apparently
developed relationships with high-level personnel at the TABC,
which helped expedite the permit renewal process. After
Kalantzakis’s split with Helmle and Helmle’s subsequent purchase of
Kalantzakis’s stock, however, Kalantzakis was no longer willing to
use his relationship with TABC officials for the corporation’s
benefit. In fact, there are allegations that Kalantzakis lobbied
his contacts at the TABC to deny renewal of 2618's mixed-beverage
permit. Payne contends that ultimately, through its relationship
with Kalantzakis, the TABC learned that criminal drug charges were
pending against Helmle. This prompted the head of enforcement for
the TABC to determine that, because Helmle was the sole owner of
2618, its mixed-beverage permit should not be renewed.
Payne counseled Helmle that his best solution was to sell the
5
club. Helmle agreed and authorized Payne to find a buyer.
Unfortunately for Helmle, though, all potential buyers that Payne
contacted lost interest when they discovered that the City had
denied the club’s application for an SOB license and that the TABC
was refusing to renew the club’s mixed-beverage permit.
After trying unsuccessfully to preserve any going-concern
value that the club might have (apparently at this point, there was
little or none), Payne foreclosed on encumbrances of 2618’s assets
that he held as security for unpaid legal fees. Specifically,
Payne foreclosed on the corporation’s (1) leasehold interest in the
building in which the club operated, (2) furniture, furnishings,
fixtures, and leasehold improvements in the building, and (3) right
to use the name Caligula XXI. Payne concluded that the assets he
foreclosed on had a fair market value of $35,000 and reported this
amount as income on his federal income tax return. Payne leased
the assets back to 2618 in the hope that the liquor license and SOB
permit would be issued, which should make it possible for Helmle or
2618 to pay the remaining legal fees owed to Payne.
After they failed to find a buyer for the club and determined
that the reason the TABC would not issue a mixed-beverage permit to
2618 was the criminal charges pending against Helmle, Payne and
Helmle embarked on a new strategy to secure a mixed-beverage
permit: They entered into a conditional stock-purchase agreement
under which Payne agreed to buy all issued and outstanding 2618
stock from Helmle in consideration of Payne’s $500,000 note, when
6
and if 2618 secured a mixed-beverage permit. Payne reasoned that
when the TABC realized that its issuance of a permit to the club
would terminate Helmle’s ownership, the TABC would grant the mixed-
beverage permit. Payne negotiated with the TABC for the renewal of
the club’s permit, but when these negotiations broke down he filed
suit against the TABC. The lawsuit was ultimately settled when the
TABC agreed to issue the club a mixed-beverage permit. This
satisfied the condition precedent in the stock purchase agreement
between Helmle and Payne, causing the stock to be transferred to
Payne in exchange for his note and making him the sole shareholder
of 2618.
Shortly after the stock was transferred to Payne, Helmle
agreed to reduce the sum due on Payne’s note from $500,000 to
$300,000. Even so, Payne never made any payments on the note.
The Tax Court found the credit sale of the stock from Helmle
to Payne to be a sham transaction, and reclassified the transfer of
the stock from Helmle to Payne as an in-kind payment for past legal
services. On appeal, Payne does not contest the Tax Court’s
characterization of the transaction as a payment in-kind for legal
fees. Rather, he contends that the 2618 stock was worthless at the
time he received it from Helmle. As such, urges Payne, he was
correct in concluding that he need not report receipt of the
valueless stock as income from his law practice.
Payne based his conclusion of worthlessness on the specter of
the litigation that was then pending between 2618 and the City
7
concerning the denial of the club’s SOB permit. Without an SOB
permit the club could not operate; and, in Payne’s considered
professional opinion, 2618's odds of success in that suit were
abysmal. Furthermore, the liquor license was the corporation’s
only significant asset; it had no SOB permit and no longer owned
(1) its leasehold interest in the only location where it was
licensed to sell liquor, (2) the leasehold improvements needed to
conduct the dance club operations, or (3) the trade name under
which the club operated. Those assets had long since been lost to
Payne through foreclosure, a transaction on which Payne had
reported income. In Payne’s estimation, these factors combined to
render the stock worthless on the date he acquired it.
The IRS prosecuted Payne for criminal tax fraud on facts
arising from essentially the same transactions that are at issue in
this case —— and Payne was acquitted. During the pendency of the
criminal tax prosecution, Payne filed a civil suit against the IRS
for divulging confidential tax information during its criminal
investigation. Payne’s civil suit against the IRS resulted in a
$1.7 million judgment for Payne. The government’s appeal of that
decision is currently pending before this court.
II.
ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tax Court
8
pursuant to I.R.C. § 7482. We review such decisions “in the same
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts
in civil actions tried without a jury.”2 Accordingly, findings of
fact are reviewed for clear error and conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo.3
B. Statute of Limitations
This appeal is governed by § 6501 of the Internal Revenue
Code. Subsection (a) of § 6501 proclaims the general rule that
“the amount of any tax imposed by this title [Title 26, U.S.C.]
shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed,”
otherwise any collection effort by the government shall be time
barred. As the three-year period set forth in § 6501(a) is tolled
by the issuance of a statutory notice of deficiency,4 that general
rule of limitation can be rephrased to read: Unless a statutory
notice of deficiency is sent to the taxpayer within 3 years after
the return was filed, the government’s collection effort shall be
time barred.
In this case, the government sent the statutory notices of
deficiency for both 1987 and 1988 more than three years after Payne
had filed his returns for those years. Thus, unless an exception
2
I.R.C. § 7482(a). See also Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S.
3, 6 (1987).
3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Sealy Power Ltd. v. Commissioner, 46
F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1995).
4
§ 6503(a).
9
to the three-year limitations period is applicable, notices of
deficiency were issued too late, and the government is barred from
collecting the tax deficiencies, penalties, and interest it now
asserts.
The only exception to the general three-year limitations rule
of § 6501(a) that is implicated in this appeal is § 6501(c)’s
statutory tax fraud exception, which provides: “In the case of a
false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax
may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such
tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.” The burden of
proving fraud is on the government.5 To satisfy its burden, the
government must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that at
least some portion of the asserted underpayment of tax is the
result of fraud.6 If the government carries this high burden with
respect to any part of the underpayment, “the entire underpayment
shall be treated as attributable to fraud, except with respect to
any portion that the taxpayer establishes (by a preponderance of
the evidence) is not attributable to fraud.”7 We have defined
fraud in the following terms: “Fraud implies bad faith, intentional
5
§ 7453(a) (“In any proceeding involving the issue whether the
petitioner has been guilty of fraud with the intent to evade tax,
the burden of proof in respect of such issue shall be upon the
Secretary”).
6
See, e.g., Webb v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 366, 377 (5th Cir.
1968).
7
§ 6653(b)(2) (1988). In 1989, this provision was recodified
as § 6663(b).
10
wrongdoing and a sinister motive. It is never imputed or presumed
and the court should not sustain findings of fraud upon
circumstances which at most create only suspicion.”8 Fraud is
usually inferred from “conduct, the likely effect of which would be
to mislead or conceal.”9
As a general rule, the government’s determination of a tax
deficiency is presumptively correct. A consequence of this
presumption is that the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that
the government’s determination is incorrect or arbitrary.10 We and
other courts have held, however, that when the government relies on
an exception to the three-year statute of limitations, it bears the
burden of proving its entitlement to rely on that exception.11 This
means that alone the general presumption of the correctness of the
government’s deficiency determination cannot serve to establish
fraud on the part of the taxpayer; proof of fraud remains the
burden of the government. Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to
ignore the statute and the related case law that impose on the
government the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing
8
Webb, 394 F.2d at 377.
9
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943).
10
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1976); Tax Ct.
R. 142(a); 14 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 50:437,
p.50-399 (April 2000 rev. ed.).
11
Armes, 448 F.2d at 974 (government must prove substantial
omission from gross income by a preponderance of the evidence);
Drieborg v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 216, 218 (6th Cir. 1955)
(government must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence).
11
evidence.12 There must be additional evidence, independent of the
general presumption of correctness, from which fraudulent intent on
the part of the taxpayer can be properly inferred.13
The government asserts that its most compelling evidence of
fraud —— and therefore the evidence most likely to surmount the
clear and convincing evidence threshold —— lies in the 2618 stock
transfer from Helmle to Payne. Before the Tax Court, the
government introduced an expert report that appraised the stock at
$1.14 million as of the date of the transaction. This conclusion
was expressly predicated on the expert’s assumption that 2618 would
continue to operate a topless club “indefinitely.” That
assumption, however, was directly contrary to the facts as they
existed on the date Payne acquired the stock, the only date
relevant to the appraisal. At that time, the City was steadfastly
refusing to grant 2618 an SOB permit, which all concede was an
absolute necessity if the club was to continue operating.
Aware of this flaw in the expert’s analysis, the Tax Court
“conclude[d] that [the government’s] expert’s [$1.14 million]
valuation for the stock of [2618] should be reduced by a discount
of 50 percent to reflect the risks associated with the litigation
over the [SOB license].” In essence, the court began by agreeing
with the government expert that, with the SOB license, the stock
12
§ 7454; Goldberg v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 316, 320 (5th Cir.
1956).
13
Drieborg, 225 F.2d at 218.
12
was worth $1.14 million and concluding that, without that license,
the stock was worthless. Then simplistically —— without any
analysis or expert evidence of the odds of success in the license
litigation —— the Court arbitrarily split the difference.
Consequently, the Tax Court found the stock’s value, at the time
Payne received it, to be $570,000, exactly half-way between zero
and $1.14 million. The Tax Court then jumped directly to its
ultimate conclusion that Payne’s “failure to report any amount as
income in connection with his receipt of the stock was part of
[his] fraudulent conduct.”
For the following reasons we find clearly erroneous the Tax
Court’s conclusion that Payne’s failure to report the stock
transfer from Helmle is clear and convincing proof of fraudulent
intent. First, we are skeptical of the Tax Court’s conclusional
finding that, at the time the stock was transferred to Payne, there
was a 50 percent chance that 2618 would win the litigation and get
the SOB permit. Payne assigned a far smaller chance that this
would be the outcome of the suit; and it seems to us that, as the
attorney representing 2618 in that ongoing litigation, Payne was in
the best position to assess 2618's chances. But even if we were to
disregard Payne’s opinion as incredible, we cannot disregard the
government’s failure to adduce evidence, expert or otherwise, on
this question. Our review of the record reveals no evidence that
we see as probative on this point.
Second, the Tax Court’s analysis is predicated on the
13
conclusions of the government’s expert as announced in his report.
We have examined this report and find that it contains internal
flaws not discussed by the Tax Court. For example, the report
included the following qualification: “The subject assets,
properties or business interests are appraised free and clear of
any or all liens or encumbrances . . . .” Based in part on this
statement and in part on other indicia in the report, we are
convinced that the expert was appraising not only the going concern
value of 2618's business with licenses in place, but was also
assigning value to the corporation with its lease, leasehold
improvements, and trade name in place, specifically, the leasehold
interest in the building where the club operated, the furniture,
fixtures, equipment, and the leasehold improvements used in nightly
operations, and the Caligula XXI name. As we previously noted,
though, Payne had already foreclosed on those assets in a separate
transaction months earlier, one on which he reported income and to
which neither the Tax Court nor the government has ascribed
fraudulent intent. It is fallacious, therefore, to treat the
assets lost by 2618 through foreclosure as contributing to the
value of the stock on the date, months later, that it was acquired
by Payne in an entirely separate transaction. Even with an SOB
permit, how could 2618 operate the club without its trade name, the
only location from which it was authorized to conduct its dance and
liquor business, and its furniture, fixtures and leasehold
14
improvements?14
Third, the Tax Court’s analysis fails to take into account the
delay and expense associated with litigating the licensure issue
with the City. The government’s expert’s report qualified its
conclusion that if the club were to operate indefinitely its value
was $1.14 million; the expert opined that the club’s value was
$1.14 million “net of any costs associated with removing any
impediments preventing operation as a topless club. Such costs
would be expected to include legal fees and associated costs.” The
report went on to explain that two “key parameters need to be
assessed with respect” to its projection of value:
[1] the legal avenues available to contest closure under
the [SOB] ordinance and [2] the cost of pursuing such
remedies. At this time, we believe the estimate of these
parameters would necessarily have been speculative as of
the valuation date. We have not reviewed information or
conducted discussions with individuals who could provide
reliable analyses of the relevant legal issues and
corresponding costs. As a result, we have not drawn a
conclusion with respect to these specific circumstances.
Despite this significant and substantial qualification in the
expert’s report, the government did not offer evidence regarding
these “key parameters” and the Tax Court did not reduce the $1.14
14
The government urged both before the Tax Court and on appeal
that Payne’s representations to third parties that the club had a
value in the millions constituted evidence that he perpetrated tax
fraud when he did not report receipt of the stock as income. We
note, however, that all of Payne’s representations cited by the
government were premised on the assumption that the SOB permit
would be issued, which had not occurred at the time of the stock
transfer, and that these other business assets were still owned by
the corporation. These representations do not, therefore,
constitute evidence of fraud.
15
million estimate to reflect the negative effect these factors might
have on the price a willing buyer would pay for the stock.
Taken together, the foregoing shortcomings in the Tax Court’s
analysis and the expert report on which it relied compel us to
conclude that the Tax Court’s finding on valuation is not supported
by the record. Essentially, the Tax Court began with a value that
was too high because it ignored the costs of litigating the SOB
licensure, and because it included the assets on which Payne had
already foreclosed. The court then discounted this inflated figure
by 50 percent “to reflect the risks associated with litigation”
over the SOB permit. We find no evidence in the record supporting
the Tax Court’s conclusion that 50 percent was an appropriate
discount. The product of the inflated value and the arbitrary ——
and likely excessive —— odds that the Tax Court assigned to a
favorable outcome, i.e., to the issuance of an SOB permit, yield a
conclusion as to the value of 2618's stock that we find untenable.
The Tax Court noted that its $570,000 valuation conclusion
approximated the amount of Payne’s outstanding legal bills with
2618 and Helmle at the time of the stock transfer, and suggested
that this “further supported or corroborated” the determination
that the stock was worth $570,000 when Payne acquired it. The
record indicates, however, that Helmle was not creditworthy at the
time of the stock transfer, and had proved himself unable to remit
payment for legal services to Payne in a timely fashion, if at all.
We agree with the Tax Court that if an attorney and his
16
creditworthy client had arranged an arms-length in-kind payment,
the value of the property transferred in payment should approximate
the value of the legal services for which payment is being made.
But this logic breaks down when, as here, the client is not
creditworthy and, indeed, has no other assets: An attorney with a
substantial account receivable owed by an insolvent client may well
have an account receivable with a value of zero. Any such creditor
is likely to accept even valueless assets when essentially “writing
off” a receivable from an insolvent debtor. We cannot agree with
the Tax Court that the amount Helmle owed Payne supports the
court’s valuation of the 2618 stock.
Perhaps the Tax Court concluded that, because the $500,000
note that Payne gave to Helmle in exchange for the stock was a
sham, it constituted evidence of fraudulent intent. And, if the
court did so conclude, it may well have been correct. But any
fraud associated with that element of the transaction was just as
likely if not more likely directed at some other party —— e.g., the
City or the TABC15 —— as at the IRS. Consequently, even if we
assume arguendo that the sham credit sale might constitute clear
and convincing evidence of fraud, it is not clear and convincing
15
There is no dispute that Helmle’s ownership of 2618 impeded
its ability to secure licenses and permits from these agencies;
however, it is likely that if Helmle merely transferred nominal
title to Payne, his attorney, for no consideration, the transfer
would have been viewed as a nullity by these agencies and would not
have achieved its stated purpose —— facilitating licensure of the
club.
17
evidence of tax fraud.
There is no direct evidence in the record of any deceptive or
evasive conduct by Payne. The government argues, nevertheless,
that Payne’s fraudulent intent could be inferred from his failure
to report income stemming from the stock transfer. To infer fraud
from this transaction, though, one first has to accept the
conclusion that the stock had value when Payne received it, a
conclusion about which we are dubious.
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the Tax Court
did not clearly err when it determined that the stock had
substantial value at the time Payne received it, we are
nevertheless left with the firm conviction that the court clearly
erred when it concluded that this transaction and Payne’s omission
of its value from his tax return constitute clear and convincing
evidence of fraud. “The fraud meant is actual, intentional
wrongdoing, and the intent required is the specific purpose to
evade a tax believed to be owing.”16 Payne’s explanation is that
he believed the stock to be worthless, and we find his explanation
to be plausible —— at least as plausible as the government’s
competing explanation that (1) the stock had substantial value when
Payne received it, and (2) that Payne knew this and thus believed
he owed tax but did not report it.
The question before us is whether the Tax Court committed
16
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941).
18
clear error when it found that the government proved the fact of
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. “A finding is ‘clearly
erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”17 Judged
against this standard, we find clearly erroneous the Tax Court’s
determination that the government proved fraud by clear and
convincing evidence.
As we observed, the government asserts that Payne’s return
position on the stock transfer presents its strongest case for tax
fraud. Consequently, if the evidence about that transaction fails
to surmount the clear and convincing evidentiary hurdle, then a
fortiori the evidence about other transactions in which Payne was
involved, proffered by the government to support its contention of
fraudulent intent, must also fail. As the possibility nevertheless
remains that the cumulative effect of all of the government’s
evidence could constitute clear and convincing evidence of tax
fraud, we have closely scrutinized the entire record in search of
evidence of fraud that might enhance the evidence that we have
discussed. Our review of the record only serves to reinforce our
conclusion that the Tax Court clearly erred in finding that the
government proved fraud by clear and convincing evidence.
Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse the Tax Court’s
17
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
19
determination that Payne filed his tax returns with fraudulent
intent. Consequently, the statutory fraud exception to the three-
year statute of limitations is not available to the government. As
the government’s deficiency notices for 1987 and 1988 were not duly
furnished within the applicable three-year period under the statute
of limitations provided in § 6501(a), collection of additional
taxes, penalties, and interest for those years is time barred. The
Tax Court therefore erred reversibly in applying the statutory
fraud exception of § 6501(c) and denying Payne’s petition for
redetermination of taxes, penalties, and interest assessed pursuant
to those tardy notices of deficiency.
III.
CONCLUSION
The expansive record in this case certainly demonstrates that
Payne has no acumen for keeping orderly records of his financial
dealings; and we sympathize with the government and the Tax Court
for the difficulty they faced in reconstructing Payne’s financial
affairs and then attempting to determine their tax consequences.
In addition, we are aware that, in some cases, poor record keeping
has been deemed indicative of fraud. But, as there is little else
in this record to suggest that Payne had direct fraudulent intent,
his deficiency in record keeping is not sufficient to sustain the
government’s burden of proving fraud to the required degree.
At bottom, the competing contentions of the parties are
20
obvious. Payne insists that, for the years in question, his
allowable deductions exceeded his taxable income and, believing
that he would not owe any taxes, he paid little attention to the
preparation of his returns. In contrast, the government urges that
when Payne prepared and filed his returns, he did so with the
intention of understating his income tax liability. Despite our
painstaking review of the record, we are unable to determine which
of these competing positions more closely comports with reality.
We are able to determine from our record review, however, that the
government has failed to support its version with evidence any more
convincing than the evidence that Payne has adduced in support of
his version. This evidentiary equipoise results in a draw, leaving
us with the firm conviction that the government has failed to carry
its burden of proving fraud by the heightened clear and convincing
standard. We hold, therefore, that the Tax Court erred reversibly
in allowing the statutory fraud exception to prevail over the
three-year statute of limitations.
The judgment of the Tax Court is reversed for the foregoing
reasons and judgment rendered in favor of Payne, granting his
petition for redetermination and holding that the government is
time barred from collecting additional taxes, penalties, and
interest from Payne for his tax years of 1987 and 1988.
REVERSED and RENDERED.
21