Robinson v. Figueroa ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40510
Summary Calendar
ALLEN TYRONE ROBINSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
F E FIGUEROA, ET AL.,
Defendants,
F.E. FIGUERO, Warden at Powledge Unit; KIRK BENNETT,
Officer; R. WAGSTAFF, supervisor at Metal FAB Plant;
T. NEVITT, Employee at Powledge Unit; R. THOMPSON,
Warden Powledge Unit; T. WOMACK, Assistant Warden
Powledge Unit,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:96-CV-230
May 1, 2000
Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Allen Tyrone Robinson (#519307), a state prisoner, filed a
civil rights complaint in the district court alleging that prison
employees had violated his right against cruel and unusual
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
punishment by requiring him to do work which was inconsistent
with his medical classification. After dismissing the claims
against most of the defendants, a bench trial was held, pursuant
to Flowers v. Phelps, 956 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 964 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1992), to consider the merits of
Robinson’s claims against defendants Womack and Wagstaff. After
the bench trial, judgment was entered dismissing Robinson’s
complaint. Robinson has appealed.
Robinson contends that the magistrate judge abused his
discretion in overruling his objection to the Flowers hearing and
in refusing to permit him to try his claims before a jury.
“[T]he right to a jury trial is a fundamental right.” McAfee v.
martin, 63 F.3d 436, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that courts
“should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of
the right to a jury trial). A Flowers proceeding, such as the
one conducted in Robinson’s case, is acceptable unless the
plaintiff has properly demanded a jury trial. See Archie v.
Christian, 808 F.2d 1132, 1135 (5th Cir. 1987). Robinson made a
proper jury demand and preserved his objection to the Flowers
hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b); see also Jennings v.
McCormick, 154 F.3d 542, 544-46 (5th Cir. 1998) (magistrate judge
erred in holding bench trial because appellant had not waived or
withdrawn his jury demand); McAfee, 63 F.3d at 437-38 (discussing
presumption against waiver of right to jury trial in “doubtful
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situations”). Accordingly, the magistrate judge erred in
overruling Robinson’s objection to the Flowers hearing.
Once it is determined that the magistrate judge erred by
failing to conduct a jury trial, this Court must decide whether
the error was harmless. See McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225,
230 (5th Cir. 1998). The error is harmless if the evidence could
not have withstood a motion for a judgment as a matter of law
(“JML”). McDonald, 132 F.3d at 230. A JML should be granted if
the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in
favor of one party that the court believes that a reasonable
finder of fact could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Id. A
court may not weigh the credibility of witnesses in ruling on a
motion for a JML. See Jennings, 154 F.3d at 546. Based upon a
“preponderance of the credible testimony and evidence,” the
magistrate found that Robinson’s knee condition was not very
serious, that Robinson’s job at a prison metal fabrication plant
was consistent with his medical classification, and that Robinson
had asked to be assigned to the paint booth.
The Flowers hearing transcript is not before us. On the
basis of the magistrate judge’s recitation of the evidence at
that hearing, and considering the record as a whole, it is clear
that there was no evidence that Womack was at any relevant time
aware that Robinson’s job assignment was inconsistent with his
medical classification. Consequently, Womack would have been
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entitled to a JML, and the error in denying Robinson a jury trial
was hence harmless as regards Robinson’s claims against Womack.
However, we cannot on this record reach the same conclusion as to
Robinson’s claims against Wagstaff. It appears that in rejecting
Robinson’s claims against Wagstaff the magistrate judge
necessarily failed to credit at least some of Robinson’s
testimony. See Jennings, 154 F.3d at 546. As we do not conclude
that the error in denying Robinson’s right to a jury trial of his
claims against Wagstaff was harmless, the judgment must be
vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings as to
defendant Wagstaff only.
Robinson contends that the district court erred in partially
granting the motion for summary judgment and in dismissing the
claims against defendants Thompson and Figueroa. Robinson has
failed to show that there is a genuine issue whether Thompson and
Figueroa knew of facts from which an inference could be drawn
that Robinson’s job assignment presented a substantial risk of
serious harm to Robinson’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994).
Robinson argues that the district court should have
permitted him to further amend his complaint to assert additional
claims against Figueroa, who had by then answered and moved for
summary judgment. Robinson has failed to show that the
magistrate judge abused his discretion in refusing to permit
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Robinson to amend the complaint. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d
190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
Robinson contends that the magistrate judge should have
compelled responses to his discovery requests. Robinson has
failed to show that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in
refusing to compel discovery responses. See Turnage v. General
Elec. Co., 953 F.2d 206, 208-09 (5th Cir. 1992).
Robinson contends that the magistrate judge abused his
discretion by refusing to appoint counsel to represent him at the
Flowers hearing. Robinson has failed to show that the magistrate
judge abused his discretion in holding that this case did not
present exceptional circumstances requiring appointment of
counsel. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982).
Robinson contends that the magistrate judge abused his
discretion in refusing to issue a subpoena requiring th
attendance of a physician, identified only as Dr. John Doe, at
the Flowers, hearing. Robinson has not shown that the witness’
testimony would have varied from the testimony of the prison
physician who was called to testify by the defendants. No abuse
of discretion has been shown.
Robinson contends that the magistrate judge abused his
discretion in refusing to sanction the defendants for failing to
comply with the scheduling order. Robinson argues that the
magistrate judge’s omission shows that the magistrate judge was
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biased in favor of the defendants. Adverse rulings alone do not
call into question a judge’s impartiality. See Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Robinson does not argue that
he was prejudiced by the untimely filing of the witness list.
This Court ordinarily defers to the district court in the
management of its own docket. See Union City Barge Line v. Union
Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129, 135 (5th Cir. 1987).
Robinson argues that the magistrate judge improperly limited
the scope of his cross-examination. Because nothing in the
record so indicates and Robinson has not provided a transcript of
the Flowers hearing, Robinson cannot show that the magistrate
judge abused his discretion by limiting the scope of his cross-
examination.
Robinson makes no complaint on appeal as to the pretrial
dismissal, following a hearing pursuant to Spears v. McCotter,
766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), of his claims against defendants
Zond, Branch, Crews, Luker and Simmons, nor as to the summary
judgment in favor of defendants Bennett and Nevitt.
Consequently, the judgment in favor of said seven defendants, as
well as the judgment in favor of defendants Figueroa, Thompson
and Womack is in all things AFFIRMED.
The judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED as to
defendant Wagstaff, only. In all other respects, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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