Aldridge v. Summers ( 2000 )


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  •                  IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 99-10907
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    JOHN ALDRIDGE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS,
    Secretary of the Treasury,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Texas, Wichita Falls
    USDC No. 7:98-CV-220-R
    _________________________________________________________________
    April 12, 2000
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    John Aldridge appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in a
    timely manner.    Because Mr. Aldridge failed to file his claims in
    a timely manner, and because equitable tolling and delay in the
    filing deadline are inappropriate, we affirm.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    I
    Between 1983 and 1987, Mr. Aldridge worked as an agent for the
    Internal Revenue Service.     In 1984, the IRS transferred him to its
    office in Wichita Falls, Texas.         Mr. Aldridge has alleged that his
    supervisor at that office discriminated against him until September
    1987, when Mr. Aldridge resigned.           Mr. Aldridge cited his poor
    health as his reason for leaving at the time.
    Mr. Aldridge contends that he was seriously ill over the next
    six years.   Then, in March 1993, he asserts that he found a journal
    that he kept while an IRS agent.        Mr. Aldridge contends that after
    reviewing this journal, he decided to bring a Title VII claim
    against the IRS.      However, he waited an additional six months,
    until September 1993, to file a complaint with the EEOC.
    After meeting with the EEO counselor, Mr. Aldridge filed a
    formal discrimination complaint with the Treasury Department.              Mr.
    Aldridge was informed by letter that the complaint was untimely in
    August 1994.     He replied in a letter that the delay was due to his
    illness, and that he had spent six months contemplating what to do
    after discovering his journal.     The Treasury Department’s Director
    of Regional Complaints later dismissed the complaint as untimely.
    Mr.   Aldridge    appealed   to   the     EEOC,   which   remanded   for    a
    determination of whether he had known, or should have known, of the
    requirement to file a complaint in a timely manner.          After further
    investigation, the Director of Regional Complaints again dismissed
    the complaint.
    2
    Mr. Aldridge appealed this dismissal to the EEOC in September
    1996.   The EEOC again reversed the Treasury Department’s dismissal
    and remanded the case for further processing to allow the agency to
    prove that posters concerning EEOC procedures had been posted at
    the Wichita office and that Mr. Aldridge had attended meetings
    where those procedures were discussed.      After further proof on
    these issues, the EEOC affirmed the Treasury Department’s dismissal
    as untimely on August 13, 1998.        Mr. Aldridge then filed a
    complaint in federal district court, which was later dismissed on
    July 20, 1999.    Mr. Aldridge now appeals to this court.
    II
    This appeal involves the district court's denial of subject
    matter jurisdiction over Mr. Aldridge’s claim pursuant to Rule
    12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.    We review the
    district court’s determinations of disputed fact under the “clearly
    erroneous” standard.   See MDPhysicians & Assoc., Inc. v. State Bd.
    of Ins., 
    957 F.2d 178
    , 180-81 (5th Cir. 1992)(citing Williamson v.
    Tucker, 
    645 F.2d 404
    , 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).    Questions of law we
    review de novo.   See Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 
    76 F.3d 651
    , 654 (5th
    Cir. 1996).
    As a precondition to filing suit in federal court, Title VII
    specifically requires a federal employee claiming discrimination to
    exhaust his administrative remedies.    See Brown v. General Servs.
    Admin., 
    425 U.S. 820
    , 832, 
    96 S. Ct. 1961
    , 1965, 
    48 L. Ed. 2d 402
    (1976)(“Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency
    3
    that has allegedly discriminated against him.”).          The complainant
    also must file his complaint in a timely manner.           See Tolbert v.
    United States, 
    916 F.2d 245
    , 247 (5th Cir. 1990).              A failure to
    comply with the established time limits in the administrative
    process is deemed a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
    Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 
    425 U.S. 820
    , 824, 
    96 S. Ct. 1961
    ,
    
    48 L. Ed. 2d 402
    (1976).     Thus, if the claimant fails to comply with
    either   of   these   requirements   then   the   court   is   deprived   of
    jurisdiction over the case.      See 
    id. We are
    deprived of jurisdiction here because Mr. Aldridge did
    not file his complaint with the EEOC in a timely manner.              Until
    October 1, 1992, EEOC regulations allowed for dismissal if the
    complainant failed to contact an EEOC Counselor within thirty days
    of the date of the matter alleged to have been discriminatory.
    After October 1, 1992, that time limitation was extended to 45
    days.    Mr. Aldridge resigned from his job in September 1987.            He
    did contact the EEOC, however, for six years, until September 1993.
    Mr. Aldridge does not dispute these facts.
    Instead, he first contends that the time frame should have
    tolled because of his illness during that six-year period.            It is
    true that under 45 C.F.R. § 1225.9 (1987) recodified at 12 C.F.R.
    § 268.204(a)(2)(1999), the time limit may be extended when the
    individual was “prevented by circumstances beyond his or her
    control from” contacting an EEO Counselor within the time limits.
    But the complaining party in a Title VII case bears the burden of
    4
    providing the justification for application of equitable tolling
    principles. Wilson v. Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs, 
    65 F.3d 402
    , 404
    (5th Cir. 1995); Nowlin v. RTC, 
    33 F.3d 498
    , 503 (5th Cir. 1994).
    And we “have generally been much less forgiving in receiving late
    filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in
    preserving his legal rights.”     Irwin v. Department of Veterans
    Affairs, 
    498 U.S. 89
    , 96, 
    111 S. Ct. 453
    , 
    112 L. Ed. 2d 435
    (1990);
    see also Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 
    466 U.S. 147
    , 151,
    
    104 S. Ct. 1723
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 196
    (1984) (per curiam) (“One who fails
    to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that
    lack of diligence.”); Pacheco v. Rice, 
    966 F.2d 904
    , 906 (5th Cir.
    1992) (requiring due diligence to warrant equitable tolling).   Mr.
    Aldridge has not carried his burden of proving such circumstances
    here.   His brief only mentions that he was seriously ill, but does
    not provide specifics or discuss the nature or gravity of his
    incapacitation.   By itself, this does not establish circumstances
    warranting tolling.    Moreover, even if it were to do so, Mr.
    Aldridge was apparently no longer incapacitated at the time he
    found his journal in March 1993, but he still waited six months
    from that date to file his complaint.    Thus, even if his illness
    had tolled the filing deadline, Mr. Aldridge’s complaint would
    still have been untimely.
    Second, Mr. Aldridge argues that he was unaware of the filing
    deadline, and that the deadline should not therefore apply to him.
    Again, it is true that the time limit may be extended “when the
    5
    complainant shows that he or she was not notified of the time
    limits and was not otherwise aware of them.”   45 C.F.R. § 1225.9
    (1987) recodified at 12 C.F.R. § 268.204(a)(2)(1999).   But in this
    case, the district court determined that Mr. Aldridge was notified
    of the time limitations by EEOC posters and meetings (attended by
    Mr. Aldridge) held at the Wichita office.       Mr. Aldridge has
    presented nothing before this court to suggest that this finding
    was clearly erroneous.
    Thus, because Mr. Aldridge failed to file his complaint with
    the EEOC in a timely manner, we have no jurisdiction over his
    claims.
    III
    For the reasons stated herein, the district court decision is
    A F F I R M E D.
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