United States v. Reid ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-10037
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAMON REID,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:00-CR-62-ALL-H
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March 5, 2002
Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ramon Reid appeals his convictions for armed bank robbery,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), and for using a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He argues that the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress the written
statement he gave to officers. Reid contends that the statement
was taken unlawfully after he had invoked his right to counsel
and was the result of coercion.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-10037
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Reid’s argument is unavailing. Despite his request for
counsel, Reid initiated contact with officers, expressing a
general desire to discuss the robbery. He was given his Miranda
warnings several times prior to giving the statement, and the
statement he signed in fact contained a copy of the warnings.
Moreover, the last paragraph of Reid’s statement specifically
notes that, although he originally requested counsel, Reid waived
that right after initiating contact with the officers, seeking to
confess. The facts from the suppression hearing show that Reid’s
statement was voluntary, informed, and not the result of any
coercion. The suppression motion was thus properly denied. See
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983); Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
Reid next argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions because the eyewitness to the robbery,
Linda Sykes, did not testify that she saw him with a gun, only
that she saw a “weapon.” This argument is similarly without
merit.
The use of a firearm is an essential element of both of
Reid’s convictions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2113(a) and (d).
Sykes testified that Reid “flashed” a weapon at her during the
robbery and that she believed from his actions that he was
carrying a gun. Officers found a loaded gun in a holster at
Reid’s waistband when arresting him. Reid also admitted in his
signed statement that he had carried a loaded gun into the bank.
No. 01-10037
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Based on this evidence, the jury determined that Reid had
brandished the gun during the robbery for the purpose of
intimidating Sykes. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any reasonable jury could have
found the evidence sufficient to support such a finding. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Reid additionally contends that a certain comment by the
prosecutor during closing arguments amounted to the Government’s
vouching for Sykes’ credibility and thus constituted
prosecutorial misconduct. Even if it is assumed that the
challenged comment was improper, the argument fails because Reid
has not demonstrated that it affected his substantial rights.
See United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1998).
The prejudicial effect of the statement was slight and does not
cast doubt upon the correctness of the jury’s verdict given the
district court’s instructions to the jury and the overwhelming
evidence of Reid’s guilt. See United States v.
Anchondo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Iredia, 866 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1989).
Reid also argues that the prosecutor “misled” the jury
concerning Sykes’ testimony about whether he had a gun; he
contends that the prosecutor improperly stated that Sykes
testified that she saw a gun, when in fact, she stated only that
she saw a weapon. The argument is patently frivolous.
Reid’s final contention is that even if none of the
arguments he raises constitutes reversible error standing alone,
they should be considered cumulatively to have deprived him of a
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fair trial, in violation of his due-process rights. This
argument fails for the reason that Reid has demonstrated no trial
error whatsoever. His convictions are therefore AFFIRMED.