Columbia Med Ctr Lew v. Heller ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 01-10383
Civil Docket #3:98-CV-1108-M
_______________________
COLUMBIA MEDICAL CENTER OF LEWISVILLE,
Subsidiary LP, doing business as
Columbia Medical Center of Lewisville;
RAYMOND M. DUNNING, JR.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
JEANNEAN HELLER, CRNA; HAROLD NEWSOM, CRNA;
JOANNE LEWIS, CRNA; LOLA H. WRIGHT, CRNA,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
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February 7, 2002
Before JONES, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellants are certified registered nurse anesthetists
(CRNAs) who performed anesthesia services for patients at the
Columbia Medical Center of Lewisville in Denton County, Texas.
They appeal the district court’s confirmation of an adverse
arbitration award concerning their claims against the hospital,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
which entered into an exclusive provider contract with a
doctor/anesthesiologist group. This court’s review of the district
court’s decision is conducted under extremely narrow standards.
While the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear
error and questions of law de novo, as in other appeals, the
Federal Arbitration Act strictly limits the grounds of judicial
intervention. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 947-49, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1926 (1995); Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). The district court closely examined
appellants’ contentions and found them wanting. The court’s
reasoning is unassailable. We add only a few comments in regard to
specific issues raised on appeal.
First, there is no merit in the contention that the
arbitrators failed to issue findings of fact, conclusions of law
and a reasoned opinion in accordance with paragraph 13 of the
arbitration agreement. The arbitrators’ opinion is succinct but
comprehensive and fully comprehensible. More significantly, there
is no basis in the arbitration agreement for an inference that the
requirement of a “reasoned opinion” tended to set a higher standard
of federal court review on the merits of the arbitrators’ decision.
Paragraph 17 of the agreement, which references the parties’ appeal
rights, says nothing about a heightened standard of review.
Compare Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp,
64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Since appellants do not explain how the arbitrators’
alleged failure to apply the Texas Arbitration Act and common law
prejudice their case, no reversible error is set forth. Not only
do we disagree that the arbitrators ignored Texas law but even
appellants acknowledge that federal and Texas arbitration law are
harmonious.
On appeal, the CRNAs characterize their complaints about
the admission and exclusion of evidence in several ways that they
assert should lead to the vacatur of the arbitral award. The
district court addressed most of these claims thoroughly. In no
sense can the evidentiary rulings, taken individually or with other
actions for which appellants now chastise the arbitrators, be said
to amount to misconduct, misbehavior or bias under the statute.
To the extent that the CRNAs contend that the arbitrators
misinterpreted applicable law – by (a) erroneously invoking a state
evidentiary privilege to exclude evidence of the hospital’s alleged
antitrust violations; (b) concluding that the employment
discrimination claims had not been administratively exhausted; and
(c) misapplying the law concerning tying arrangements – they have
simply come up short of the proof necessary to overturn the award.
It is immaterial to our review under the FAA whether this court
agrees with the arbitration panel’s disposition of legal issues.
There is some question whether the extra-statutory basis for
vacating arbitral awards known as “manifest disregard of the law”
applies in cases other than those involving employment
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discrimination. Compare Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors,
Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 758 (5th Cir. 1999), with McIlroy v. Paine-
Webber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir. 1993). It is unlikely
that the manifest disregard standard would apply to this case, but
even if it did, there is a wide gulf between the interpretive and
factual errors asserted by appellants and any proof that the
arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law applicable to
appellants’ claims.
Several of appellants’ remaining issues attempt to
shoehorn various of the arbitrators’ alleged errors into categories
covered by the FAA. Those attempts are adjectival, conclusory and
unpersuasive.
For the foregoing reasons, in addition to the reasons
stated by the district court, we affirm that court’s judgment
upholding the arbitral award.
AFFIRMED.
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