McKnight v. Alford ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-41217
JO LYNN MCKNIGHT; SUSAN BANKS;
STACY NAVA
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
VERSUS
GARY L JOHNSON, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division, ET AL
Defendants,
GARY L JOHNSON, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division; J E ALFORD,
Warden, Eastham Unit, Individually
and in Official Capacity; WAYNE
SCOTT; ROBERT EASTON, Assistant Warden,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division; JAMES D
MAYFIELD, Assistant Warden, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division; D L STACKS
Defendants - Appellants
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(No. 6:99-CV-18)
November 9, 2001
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs-Appellees are three former prison employees whose
husbands are prison inmates. By virtue of their having been
prison employees, Plaintiffs had their visitation rights
terminated, prison officials having concluded that the former
employees’ knowledge of prison procedure puts at risk prison
security. Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing
that prison officials violated their First Amendment right to
intimate association. They also argue that as former prison
employees they were singled out and received unequal treatment in
violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection. The officials in turn moved for summary judgment,
contending that they enjoy qualified immunity. The district
court denied the motion, and Defendants bring this interlocutory
appeal. We reverse.
The Supreme Court has made immediately appealable a district
court’s refusal to extend qualified immunity to state officials.
See Mitchell v. Fortsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). We review a
district court’s immunity determination de novo. See Cozzo v.
Tangipahoa Parish Coun., 262 F.3d 501, 510 (5th Cir. 2001). A
state official is entitled to qualified immunity unless
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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Plaintiffs can show the violation of a constitutional right and
that the right was clearly established when the violation
occurred. See Kipps v. Caillier, 197 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir.
1999). “A right is ‘clearly established’ if its contours are
‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.’” See Cozzo, 262 F.3d
at 511 (quoting Anderson v. Creigton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
We cannot conclude that Plaintiffs had a clearly-established
right to visit their inmate-husbands. As the district court
correctly noted, the Supreme Court has found that the right to
intimate association is fundamental, the Court having ruled as
much in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18
(1984). The district court also correctly noted that the Court
has not specifically held that this right protects inmates and
their spouses. Generally, that a right has not been applied to a
given situation does not mean that it is not clearly established
for purposes of a qualified immunity analysis. See Wooley v.
City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 919 (5th Cir. 2000). But the
application of constitutional rights takes on a different tenor
when applied to a prison setting. True, “Prison walls do not
form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of
the Constitution.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. But legitimate
penological objectives require that we not undo official actions
or regulations so long as they are reasonably related to the
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stated objectives. See id. at 87. Consistent with this
standard, we have upheld the constitutionality of bans on
conjugal visits between an inmate and his spouse as to each. See
McCray v. L.B. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (5th Cir.
1975)(upholding ban in the face of challenge by inmate); Davis v.
Carlson, 837 F.2d 1318, 1319 (5th Cir. 1988)(rejecting challenge
by inmate’s wife). More to the point, we have held that
“incarcerated persons . . . maintain no right to simple physical
association--with their parents or with anyone else--grounded in
the first amendment.” Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1274 (5th
Cir. 1985).
Nor are we convinced that Plaintiffs were singled out for
unequal treatment. Plaintiffs argue that prison officials’
prohibition on former employees’ visiting their inmate-spouses
distinguishes between prison staff who entered into a
relationship with an inmate during the course of their employment
and staff who already had such a relationship before they were
hired. Plaintiffs concede that this is not the sort of suspect
classification entitled to heightened scrutiny, but they
nonetheless insist that there is not even a rational basis for
such disparate treatment. Plaintiffs’ argument notwithstanding,
we see no evidence of an actual classification, Plaintiffs not
having shown that Defendants ever hired spouses of inmates for
prison work. But even if there were such evidence, we cannot
conclude that the justification given for the ban on visits
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between former employees and inmate-spouses--namely, that the
former employees’ inside knowledge of prison procedure poses a
security risk, and that prison officials want to discourage such
relationships generally--is irrational.
Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, which we must do
when reviewing the denial of qualified immunity in the context of
summary judgment ruling, see Wagner v. Bay City, Texas, 227 F.3d
316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000), we conclude that Plaintiffs have not
alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional
right. Having determined that there was no material violation,
we do not reach Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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