Brown v. G B Biosciences ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 00-20939
_______________________
CAROLYN ANN BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
G.B. BIOSCIENCES,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Civil Docket #H-99-CV-1742
_________________________________________________________________
November 28, 2001
Before JONES, DeMOSS, Circuit Judges and LIMBAUGH,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:*
The court has carefully considered Brown’s appeal of the
district court’s adverse summary judgment on her claim that she was
fired in retaliation for complaints of sex-and race-based
discrimination and a hostile work environment. The district court
*
District Judge of the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by
designation.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
found that Brown could not establish a causal connection between
her protected activities and the discharge, inasmuch as she
admitted to sleeping on the job during a probationary period, which
caused her termination, and there was no close temporal proximity
between her complaints and the company’s disciplinary action.
Alternatively, the court found insufficient evidence that the
employer’s explanation for her termination was false and
pretextual.
After reviewing the briefs and pertinent portions of the
record, we agree with the district court’s conclusions. Brown
produced no evidence from which it could be inferred that her
complaints about a picture on her computer in early 1996, or an
unwanted kiss on the cheek at the 1997 holiday party were connected
in any way to her being placed on probation in April, 1998 or her
being fired for violation of probationary conditions in August of
that year. See Mato v. Baldauf, 267 F.3d 444, (5th Cir. 2001)
(plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that a causal connection existed
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.)
Further, Brown did not present sufficient evidence to permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that the employer’s basis for
terminating her was unworthy of credence and a pretext for
discrimination or retaliation. Mato, citing Crawford v. Formosa
Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899, 902-03 (5th Cir. 2001). Brown
admitted the crucial facts that she was on probation and that she
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was found sleeping on the job, which was precisely one of the acts
that led to her probation.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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