United States v. O'Neal ( 2001 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-30864
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    L.S. POUNCY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 00-30958
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CLYDE O’NEAL, III,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 00-31146
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ROY LEE DEBOSE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 99-CR-50082-3
    --------------------
    November 19, 2001
    No. 00-30864
    No. 00-30958
    No. 00-31146
    -2-
    Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    L.S. Pouncy and Clyde O’Neal appeal the sentences following
    their guilty plea convictions.    Pouncy pleaded guilty to
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 or more grams
    of cocaine base.    O’Neal pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine.      Both
    Pouncy and O’Neal assented to a forfeiture-of-property count
    under 21 U.S.C. § 853.    Roy Lee Debose was convicted by a jury of
    two conspiracy counts, one to possess with intent to distribute
    500 or more grams of cocaine and one to possess with intent to
    distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base.
    Pouncy argues that $100 special assessment should not have
    been imposed for his forfeiture count.     However, Pouncy did not
    raise this objection in the district court, and he has not shown
    that the imposition of the special assessment was plain error.
    See United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 
    162 F.3d 863
    , 870 (5th
    Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).    His sentence is AFFIRMED.
    O’Neal argues that the district court should have credited
    his offense level by two because O’Neal was a minor participant
    in the offense.    Our review of the presentence report and
    sentencing record reveals that the district court did not clearly
    err by not sustaining O’Neal’s role-in-the-offense objection.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 00-30864
    No. 00-30958
    No. 00-31146
    -3-
    See United States v. Zuniga, 
    18 F.3d 1254
    , 1261 (5th Cir. 1994).
    O’Neal was also imposed a $100 special assessment for his
    forfeiture count; however, like Pouncy, he does not show that the
    special assessment was plain error.    O’Neal’s sentence is
    AFFIRMED.
    Debose argues that there was insufficient evidence to
    support his conviction for either of his conspiracy counts, that
    there was a material variance between the trial evidence and the
    conspiracy allegations in the indictment, that the district court
    should have sentenced Debose within the Sentencing Guidelines
    range for count two because he satisfied the requirements of the
    safety-valve provision, that he should have been assessed only
    one criminal history point, and that he should have received a
    minimal-role-in-the-offense adjustment to his offense level.
    Our review of the trial evidence reveals that Debose was
    aware of the conspiracy and that he took actions to participate
    in the conspiracy.     See United States v. Puig-Infante, 
    19 F.3d 929
    , 936 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morris, 
    46 F.3d 410
    ,
    416 (5th Cir. 1995).    The evidence at trial did not prove that
    Debose was involved in a conspiracy different than the one
    alleged in the indictment; nor were Debose’s substantial rights
    affected.   See United States v. Morgan, 
    117 F.3d 849
    , 858 (5th
    Cir. 1997); United States v. Mikolajczyk, 
    137 F.3d 237
    , 243 (5th
    Cir. 1998).   The calculation of his criminal history category was
    correct, Debose did not meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C.
    No. 00-30864
    No. 00-30958
    No. 00-31146
    -4-
    § 3553(f), and he was not entitled to be sentenced under the
    safety-valve provision.     See United States v. Flanagan, 
    80 F.3d 143
    , 146 (5th Cir. 1996).    The district court’s refusal to credit
    Debose’s offense level for a role-in-the-offense adjustment was
    not clear error.   See Zuniga, 
    18 F.3d 1254
    , 1261.
    Debose’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.    Pouncy’s and
    O’Neal’s sentences are AFFIRMED.