Ogunbor v. City of New Orleans ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-30894
Summary Calendar
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CHERYL OGUNBOR,
formerly known as Cheryl Hillery
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; RONNIE OWENS; CAROLYN
BRYANT; AVIS MARIE RUSSELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 96-CV-712-K
July 19, 1999
Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Cheryl Ogunbor, pro se, appeals the judgment for Appellees
following a jury trial in her action against them. We AFFIRM.
I.
Ogunbor, who was employed by the City of New Orleans, claimed
that another City employee, appellee Ronnie Owens, subjected her to
sexual harassment, including an incident where she claims he groped
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
at her body. Ogunbor filed three charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission before filing this action, in which she
claimed, inter alia, violations of Title VII (including sexual
harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation for filing a
charge with the EEOC), defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. On the same day as the City was served with
this action, Ogunbor’s employment was terminated.
At trial, Ogunbor, Owens, and other City employees and named
defendants testified regarding the events alleged in Ogunbor’s
complaint. Her doctors also testified regarding her physical and
mental condition during the relevant time period. The jury
returned a verdict for Appellees.
II.
Ogunbor, who was employed by the City as a legal secretary,
was represented by counsel in the district court, but, as noted,
appeals pro se. Of course, we liberally construe such briefs.
See, e.g., Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1027-28
(5th Cir. 1988). Ogunbor appears to challenge three actions by the
district court: excluding certain evidence; not instructing the
jury as to the consequences of failure to reach a unanimous
verdict; and denying her new trial motion.
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A.
Ogunbor’s first claim is that the district court’s erroneous
evidentiary ruling biased the jury’s verdict. But, Ogunbor does
not cite to the record for when this ruling occurred. She states
that the court erred in precluding her from testifying as to an
allegedly harassing comment made to her by another secretary;
however, the record of her testimony does not bear this assertion
out. A different witness testified that she heard the other
secretary make an “inappropriate” comment; but, upon objection by
Appellees, Ogunbor’s counsel stated that she had no intention of
even asking what the comment was.
In her reply brief, Ogunbor mentions evidence that she wanted
to introduce regarding the sexual harassment of other women by
Owens. However, she fails to cite to any place in the record where
she attempted to introduce this evidence, made a proffer of the
evidence, or was denied the right to mention this evidence, and our
review of the record reveals none. Because Ogunbor has failed to
cite to the record as to where these alleged errors occurred and
has neglected to cite any authority supporting her position on this
issue, we deem the matter abandoned. See, e.g., id. (“Although we
liberally construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require
that arguments must be briefed to be preserved”)(citation omitted);
FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(4).
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B.
Ogunbor next claims that the court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on the consequences of a failure to reach a
unanimous verdict. She cites no authority for requiring such an
instruction, and it is unclear that such an instruction was
requested. Arguments that are not briefed are deemed abandoned.
See, e.g., Price, 846 F.2d at 1027-28; FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(4).
C.
Finally, Ogunbor asserts that the court erred in denying her
new trial motion. Following the verdict, Ogunbor’s counsel filed
such a motion. Although Ogunbor is not explicit about the relief
that she seeks, she is limited to a new trial because she did not
seek judgment as a matter of law in district court. See Whitehead
v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 270-71 (5th Cir.
1998). We review denials of new trial motions for abuse of
discretion and will affirm unless the movant, in district court,
demonstrates “an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s
verdict”. Id. at 269. (Internal quotation omitted). Pursuant to
our reveiw of the record and the briefs, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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