Hill v. Fort Bend Indep Sch ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________
No. 01-20297
Summary Calendar
______________________________
CHERYL E. HILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant
VERSUS
FORT BEND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(H-99-CV-3961)
___________________________________________________
September 26, 2001
Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff, Cheryl Hill, has asserted claims of race and age
discrimination against the Defendant, Fort Bend Independent School
District,(hereinafter referred to as “FBISD” or the “District)
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
because of the District’s failure to promote her to various
administrative positions on numerous occasions. On appeal, Hill
contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
against her on each of her claims. For the following reasons, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff Hill is a 53 year old black female who has worked as
a teacher since 1970. In 1989, Hill began teaching in the FBISD.
In 1994, she commenced an English as a Second Language (“ESL”)
teaching position at Townewest Elementary School in the District.
Hill alleges in this lawsuit that, since 1988, FBISD has
denied her promotions to approximately twenty administrative
positions because of her race and/or age in violation of both Title
VII and the ADEA. Hill also contends that the District subjected
her to a hostile working environment during her tenure as an ESL
teacher, and unlawfully retaliated against her for filing an EEOC
charge.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment de novo, applying the standard set forth in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56. See Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 624
(5th Cir. 2000). Thus, we view all evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable
inferences in the party’s favor. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
2
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105
(2000).
III. ANALYSIS
1. Continuing Violation Doctrine
Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in finding
that her nonpromotion claims prior to June 10, 1998 are time-barred
due to her failure to file an EEOC charge within the required 300
day period. We disagree.
A jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit under both Title
VII and the ADEA is that a plaintiff must file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC within three hundred days after
learning of the alleged discriminatory conduct. See Griffin v.
City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612 (5th Cir. 1994); Conaway v.
Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d 358, 362 & n.3. However, the Fifth
Circuit has recognized the continuing violation doctrine as an
equitable exception to the statutory limitations period. See
Huckaby v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998).
In Huckaby, the Court noted that, “[a]lthough there is no
definitive standard for what constitutes a continuing violation,
the plaintiff must demonstrate more than a series of discriminatory
acts. He must show an organized scheme leading to and including a
present violation, such that it is the cumulative effect of the
discriminatory practice, rather than any discrete occurrence, which
gives rise to the cause of action.” Id. at 239. Applying this
3
language to the case before it, the Huckaby Court found that the
employer’s failure to promote the plaintiff was an isolated
occurrence which should have put the plaintiff on notice that a
claim had accrued. Id. at 240. As such, the plaintiff’s claims
concerning his failure to be promoted were time-barred. Id. In
light of Huckaby, we find that Hill’s claims regarding her lack of
promotions prior to June 10, 1998 are similarly time-barred.
2. Race and Age Discrimination Claims
Hill’s claims for racial and age discrimination which are not
time-barred are governed by the tripartite burden-shifting test
established by McDonnel Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93
S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Under this test, if Hill
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of
production shifts to the District to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for not selecting Hill. If the District
satisfies this burden of production, Hill must prove that the
legitimate reason offered by the District for not selecting her is
not the true reason, but is merely a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. See Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 326 (5th
Cir. 1993).
In order to establish the prima facie case of her Title VII
failure to promote claim, Hill must demonstrate that she was: (1)
within a protected class; (2)qualified for the positions sought;
(3) not promoted; and (4) the positions she sought were filled by
4
someone outside the protected class. See Blow v. City of San
Antonio, Texas, 236 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2001). Hill must also
satisfy these four elements to establish her prima facie case for
her ADEA claim. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 348
(5th Cir. 2001).
In the instant case, Hill has satisfied the four prongs of the
prima facie case for both her race and age discrimination claims.
It is apparent that the first and third prongs are satisfied. With
respect to the second prongs, the parties do not dispute that Hill
had the general, minimal qualifications for many of the
administrative positions sought. With respect to the fourth
prongs, it is true that some of the administrative positions were
filled by black applicants, and applicants over the age of forty.
However, since various positions were filled by individuals outside
the protected classes, the fourth prongs of both claims are also
satisfied. See Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir.
2001).
The District has also met its burden of producing a non-
discriminatory reason for failing to promote Hill on each of the
relevant occasions. Specifically, the District has articulated
that Hill has not been promoted because she was never as qualified
as the various candidates selected. However, Hill has failed to
produce enough evidence to raise a material issue of fact
concerning her contention that the District’s explanation for
5
failing to promote her is pretextual for the following reasons.
First, there is absolutely no evidence that Hill was subjected
to discriminatory racial or age-related remarks. Second, Hill has
not produced any evidence which would demonstrate that she was more
qualified than the applicants selected for the various
administrative positions. Indeed, there is a dearth of evidence
concerning the qualifications and abilities of the applicants hired
to fill the positions sought by Hill. Without comparative evidence
of a gross disparity between Hill’s qualifications and those of the
successful applicants, it is exceedingly difficult to rebut the
District’s assertion that Hill was not promoted because she was not
the most qualified individual. See Deines v. Texas Department of
Protective and Regulatory Services, 164 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir.
1999).
Third, and, perhaps of most importance, the evidence shows
that many minority employees and employees over age 40 were
actually hired to fill the positions that Hill sought. For
example, Hill applied for an assistant principal position for the
summer 1999 term and 1999-2000 school year. She was not hired for
any of these positions. However, the District filled the four
regular term elementary school assistant principal positions
available for the 1999-2000 school year with a white individual,
age 43, a black individual, age 26, a Hispanic individual, age 35,
and a black individual, age 49. Of the individuals chosen as
6
summer school principals and assistant principals for summer 1999,
four were white and three were black. Moreover, out of the
approximately twenty-one positions in which Hill applied but did
not garner a promotion, fifteen positions were filled by persons
over the age of 40; nine positions were filled by whites, nine
positions were filled by blacks; and three positions were filled by
Hispanics. This numerical evidence tends to negate the inference
that individuals were not being hired because of their race or age.
Fourth, attached to her summary judgment motion, Hill produced
affidavits from several of her fellow teachers which praised her
ability to teach reading. These affidavits tended to show that
Hill was a good teacher who brought out the best in her students.
In fact, Hill contends that because she has been a successful
teacher for many years, she is better qualified for a promotion to
an administrative position than younger, less experienced
educators.
However, the District argues that making a decision upon the
best applicant involves more than merely finding the person who has
worked more years as a teacher. According to the District, there
are a multitude of factors which are taken into account in the
hiring decisions for administrative positions. These include an
applicant’s academic or technical preparation, certification,
experience as it relates to the vacancy, recommendations and
references, evaluations, suitability for the positions, and the
7
ability to interact with others.
At the summary judgment stage, the District introduced certain
affidavits from Hill’s supervisors which indicated that, despite
her teaching abilities, Hill has certain personal characteristics
which impede her ability to work well with others. Hill’s alleged
interpersonal relationship weaknesses, in combination with the fact
that many black applicants as well as many individuals over the age
of forty have successfully attained promotions similar to the ones
sought after by Hill, severely undermine her contention that the
District’s stated reason for failure to promote her is a pretext
for unlawful race and/or age discrimination.
In sum, Hill’s prima facie case is weak, the probative value
of her proof of pretext is low, and the District’s statistical
evidence is compelling. In the instant case, these factors negate
any inference of racial and/or age discrimination. See Reeves, 120
S. Ct. at 2109. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to create a jury issue
on whether the District’s proffered reason for failing to promote
her was a pretext for discrimination.
3. Hostile Working Environment Claim
The district court also did not err in dismissing Hill’s
hostile work environment claim. Although Hill makes several
unsubstantiated allegations of general harassment, the crux of
Hill’s hostile working environment claim is that her supervisors
constantly requested her schedules and asked her questions about
8
the ESL program. We concur with the district court’s determination
that these types of complaints do not demonstrate that Hill has
been subjected to racial or age-based harassment that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions
of her employment and create an abusive working environment. See
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405,
91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986).
4. Retaliation Claims
With respect to Hill’s retaliation claims, we concur with the
District Court’s assessment that any alleged retaliation claims
that occurred prior to May 30, 1999 are time-barred. Furthermore,
the record reflects that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a causal
connection between her filing of the April 5, 1999 EEOC charge and
any adverse employment action.
5. State Law Claims
Finally, Hill contends that her slander/defamation claims
should not have been dismissed by the district court. Her
contention is without merit. An independent school district is an
agency of the state and, while exercising governmental functions,
is not answerable in a suit sounding in tort because of sovereign
immunity. See Barr v. Bernhard, 562 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1978).
Although the Texas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity under
certain circumstances, the waiver of immunity for school districts
is limited to claims arising from accidents involving the use of
9
motor-driven vehicles. See LeLeauax v. Hamshire Fannet Indep. Sch.
Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the District on each of Plaintiff’s claims is AFFIRMED.
10