Kadonsky v. United States , 216 F.3d 499 ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-11341
Conference Calendar
STEVEN J. KADONSKY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 96-CV-2969
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August 27, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Steven J. Kadonsky appeals from a judgment issued by the
magistrate judge denying his claim for the return of currency
seized and subsequently administratively forfeited by the Drug
Enforcement Administration. For the reasons assigned, we dismiss
the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
The statutory authority for a magistrate judge to adjudicate
a matter is found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which provides in
pertinent part:
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 98-11341
-2-
(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a . . .
magistrate [judge] . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order
the entry of judgment in the case, when specially
designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the
district court or courts he serves....
(emphasis added). When a magistrate judge enters judgment
pursuant to § 636(c)(1), the absence of the parties’ consent and
a reference (or special designation) order from the district
court “results in a lack of jurisdiction (or at least fundamental
error that may be complained of for the first time on appeal).”
United States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1999)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 1795 (1999).
A review of the record reveals that Kadonsky never consented
to have this matter adjudicated by the magistrate judge.
Although the Government signed a form consenting to have the
magistrate judge decide this matter, Kadonsky did not. Nor does
the record indicate that the district court referred the matter
to the magistrate judge or otherwise specially designated her
pursuant to § 636(c)(1). As a result, the magistrate judge
lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment in this case. See
Muhammad, 165 F.3d at 330-31.
The magistrate judge’s order, therefore, is not a final and
appealable one. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction,
and the appeal is DISMISSED. See Trufant v. Autocon, Inc., 729
F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1984).
DISMISSED