Gustavo Barrios-Cantarero v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 772 F.3d 1019 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-60545    Document: 00512845747     Page: 1   Date Filed: 11/21/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-60545
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    GUSTAVO BARRIOS-CANTARERO,                                      November 21, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Petitioner            Clerk
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JONES and HIGGINSON, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Petitioner Gustavo Barrios-Cantarero petitions this court for review of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals' (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration
    Judge's (“IJ”) denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings and rescind
    an in absentia removal order. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) and (c)(7)(C)(ii)
    For the following reasons, we GRANT the petition.
    On May 30, 2001, Gustavo Barrios-Cantarero (“Barrios-Cantarero”), a
    native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States near Fabens,
    Texas, with his brother, Adrian Eliseo Barrios-Cantarero (“Adrian Eliseo”).
    U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended the brothers shortly after entry. The
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    No. 13-60545
    agents gave each brother a separate Notice to Appear (“NTA”), ordering each
    to appear before an immigration judge on “a date to be set” and at “a time to
    be set.” Before being released on his own recognizance, Barrios-Cantarero
    provided the agents with an address in Fremont, California, where he would
    be staying with family. Adrian Eliseo provided the same address.
    On June 28, 2001, the immigration court sent one Notice of Hearing
    (”NOH”) to the Fremont, California, address. The NOH was addressed only to
    Adrian Eliseo and stated that it served as notice to the “Alien” for a “hearing”
    to be conducted on September 25, 2001, in the “above captioned case.”
    Problematically, the header of the document contained two case citations, one
    for each brother.
    Barrios-Cantarero failed to attend his September 25, 2001, removal
    hearing and an in absentia removal order was entered against him. That same
    day, the immigration court sent a letter containing a number of documents to
    Barrios-Cantarero at his Fremont address. This time, the letter was addressed
    directly to Barrios-Cantarero and contained documents pertaining solely to his
    proceedings. Among the documents were a copy of the warrant that had been
    served upon him while he had been detained, a copy of the NTA, a copy of the
    government memorandum notifying the immigration Court that he had been
    released on his own recognizance, a copy of the in absentia removal order, and
    information regarding the BIA review process.        The letter contained no
    reference to the NOH that had been sent to Adrian Eliseo.
    More than a decade later, Barrios-Cantarero moved to reopen his
    removal proceedings and rescind the in absentia order, claiming that he failed
    to receive proper notice, and in the alternative, that changed conditions in
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    Guatemala entitled him to reopen proceedings. 1 The IJ denied the motion to
    reopen, determining that the petitioner had received proper notice of the
    hearing and that conditions in Guatemala had not changed materially since
    the time of the original hearing. The BIA affirmed the IJ and this petition for
    review followed.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court reviews the denial of a motion to reopen “under a highly
    deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Zhao v. Gonzales, 
    404 F.3d 295
    , 303
    (5th Cir. 2005). The Board abuses its discretion when it issues a decision that
    is capricious, irrational, utterly without foundation in the evidence, based on
    legally erroneous interpretations of statutes or regulations, or based on
    unexplained departures from regulations or established policies. 
    Zhao, 404 F.3d at 303
    ; Alarcon-Chavez v. Gonzales, 
    403 F.3d 343
    , 345 (5th Cir. 2005)
    (“[W]e conclude that it was legal error, and therefore abuse of discretion.”). The
    BIA's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, although deference is given to
    the BIA's interpretation of immigration regulations if that interpretation is
    reasonable. Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 
    436 F.3d 516
    , 519 (5th Cir. 2006).
    Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.               Zhu v. Gonzales,
    
    493 F.3d 588
    , 594 (5th Cir. 2007).
    DISCUSSION
    Despite the high review bar, the BIA abused its discretion by denying
    Barrios-Cantarero’s motion to reopen, because insufficient notice of the
    removal proceedings entitled him to reopen proceedings at any time. 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)
    1 Because we resolve the case under the “proper notice” grounds contained in 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), we need not address the “changed conditions” argument based on
    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
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    The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) requires the government
    to give written notice that specifies the “time and place” of removal proceedings
    to an alien charged with being subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
    This written notice must be given either in person or “through service by mail
    to the alien or to the alien’s counsel of record.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) & (2)(A).
    If an alien proves that he did not receive notice in compliance with the Act, the
    alien is entitled to rescind the in absentia ruling and reopen the proceedings.
    8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
    Federal regulations give further guidance as to the proper interpretation
    of the INA’s requirement that the government give notice “to the alien.”
    8 C.F.R. § 103.8(a)(1)(i) states that notice must be “addressed to the affected
    party” and the party’s representative of record. After the alien reaches the age
    of fourteen, notice is generally sent to directly to the alien, rather than a
    guardian. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii) (requiring notice be given to an adult if
    the alien is under fourteen years of age); Lopez-Dubon v. Holder, 
    609 F.3d 642
    ,
    646 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming propriety of serving a seventeen year old alien).
    The BIA committed legal error by determining that Barrios-Cantarero
    was properly given notice through a letter addressed to Adrian Eliseo and
    therefore abused its discretion by denying his motion to reopen. The only
    document in the record that could possibly amount to notice for Barrios-
    Cantarero is a Notice of Hearing in Removal Proceedings addressed solely to
    Adrian Eliseo, a third-party alien also subject to removal proceedings. The
    body of that letter refers to a hearing in the “case,” a singular noun. Similarly,
    the Certificate of Service explains that the document was served by mail on
    the “Alien,” once again using a singular noun. The header of the letter does
    include two case citations, one for each brother.       But given the singular
    language of the letter combined with the fact that it is only addressed to Adrian
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    Eliseo, the letter therefore only gives notice to Adrian Eliseo and does not
    appear to be helpful in providing notice to Barrios-Cantarero.
    Aside from these deficiencies of the document, the federal regulations
    interpreting the INA require service of notice by mail to be addressed to the
    affected party and his representative of record in order for notice to be proper.
    8 C.F.R. § 103.8(a)(1)(i). We review the BIA's conclusions of law de novo, but
    defer to the BIA's interpretation of immigration regulations, unless that
    interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations.
    Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 
    436 F.3d 516
    , 519 (5th Cir. 2006); Silwany-
    Rodriguez v. I.N.S., 
    975 F.2d 1157
    , 1160 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, the BIA failed
    to apply 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(a)(1)(i) in determining whether Barrios-Cantarero
    had received proper notice of his hearing; its proper notice conclusion is owed
    no deference. The document is clearly not addressed to Barrios-Cantarero and
    therefore cannot be proper notice to him. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii),
    the lack of sufficient notice entitled Barrios-Cantarero to reopen his
    proceedings at any time. Accordingly, the BIA abused its discretion in denying
    Barrios-Cantarero’s motion to reopen. 2
    The Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) arguments why Barrios-Cantarero
    was properly served with notice are unpersuasive. First, DOJ argues that the
    brothers’ cases had been consolidated, thus allowing the immigration court to
    address the letter to a single brother and still properly serve both of them with
    notice. DOJ also contends that notice addressed solely to Adrian Eliseo was
    proper since Barrios-Cantarero was under eighteen years old and his brother
    was an adult. Both positions are unconvincing.
    2   Because the NOH here was not addressed to Barrios-Cantarero, as required, any
    issue of “presumed delivery” is not before us.
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    The record contains no evidence that the brothers’ cases were
    consolidated. In fact, the record suggests the opposite; all prior and subsequent
    correspondence and all proceedings dealt separately with each brother. The
    immigration court clerk’s letter containing the in absentia order was addressed
    solely to Barrios-Cantarero, the in absentia order was entered against Barrios-
    Cantarero separately, the removal order was entered against Barrios-
    Cantarero    separately,    the   Immigration     and   Customs        Enforcement
    memorandum      detailing   Barrios-Cantarero’s     release    was    written   and
    submitted to the immigration court separately, and Barrios-Cantarero was
    given a separate NTA and warrant when he was apprehended.
    Adrian Eliseo’s status as an adult while Barrios-Cantarero was under
    the age of eighteen also fails to cure the government’s notice error. After age
    fourteen, notice need not be given to an alien’s guardian.            
    Lopez-Dubon, 609 F.3d at 646
    (affirming propriety of serving a seventeen year old alien).
    Indeed, all other correspondence from the government was directed specifically
    to Barrios-Cantarero. Moreover, nothing in the record establishes Adrian
    Eliseo as Barrios-Cantarero’s representative of record, even if he was Barrios-
    Cantarero’s older brother. Therefore arguing for the propriety of the notice
    based on Adrian Eliseo’s age still departs from the federal regulation, since it
    requires notice be addressed to the affected party.
    Accordingly, the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    decision is GRANTED.
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