United States v. Arroyo-Villafana ( 2003 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS           May 19, 2003
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-51035
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    HECTOR NAIN ARROYO-VILLAFANA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. A-02-CR-166-ALL
    --------------------
    Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Hector Nain Arroyo-Villafana (“Arroyo”) appeals the sentence
    imposed following his guilty plea conviction for illegal re-entry
    into the United States after commission of an aggravated felony.
    Arroyo challenges both the reasons for and the extent of the
    district court’s upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.
    He also contends that the sentencing provision found in 8 U.S.C.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 02-51035
    -2-
    § 1326(b)(2) is unconstitutional based on Apprendi v. New Jersey,
    
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000).
    Contrary to Arroyo’s contentions, the record shows that the
    district court did not base its decision to depart upwardly on
    speculation that Arroyo had further unknown convictions or place
    the burden of proof on Arroyo to show that he would not commit
    future crimes.   The district court properly considered Arroyo’s
    use of multiple aliases and dates of birth in determining that
    his criminal history category did not adequately reflect the
    likelihood that he would commit other crimes.   See United States
    v. Rosogie, 
    21 F.3d 632
    , 634 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Given Arroyo’s 13 prior convictions, four deportations, 19
    criminal history points, and use of numerous aliases and dates of
    birth, the district court’s conclusion that Arroyo’s criminal
    history category failed to adequately reflect the seriousness of
    his past criminal conduct or the likelihood that he would commit
    other crimes is not clearly erroneous.    See id.; United States v.
    Laury, 
    985 F.2d 1293
    , 1310 (5th Cir. 1993).   While the guidelines
    did incorporate some of Arroyo’s criminal history into his
    offense level, the district court’s findings provided
    justification for the upward departure, given Arroyo’s criminal
    history points and the relatively small adjustment to his offense
    level.   See United States v. Ford, 
    996 F.2d 83
    , 87-88 (5th Cir.
    1993).   Accordingly, the district court’s decision to depart
    No. 02-51035
    -3-
    upwardly was not an abuse of discretion.   See id.; 
    Laury, 985 F.2d at 1310
    .
    The extent of the district court’s departure was reasonable
    and within the wide discretion afforded to the district court.
    See United States v. Hawkins, 
    87 F.3d 722
    , 728 (5th Cir. 1996);
    
    Rosogie, 21 F.3d at 634
    .   The district court properly remained
    within the guidelines by departing to a higher offense level
    within criminal history category VI.   See United States v.
    Lambert, 
    984 F.2d 658
    , 663 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).   While the
    district court did not explicitly explain why intermediate
    offense levels were rejected, we have rejected the notion that a
    district court, when departing on the basis of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3,
    must “go through a ritualistic exercise in which it mechanically
    discusses each criminal history category it rejects en route to
    the category that it selects.”   
    Id. Arroyo concedes
    that his argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)
    is unconstitutional is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United
    States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235 (1998), but asserts that the decision
    has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    ,
    490 (2000).   He seeks to preserve his argument for further
    review.
    Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres.   See 
    Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90
    ; United States v. Dabeit, 
    231 F.3d 979
    , 984
    (5th Cir. 2000).   As Arroyo acknowledges, this court must follow
    Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself
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    -4-
    determines to overrule it.”   
    Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984
    (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    For the foregoing reasons, Arroyo’s sentence is AFFIRMED.