United States v. Rostro-Morales ( 2003 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                   June 25, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-21260
    Conference Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MARTIN ROSTRO-MORALES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-02-CR-257-ALL
    --------------------
    Before DeMOSS, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Martin Rostro-Morales (“Rostro”) appeals his guilty-plea
    conviction and sentence for being found in the United States
    without permission, following deportation, in violation of
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    .    Rostro concedes that his appellate arguments
    are foreclosed.    He nevertheless raises two issues to preserve
    them for possible further review.
    Rostro renews his argument that the district court erred
    in determining that his prior state felony conviction for
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 02-21260
    -2-
    possession of cocaine was a “drug trafficking crime” under
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(B) and thus an “aggravated felony”
    which warranted an eight-level increase in his base offense
    level under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) and 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2).
    Rostro’s argument regarding the definitions of “drug trafficking
    crime” and “aggravated felony” is foreclosed by United States
    v. Caicedo-Cuero, 
    312 F.3d 697
    , 706-11 (5th Cir. 2002), cert.
    denied, 
    123 S. Ct. 1948
     (2003).    Accordingly, the district
    court did not err in determining that his prior conviction was
    an “aggravated felony” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).
    Rostro also argues, for the first time on appeal, that
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b) is unconstitutional because it treats a prior
    conviction for a felony or aggravated felony as a sentencing
    factor and not as an element of the offense.    Rostro’s argument
    is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235, 239-47 (1998).    The Supreme Court did not overrule
    Almendarez-Torres in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 489-90
    (2000).    See United States v. Dabeit, 
    231 F.3d 979
    , 984 (5th Cir.
    2000).    Thus, the district court did not err in sentencing Rostro
    under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b).
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.