United States v. Eddie Jackson ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 19-30252       Document: 00515221409         Page: 1     Date Filed: 12/03/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 19-30252
    FILED
    December 3, 2019
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    EDDIE KENDRICKS JACKSON, also known as Mookie, also known as Mook
    Dog,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 1:17-CR-172-1
    Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Eddie Kendricks Jackson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50
    grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture
    containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
    The district court sentenced him to, inter alia, 300-months’ imprisonment,
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 19-30252
    below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 324- to 405-months’
    imprisonment.
    Challenging only his sentence, Jackson asserts primarily that the court
    erred by treating his convictions at age 17 as predicate offenses in determining
    he was a career offender under the Guidelines, despite the Louisiana
    legislature’s having recently changed the age at which an offender must be
    considered an adult to 18-years-old. (As discussed infra, his other sentencing
    issue is waived.)
    Although post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory only, the district
    court must avoid significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating
    the Guidelines sentencing range. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 46, 51
    (2007). If no such procedural error exists, a properly preserved objection to an
    ultimate sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-
    of-discretion standard. 
    Id. at 51;
    United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 
    564 F.3d 750
    , 751–53 (5th Cir. 2009). In that respect, for issues preserved in district
    court, its application of the Guidelines is reviewed de novo; its factual findings,
    only for clear error. E.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 
    517 F.3d 751
    ,
    764 (5th Cir. 2008).
    “The Guidelines define a ‘career offender’ as an offender with at least two
    prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes.” Buford v. United
    States, 
    532 U.S. 59
    , 60 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    “To serve as a predicate for the career-offender enhancement, a conviction
    must be an adult conviction.” United States v. Bams, 
    858 F.3d 937
    , 947 (5th
    Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). A conviction obtained at age 17 “is an adult
    conviction if it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the
    jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted”. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1.
    2
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    No. 19-30252
    Jackson does not dispute that his predicate convictions were classified
    as adult convictions under Louisiana law. He instead asserts the State has
    since raised the age for adult convictions. He speculates that, because the
    Supreme Court made retroactive its holdings that it is unconstitutional to
    execute an individual who was under 18-years-old at the time he committed a
    capital crime, Roper v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    , 578–79 (2005), and to impose a
    mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
    offenders, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
    136 S. Ct. 718
    , 732 (2016), Louisiana will
    make its new law retroactive.
    The Louisiana act, however, was written prospectively, defining a child
    as “any person under the age of twenty-one . . . who commits a delinquent act”
    (a) before turning 17; (b) “on or after March 1, 2019, when the act is not a crime
    of violence . . . and occurs before the person attains eighteen years of age”; and
    (c) “on or after July 1, 2020, and before the person attains eighteen years of
    age”. La. Child. Code Ann. art. 804(1) (2018). Under Louisiana law, “the
    legislature’s intent as to the retroactive application of a statute must be
    present in the wording of the Act”. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 
    988 So. 2d 186
    ,
    200 (La. 2008) (citations omitted). Nothing in the Louisiana act suggests it is
    retroactive.   Jackson, therefore, has not demonstrated the district court
    misapplied the Guidelines in determining he was a career offender.
    Relying on a district-court decision from another circuit, which was
    rendered before his original brief on appeal was filed, Jackson asserts in his
    reply brief that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because Guideline
    § 2D1.1(c), pertaining to controlled substances and quantity, overemphasizes
    purity and amount of methamphetamine and does not accurately account for
    his actual role in the conspiracy. Jackson’s not raising this issue until his reply
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    brief results in its being waived. See United States v. Clay, 
    921 F.3d 550
    , 557
    n.2 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
    AFFIRMED.
    4