Ogbodiegwu v. Wackenhut Corr ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-50404
Summary Calendar
Ben Ogbodiegwu,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(A-98-CV-295-JN & A-98-CV-300-JN)
November 10, 1999
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ben Ogbodiegwu brought employment discrimination and other
claims arising from his final months as a Counselor for Wackenhut
Corrections Corporation (“WCC”). The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, which we now affirm.
This lawsuit arose from Ogbodiegwu’s employment at the
Kyle New Vision Program (“the Kyle facility”), a drug treatment
facility operated by WCC in Kyle, Texas. Ogbodiegwu began
working at the Kyle facility on June 29, 1992 as a Counselor II,
earning a quick promotion to a Counselor I supervisory position
in October 1992. In January 1996, however, WCC began to have
serious concerns with Ogbodiegwu’s job performance. During that
month, Ogbodiegwu left the Kyle facility without authorization,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except for the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
failed to complete confidential client files as instructed by his
supervisor, and lost his keys to several secure areas of the
facility which required a lockdown of the entire facility and a
suspension of normal operations.
On February 6, 1996, an employee hearing committee found
that Ogbodiegwu’s violations of company policy were hurting the
effectiveness of the Kyle facility, and it recommended his
dismissal. Ogbodiegwu resigned the next day, February 7, 1996.
On July 17, 1997, Ogbodiegwu filed this lawsuit,
charging WCC with race and national origin discrimination under
Title VII, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district
court dismissed all of these claims.
Ogbodiegwu now appeals, raising two issues. First, he
challenges the district court’s determination that most of his
defamation claims were time-barred under the one-year statute of
limitations in Section 16.002(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. Specifically, he contends that the statute of
limitations does not apply to claims filed with the EEOC or the
Texas Commission on Human Rights (“TCHR”). Because he asserted a
cause of action for defamation in his charge of discrimation
filed with the EEOC and TCHR, Ogbodiegwu believes that his
defamation claims are governed by the same law that governs
discrimation claims under Title VII. In other words, he believes
that he had 60 or 90 days after he received his right to sue
2
letter to file a suit for damages suffered as a result of the
alleged defamation.
Ogbodiegwu offers no legal authority to support this
argument, and it is clear that he misunderstands the consequences
of filing a discrimination complaint. A charge of discrimination
lodged with the EEOC is not the equivalent of a lawsuit, and it
will not toll the statute of limitations or free Ogbodiegwu from
his obligation of filing a defamation lawsuit within one year
after the cause of action accrues. Ogbodiegwu’s argument lacks
merit, and the district court’s ruling on this issue will stand.
Ogbodiegwu’s second argument on appeal charges that the
district court “deprived [appellant] (sic) his opportunity to
present his evidence in support of his allegations.” Alhough the
district court recognized that less stringent standards are
applied to pleadings of pro se plaintiffs, Ogbodiegwu argues that
less stringent standards were not applied to his case and that he
was denied his day in court as a result.
Ogbodiegwu’s argument here is actually a reprise of his
first argument. He is suggesting that the district court should
have given this pro se plaintiff a break, declined to apply the
statute of limitations, and allowed him to present evidence in
support of his defamation claims. This line of reasoning
reflects Ogbodiegwu’s deep misunderstanding of the concessions
afforded pro se parties in federal court. Although the pleadings
filed by pro se parties are held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” pro se parties must
3
still comply with the rules of procedure and make arguments
capable of withstanding summary judgment. Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Grant v. Cellular, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th
Cir. 1995). There is certainly no authority for suggesting that
pro se parties are exempt from provisions of substantive law that
restrict or bar their causes of action. Thus, there is nothing
improper in dismissing a pro se party’s complaints on summary
judgment, and nothing improper in doing it here.
Because both of Ogbodiegwu’s claims lack merit, this
Court affirms the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of WCC.
AFFIRMED.
The district court dismissed Ogbodiegwu’s Title VII claims
because the plaintiff could show neither a prima facie case nor
rebut defendant’s legitmate nondiscriminatory reasons for
dismissal. The court found that most of Ogbodiegwu’s defamation
4
claims were time-barred, with the remainder failing from a lack
of evidence.
5