Royce McLin v. Jason Ard , 611 F. App'x 806 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-30536      Document: 00513048221         Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/19/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 14-30536                             May 19, 2015
    Lyle W. Cayce
    ROYCE DENTON MCLIN,                                                                Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    JASON GERALD ARD, In His Capacity as Sheriff of Livingston Parish;
    BENJAMIN THOMAS BALLARD, LPSO Detective; JACK R. ALFORD, JR.,
    LPSO Detective; STAN CARPENTER, LPSO Major; BRIAN P. SMITH,
    LPSO Lieutenant Colonel; BONITA G. SAGER, LPSO Detective; WILLIAM
    DORSEY, also known as Willie,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:13-CV-538
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and SOUTHWICK and COSTA, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellee filed suit pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
     and 1988
    against Defendants-Appellants alleging violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth,
    and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights. The district court granted
    Defendants-Appellants’ motions to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-30536   Document: 00513048221     Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/19/2015
    No. 14-30536
    each of Plaintiff-Appellee’s claims except his Fourth Amendment claim of
    unlawful search and seizure. Defendants-Appellants filed this appeal. For the
    following reasons, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    According to Plaintiff-Appellee Royce Denton McLin (“McLin”), on April
    20, 2012, Livingston Parish council member Chance Parent filed a report with
    the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office (“LPSO”) alleging that someone had
    anonymously posted negative comments on Facebook about Parent and two
    other council members, James Norred and Cynthia Wale.           After Parent’s
    complaint was filed, LPSO Detective Benjamin Ballard (“Det. Ballard”)
    obtained a subpoena duces tecum for records from Facebook and Charter
    Communications. The documents obtained from these companies indicated
    that there was a link between the account used to post the anonymous
    comments and McLin’s home address. Det. Ballard then obtained a search
    warrant to search McLin’s home. Pursuant to the warrant, Det. Ballard and
    LPSO Det. Jack Alford searched McLin’s home and seized various computers
    and electronic devices, including a gaming console, and sent the items to the
    Louisiana State Police Department (“LAPD”) for forensic analysis.          The
    LAPD’s analysis concluded that the anonymous posts originated from one of
    the computers that had been seized from McLin’s home.
    A few months later, on August 16, 2012, several detectives from the
    LPSO including Dets. Ballard and Alford met with council members Parent,
    Norred and Wale, who swore out criminal complaints resulting in the issuance
    of a misdemeanor summons charging McLin with three counts of violating La.
    R.S. § 14:47, which is Louisiana’s criminal defamation statute. LA. REV. STAT.
    2
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    No. 14-30536
    § 14:47. 1 When McLin learned of the summons and the charges, he voluntarily
    surrendered to the LPSO. Four months later, on December 19, 2012, the
    misdemeanor charges were dismissed by the Livingston Parish District
    Attorney’s Office.
    In August 2013, after the charges were dismissed against him, McLin
    filed suit in federal court against council members Parent, Norred, and Wale
    (collectively, “Council Member Defendants”), as well as Livingston Parish
    Sheriff Jason Ard, and LPSO Dets. Ballard, Alford, Stan Carpenter, Brian
    Smith, Bonita Sager, and William Dorsey (collectively, “LPSO Defendants”).
    McLin’s complaint was filed pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
     and 1988 and
    alleged violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
    constitutional rights. 2 U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V, XIV.
    The district judge granted in full Council Member Defendants’ motion to
    dismiss McLin’s claims against them. McLin does not appeal that judgment.
    The district court also granted LPSO Defendants’ motion to dismiss McLin’s
    claims against them alleging violations of his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
    Amendment rights, and his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful seizure
    as it pertained to McLin’s misdemeanor summons. McLin does not appeal that
    part of the district court’s judgment. The district court denied, however, LPSO
    1   La. R.S. § 14:47 provides in part:
    Defamation is the malicious publication or expression in any manner, to
    anyone other than the party defamed, of anything which tends:
    (1) To expose any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of
    the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse; or
    (2) To expose the memory of one deceased to hatred, contempt,
    or ridicule; or
    (3) To injure any person, corporation, or association of persons
    in his or their business or occupation.
    2  McLin also brought in this action pendent state law claims arising under Louisiana
    Civil Code articles 2315−17 and 2320. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315−17; 2320. Those claims
    are not at issue in this appeal.
    3
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    No. 14-30536
    Defendants’ motion to dismiss McLin’s claim that they violated his Fourth
    Amendment right against the unlawful search of his home and seizure of his
    property.    In its written ruling, the district court concluded that LPSO
    Defendants’ qualified immunity defense failed because their search of McLin’s
    home was not “objectively reasonable” since it was based on a warrant issued
    pursuant to a non-crime, i.e., criminal defamation of a public official. See State
    v. Defley, 
    395 So. 2d 759
    , 761 (La. 1981) (holding that La. R.S. § 14:47 “is
    unconstitutional insofar as it punishes public expression about public officials.”
    (citations omitted)).
    LPSO Defendants appeal the part of the district court’s judgment
    denying their motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity.
    II. DISCUSSION
    The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying
    LPSO Defendants’ motion to dismiss McLin’s § 1983 claim stemming from the
    alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment right against the unlawful search
    of his home and seizure of his property. 3 LPSO Defendants assert two primary
    arguments on appeal. First, they contend that McLin failed to plead sufficient
    facts in his complaint to state a claim for relief under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     because
    his complaint does not allege that the search warrant was issued pursuant to
    La. R.S. § 14:47, but instead, it only states that his misdemeanor summons
    was issued pursuant to La. R.S. § 14:47. Second, LPSO Defendants argue that,
    even assuming the search warrant was based on La. R.S. § 14:47, they are
    nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were
    objectively reasonable since the search of McLin’s home was conducted
    3 McLin also argued before the district court that his Fourth Amendment right against
    unlawful seizure was violated when he was issued the misdemeanor summons. In that
    context, he argued that the issuance of the summons was tantamount to an unlawful seizure
    because the summons was no different than an arrest. The district court rejected that
    argument and McLin does not appeal that part of the judgment.
    4
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    No. 14-30536
    pursuant to a warrant. For the reasons stated, we do not address the second
    argument.
    A. Standard of Review
    “We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     to review the district court’s
    denials of qualified immunity.” Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 
    568 F.3d 181
    ,
    193−94 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “The denial of a motion to dismiss
    predicated on a defense of qualified immunity is a collateral order capable of
    immediate review.”      
    Id. at 194
     (citation omitted).       Appellate jurisdiction,
    however, is very limited: “we are restricted to determinations ‘of question[s] of
    law’ and ‘legal issues,’ and we do not consider ‘the correctness of the plaintiff's
    version of the facts.’” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). “We must accept all well-pleaded
    facts as true, draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and view all
    facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 
    Id.
    (citation omitted). To avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to
    state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
    v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 547 (2007)).
    B. Analysis
    We agree with LPSO Defendants’ first argument that “nowhere in
    [McLin’s] complaint is it alleged that the search warrant sought evidence of a
    violation of [La. R.S. § 14:47].” Page 2, Paragraph 3 of McLin’s complaint
    states: “On or about August 16, 2012, Plaintiff Royce Denton McLin was issued
    a Misdemeanor Summons alleging Plaintiff was guilty on three (3) counts of
    having violated La. R.S. § 14:47, Criminal Defamation.” Paragraph 4, which
    immediately follows, states: “Plaintiff’s Summons with its incorporated
    charges was based upon three (3) facially-invalid arrest warrants maliciously
    concocted through the individual and concerted efforts of each and every party
    defendant.” The complaint then goes on to describe the legal history of the
    5
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    No. 14-30536
    statute’s unconstitutionality as it applies to public speech against public
    officials.
    Although McLin’s complaint does mention a misdemeanor summons and
    an arrest warrant, it fails to reference the search warrant. McLin’s § 1983
    claim that his Fourth Amendment right against unconstitutional search was
    violated could not prevail on allegations merely referencing an arrest warrant.
    Accordingly, we hold that the complaint fails to adequately plead “enough facts
    to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face,” see Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 547
    , and we remand for the district court to afford McLin an opportunity to
    amend his complaint. 4
    In light of this conclusion, we pretermit discussion of LPSO Defendants’
    second argument that, assuming the warrant was issued pursuant to La. R.S.
    § 14:47, they were nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    4  We note that McLin never sought leave to amend his complaint below because the
    district court appears to have found the complaint sufficient on its face to state a plausible
    claim for relief. Because we hold that the district court committed error in this regard, we
    conclude that McLin is entitled to an opportunity to cure his complaint on remand. See
    Foman v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    , 182 (1962) (stating that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, leave
    to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”).
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-30536

Citation Numbers: 611 F. App'x 806

Judges: Stewart, Southwick, Costa

Filed Date: 5/19/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024