Joe Pool v. Donald Trump, President ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 18-50671      Document: 00514861334         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/06/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 18-50671                             FILED
    Summary Calendar                       March 6, 2019
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    JOE R. POOL,
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, In His
    Official Capacity as United States President; JAMES MATTIS,
    SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, In His Official Capacity
    as United States Secretary of Defense; MARK GREEN, In His Official
    Capacity as Administrator for United States Agency for International
    Development,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:17-CV-831
    Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellant Joe Pool filed suit as a taxpayer against President Donald J.
    Trump, Department of Defense Secretary James Mattis, and the U.S. Agency
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-50671    Document: 00514861334      Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/06/2019
    No. 18-50671
    for International Development Administrator Mark Green, in their official
    capacities.   Pool claimed that tax-funded foreign aid to Afghanistan and
    Pakistan violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. He
    sought to enjoin aid on the basis that Afghanistan and Pakistan are “religious
    organizations” and, according to Pool, congressionally-appropriated aid sent to
    these countries impermissibly established the Islamic religion. Defendants
    moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The magistrate judge
    recommended granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss and concluded that Pool
    lacked standing as a taxpayer to challenge the foreign-aid payments, Pool’s
    claims were barred by the political question doctrine, and that granting Pool
    leave to amend his complaint would be futile because his claims could not be
    pleaded in a manner that would confer subject matter jurisdiction. The district
    court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations, dismissing
    the suit without prejudice. Pool appealed.
    We review a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for lack
    of subject matter jurisdiction de novo, applying the same standards as the
    district court. See Benton v. U.S., 
    960 F.2d 19
    , 21 (5th Cir. 1992). On appeal,
    Pool has failed to challenge in his opening brief the district court’s conclusion
    that he lacked standing and has therefore abandoned this argument. See
    Dixon v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 
    794 F.3d 507
    , 508 (5th Cir. 2015). This
    alone is grounds for affirmance. But even if Pool’s failure to challenge the
    district court’s standing determination were not dispositive, his claims are also
    barred by the political question doctrine. See Dickson v. Ford, 
    521 F.2d 234
    ,
    235 (5th Cir. 1975) (taxpayer’s claim that foreign-aid payments to Israel
    violated the Establishment Clause was a nonjusticiable political question); see
    also Baker v. Carr, 
    369 U.S. 186
    , 210 (1962) (setting forth factors for evaluating
    whether a claim falls under the political question doctrine).
    AFFIRMED.
    2