In Re: Deepwater Horizon ( 2012 )


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  •        IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 13, 2012
    No. 11-31172                   Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    IN RE: DEEPWATER HORIZON
    __________________________________________________________
    TERRY G. ROBIN, Individually and on behalf of all members of the 3 classes
    represented by the named plaintiffs including individuals/entities which are
    landowners, individuals/entities which are commercial fisherman, shrimpers,
    oyster harvesters, etc.; CAROLYN FRIERE; DOROTHY MOLERO; JANICE
    GONZALES; JANET ESTAVEZ; RICKY ESTAVEZ; ANABELLE NUNEZ;
    DARDINELLA LONG; KAREN SCOTT; MARIE CAMPO; LARRY FRILOT;
    B.M. PERRY, II, LIMITED; DAVID ESTAVEZ,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants
    v.
    SEACOR MARINE, L.L.C.; SEACOR MARINE, INCORPORATED; SEACOR
    MARINE INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED; NAUTICAL VENTURES,
    L.L.C.; ISLAND VENTURES, II; JOE GRIFFIN MV, in rem; MR. SIDNEY
    MV, in rem; SEACOR WASHINGTON MV, in rem; SEACOR VANGUARD
    MV, in rem,
    Defendants - Appellants
    consolidated with
    No. 11-31178
    In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Seacor Worldwide, Incorporated, As
    Beneficial Owner, Registered Owner, and Managing Owner of the M/V Seacor
    Lee, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
    Nos. 11-31172, 11-31178, 11-31179, 11-31180, 11-31181, & 11-31183
    __________________________________________________________
    SEACOR HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED; SEACOR OFFSHORE, L.L.C.;
    SEACOR MARINE, L.L.C.; SEACOR WORLDWIDE, INCORPORATED, As
    Beneficial Owner, Registered Owner, and Managing Owner of the M/V Seacor
    Lee Petitioning for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability,
    Petitioners - Appellees
    v.
    TERRY G. ROBIN; AIMAN ABDEL; CARL ALEXANDER; SERGIO
    ALVARADO; BILLY BENSEL; ET AL.,
    Claimants - Appellants
    consolidated with
    No. 11-31179
    In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Seacor Marine, L.L.C., As Beneficial
    Owner, Registered Owner, and Managing Owner of the M/V Seacor
    Vanguard, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
    __________________________________________________________
    SEACOR HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED; SEACOR OFFSHORE, L.L.C.;
    SEACOR MARINE, L.L.C., As Beneficial Owner, Registered Owner, and
    Managing Owner of the M/V Seacor Vanguard Petitioning for Exoneration
    from or Limitation of Liability,
    Petitioners - Appellees
    v.
    TERRY G. ROBIN; AIMAN ABDEL; CARL ALEXANDER; SERGIO
    ALVARADO; BILLY BENSEL; ET AL.,
    Claimants - Appellants
    consolidated with
    2
    Nos. 11-31172, 11-31178, 11-31179, 11-31180, 11-31181, & 11-31183
    No. 11-31180
    In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Siemens Financial, Incorporated, As
    Beneficial Owner, Registered Owner, and Managing Owner of the M/V Seacor
    Washington, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
    __________________________________________________________
    SEACOR HOLDINGS, INCORPORATED; SEACOR OFFSHORE, L.L.C.;
    SEACOR MARINE, L.L.C., SIEMENS FINANCIAL, INCORPORATED, As
    Beneficial Owner, Registered Owner, and Managing Owner of the M/V Seacor
    Washington Petitioning for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability,
    Petitioners - Appellees
    v.
    TERRY G. ROBIN; AIMAN ABDEL; CARL ALEXANDER; SERGIO
    ALVARADO; BILLY BENSEL; ET AL.,
    Claimants - Appellants
    consolidated with
    No. 11-31181
    In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Island Ventures, II, L.L.C., As
    Owner of the M/V Joe Griffin, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
    __________________________________________________________
    ISLAND VENTURES, II, L.L.C., As Owner of the M/V Joe Griffin, Petitioning
    for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability,
    Petitioner - Appellee
    v.
    TERRY G. ROBIN; AIMAN ABDEL; CARL ALEXANDER; SERGIO
    ALVARADO; BILLY BENSEL; ET AL.,
    Claimants - Appellants
    3
    Nos. 11-31172, 11-31178, 11-31179, 11-31180, 11-31181, & 11-31183
    consolidated with
    No. 11-31183
    In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Nautical Solutions, L.L.C., As Owner
    of the M/V Mr. Sidney, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
    __________________________________________________________
    NAUTICAL SOLUTIONS, L.L.C., As Owner of the M/V Mr. Sidney,
    Petitioning for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability,
    Petitioner - Appellee
    v.
    TERRY G. ROBIN; AIMAN ABDEL; CARL ALEXANDER; SERGIO
    ALVARADO; BILLY BENSEL; ET AL.,
    Claimants - Appellants
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:10-MD-2179
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Terry Robin and a group of persons asserting losses (“Plaintiffs”) as a
    result of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident1 sued Defendant rescue vessels
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    1
    For a description of this incident, see the district court’s opinion in this case, In re Oil
    Spill, MDL No. 2179 Section: J, 
    2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117969
     (E.D. La. Oct. 12, 2011).
    4
    Nos. 11-31172, 11-31178, 11-31179, 11-31180, 11-31181, & 11-31183
    and their owners and/or operators (“Defendants”) for economic damages and
    personal injuries allegedly incurred as a result of the incident.                 Plaintiffs
    asserted a claim for general maritime law negligence, a claim under the Oil
    Pollution Act of 1990, and a negligence claim under Louisiana state law, alleging
    that Defendants’ negligence in attempting to extinguish the fire on the
    Deepwater Horizon ultimately caused the oil spill and Plaintiffs’ resulting
    damages. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that “[a]s a result of the flooding of the
    rig by the fireboats, the rig began to sink. When the rig turned and began to
    sink, the pipe connected to the wellhead collapsed and fell to the sea floor.”
    Further, they claimed that “[t]he actions of Defendants were independent of the
    fire and are separate and distinct causes of the resulting mega-spill of oil that
    continues to cause Plaintiffs’ damages.”
    Defendants moved for a judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rules
    of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c). Pertinent to this appeal, the district court
    dismissed Plaintiffs’ general maritime law negligence claim on the ground that
    it did not state a plausible claim of foreseeability of the types of harm alleged.
    Alternatively, the district court concluded that all general maritime law
    negligence claims except those of Terry Robin, a commercial fisherman, and
    Rafael Lopez, Aiman Abdel, and Sergio Alvarado, personal-injury claimants,2
    were also subject to dismissal under the rule announced in Robins Dry Dock &
    Repair Co. v. Flint, 
    275 U.S. 303
     (1927), as articulated in Louisiana ex rel. Guste
    v. M/V Testbank, 
    752 F.2d 1019
    , 1021 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (limiting
    plaintiffs’ foreseeable injuries by finding that general economic losses absent
    physical injuries are unrecoverable). In re Oil Spill, 
    2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117969
    , at *22 n.10. We AFFIRM.
    2
    The plaintiffs allege that they were personally injured by exposure to dispersants.
    5
    Nos. 11-31172, 11-31178, 11-31179, 11-31180, 11-31181, & 11-31183
    At the outset, we note that Plaintiffs failed to challenge this alternate
    holding in their opening brief. Accordingly, we conclude that any such challenge
    is waived. See R.R. Mgmt. Co. v. CFS La. Midstream Co., 
    428 F.3d 214
    , 220 n.3
    (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that where appellant challenges only one alternate
    holding, argument that other holding was in error is waived). Under the
    alternate holding, however, the claims of Robin, Lopez, Abdel, and Alvarado
    (“Remaining Plaintiffs”) remain, a point that Defendants do not challenge. Thus,
    we consider whether the dismissal on the pleadings as to the Remaining
    Plaintiffs was proper.
    “We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion for
    judgment on the pleadings.” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 
    624 F.3d 201
    ,
    209 (5th Cir. 2010). “A motion under Rule 12(c) for failure to state a claim is
    subject to the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.
    at 209-10. To survive Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs’ “complaint must contain
    sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).      Although the court must “accept all
    well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable
    to the plaintiff . . . [, it] do[es] not accept as true conclusory allegations,
    unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” In re Great Lakes, 624
    F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We conclude that the district court correctly determined that the damages
    alleged by the Remaining Plaintiffs are too attenuated and distant from the
    alleged negligence of the Defendants to state a plausible claim of foreseeability,
    as required for proximate cause. As the district court stated:
    In order to foresee such a result, the Defendants would have had to
    have anticipated that spraying water on the [mobile offshore drilling
    unit, i.e., the Deepwater Horizon] would probably cause the vessel
    to capsize, and would probably cause the connecting pipe to collapse,
    6
    Nos. 11-31172, 11-31178, 11-31179, 11-31180, 11-31181, & 11-31183
    and the blowout preventer would probably not control the flow of
    hydrocarbons, and the discharge would probably flow unabated for
    three months, and that oil would probably flow fifty miles inland.
    Moreover, as to those Claimants who assert physical injury damages
    from chemical dispersant, the harm is even further removed from
    Defendants’ scope of duty, given that the decision to use an allegedly
    toxic dispersant appears to have been made by parties other than
    Defendants . . . .3
    In Re Oil Spill, 
    2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117969
    , at *20. We agree. Accordingly,
    we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    3
    The three personal-injury claimants do not allege otherwise. They claim to have
    been exposed to toxic dispersants used to control the oil spill that was, in turn, allegedly caused
    by Defendants. They do not allege that Defendants themselves used the toxic dispersants.
    7