United States v. Carlos Vasquez-Puente , 922 F.3d 700 ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 17-41099   Document: 00514938636        Page: 1   Date Filed: 05/01/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 17-41099                           FILED
    May 1, 2019
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                  Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    CARLOS VASQUEZ-PUENTE,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    Before CLEMENT, DUNCAN, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.
    STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
    Carlos Vasquez-Puente appeals two special conditions of supervised
    release in his written judgment, arguing they conflict with the sentence orally
    pronounced by the district court. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
    I.
    Vasquez-Puente pleaded guilty to being unlawfully found in the United
    States after a previous deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b).
    Based on his presentence report (“PSR”), he faced a guidelines range of 51–63
    months. In objections to the PSR, he admitted he “obviously knew that it was
    illegal to return [to the United States], because he has been prosecuted for this
    same offense twice before.” At sentencing, Vasquez-Puente’s attorney stated
    Case: 17-41099     Document: 00514938636     Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/01/2019
    No. 17-41099
    he had warned his client “more than once . . . that he should not be coming
    back here because these sentences are just going to get higher and higher[,]”
    adding that Vasquez-Puente “has indicated that he has no plans to return here,
    [and] that he’s going to stay in Mexico.” For his part, Vasquez-Puente stated,
    “I want to apologize for having entered the country illegally.” He explained he
    had come to the United States “to give a better life for my children but [now] I
    see I cannot be here,” and so he promised, “I’m not coming back.”
    The district court gave Vazquez-Puente a low-end prison sentence of 51
    months. The court also imposed “a 3-year term of supervised release,”
    explaining this was needed “because . . . in the PSR it indicates how that after
    that last removal, you remained in Mexico for only about one month.” The court
    explicitly warned Vasquez-Puente that he had been previously deported and
    that therefore he “should understand certainly just from that that you can’t be
    [in the United States].” The court also admonished him that, “[i]f you are
    deported, it will be without active supervision[,] but if you are in the country,
    you’re to comply with all the standard conditions adopted by the Court.”
    The court’s subsequent written judgment imposed on Vasquez-Puente
    the following “special conditions” of supervision (formatted for ease of reading):
    [1] You must surrender to U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement and follow all [its] instructions and reporting
    requirements until any deportation proceedings are completed.
    [2] If you are ordered deported from the United States, you must
    remain outside the United States unless legally authorized to
    reenter.
    [3] If you reenter the United States, you must report to the nearest
    probation office within 72 hours after you return.
    These specific conditions, however, did not appear in Vasquez-Puente’s PSR.
    Nor did the district court expressly enumerate them when orally pronouncing
    sentence.
    2
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    Vasquez-Puente appealed, arguing that the first and second special
    conditions in the written judgment conflict with the oral sentence and
    therefore must be excised. 1
    II.
    We review imposition of special conditions for abuse of discretion when
    the district court does not “orally enumerate each special condition” and the
    defendant therefore “has no meaningful opportunity to object.” United States
    v. Rivas-Estrada, 
    906 F.3d 346
    , 349 (5th Cir. 2018); see also, e.g., United States
    v. Bigelow, 
    462 F.3d 378
    , 381 (5th Cir. 2006).
    III.
    Given a defendant’s constitutional right to be present at sentencing,
    “when there is a conflict between a written sentence and an oral
    pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls.” United States v. Torres-
    Aguilar, 
    352 F.3d 934
    , 935 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting United States
    v. Martinez, 
    250 F.3d 941
    , 942 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). If, however, there
    is “merely an ambiguity” between oral and written sentences, “then ‘we must
    look to the intent of the sentencing court, as evidenced in the record’ to
    determine the defendant’s sentence.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Warden, 
    291 F.3d 363
    , 365 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also 
    Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 381
    (distinguishing
    “ambiguity” in sentences from “conflicting” oral and written sentences).
    In general, a conflict exists “[i]f the written judgment broadens the
    restrictions    or   requirements       of    supervised    release     from    an    oral
    pronouncement.” United States v. Mudd, 
    685 F.3d 473
    , 480 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (quoting United States v. Mireles, 
    471 F.3d 551
    , 558 (5th Cir. 2006)). A conflict
    1 Vasquez-Puente does not challenge the third special condition that, upon reentering
    the United States, he must report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours.
    3
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    may arise because a sentencing court omits certain conditions from its oral
    pronouncement but includes them in its written judgment. 
    Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 935
    –36. Omitted conditions that are “mandatory, standard, or
    recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines” do not create a conflict with the
    oral pronouncement. 
    Id. at 938.
    “On the other hand, . . . ‘if the district court
    fails to mention a special condition at sentencing, its subsequent inclusion in
    the written judgment creates a conflict that requires amendment of the written
    judgment to conform with the oral pronouncement.’” 
    Id. at 936
    (quoting United
    States v. Vega, 
    332 F.3d 849
    , 852–53 (5th Cir. 2003)).
    Vasquez-Puente contends there is a conflict between the district court’s
    oral pronouncement and its written judgment. Specifically, he points to the
    first two special conditions in the written judgment: (1) that he surrender to
    immigration authorities until deported (the “surrender condition”), and (2)
    that he remain outside the United States until authorized to reenter (the “no-
    reentry condition”). Vasquez-Puente argues these conditions were not
    pronounced orally at sentencing and therefore must be excised from the
    written judgment.
    A.
    We first address the surrender condition—namely, that Vasquez-Puente
    “surrender to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and follow all [its]
    instructions and reporting requirements until any deportation proceedings are
    completed.” Vasquez-Puente contends, and the government concedes, that this
    is not a standard or mandatory condition, but rather a special condition
    included in the Southern District of Texas’ standing General Order 2017-01.
    See In re Conditions of Prob. and Supervised Release, Gen. Order No. 2017-01
    (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2017); see also United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, 702 F. App’x
    241, 242 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“report or surrender” requirement is not
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    standard, mandatory, or guidelines-recommended, but is instead a “permissive
    special condition set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and in the Southern District
    of Texas’s General Order 2014-01”). Because the district court did not orally
    enumerate the surrender condition, Vasquez-Puente argues that there is
    necessarily a conflict between the oral and written sentences and that the
    written sentence must therefore be reformed. We disagree.
    We have recognized in numerous unpublished opinions that the district
    court’s failure to orally enumerate a surrender condition (like the one at issue
    here) may create a conflict with the written judgment, requiring excision of the
    surrender condition from the written judgment. See, e.g., United States v.
    Cepeda-Olguin, 736 F. App’x 489, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“We
    have previously concluded that the addition [to the written judgment] of a
    condition to surrender to immigration officials after release from prison
    conflicts with oral pronouncements stating no such requirement where the
    district court had not adopted it as a standard condition.”). 2 A conflict in these
    circumstances is not inevitable, however. See, e.g., 
    Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d at 351
    (observing “not all unpronounced conditions create conflicts”). In another
    unpublished opinion, Vasquez-Ruiz, we held that—despite the district court’s
    failure to orally pronounce a similar surrender condition—there was no conflict
    with the written judgment when the surrender requirement was “clearly
    consistent with the district court’s intent that [the defendant] would be
    deported upon his release from prison.” 702 F. App’x at 243. In reaching that
    2 See also, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, No. 17-40900, 
    2019 WL 919809
    , at *2 (5th
    Cir. Feb. 22, 2019) (per curiam); United States v. Zepeda-Zalaberry, 458 F. App’x 342, 342–
    43 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); United States v. Vasquez-Parrales, 457 F. App’x 390, 391 (5th
    Cir. 2012) (per curiam); United States v. Chinchilla-Comelly, 456 F. App’x 463, 464 (5th Cir.
    2012) (per curiam); see also Ballard v. Burton, 
    444 F.3d 391
    , 401 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2006)
    (recognizing unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 1996 are “not controlling
    precedent, but may be persuasive authority”).
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    conclusion, we cited our decision in Warden, which explained that “ambiguity”
    between oral and written sentences requires us to “look to the intent of the
    sentencing court, as evidenced in the 
    record.” 291 F.3d at 365
    ; see also, e.g.,
    
    Mireles, 471 F.3d at 558
    (explaining “[t]he key determination is whether the
    discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment is a
    conflict or merely an ambiguity that can be resolved by reviewing the rest of
    the record”).
    Following those principles, we find ambiguity—rather than conflict—
    between Vasquez-Puente’s oral and written sentences. The special condition
    that Vasquez-Puente surrender to immigration officials does not obviously
    “conflict” with the district court’s oral pronouncement. Cf., e.g., 
    Mireles, 471 F.3d at 558
    (giving as examples of “conflicts” between oral and written
    sentences a five-hour discrepancy in community service requirements and a
    two-year discrepancy in supervised release terms (citing United States v.
    Wheeler, 
    322 F.3d 823
    , 828 (5th Cir. 2003)); United States v. Moreci, 
    283 F.3d 293
    , 299–300 (5th Cir. 2002)). We must therefore determine the propriety of
    the surrender condition by “look[ing] to the intent of the sentencing court, as
    evidenced in the record,” 
    Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 935
    (quoting 
    Warden, 291 F.3d at 365
    ), seeking to determine whether “the oral and written
    pronouncements are . . . reconcilable in this respect,” 
    Mireles, 471 F.3d at 559
    .
    See also, e.g., 
    Martinez, 250 F.3d at 942
    (unlike a conflict, “[i]f . . . there is
    merely an ambiguity between the two sentences, the entire record must be
    examined to determine the district court’s true intent” (citing United States v.
    De la Pena-Juarez, 
    214 F.3d 594
    , 601 (5th Cir. 2000))).
    Our review of the record convinces us that the surrender condition is
    consistent with the district court’s intent that Vasquez-Puente be deported
    after serving his prison term. At the sentencing hearing, the district court
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    repeatedly warned Vasquez-Puente that, because he had been deported before,
    he could not legally be present in the United States. Indeed, the court imposed
    three years of supervised release specifically because, when Vasquez-Puente
    was last deported, he remained outside the country “for only about one month.”
    Moreover, Vasquez-Puente’s attorney explained that he had talked with his
    client on several occasions about not returning to the United States because
    the “sentences are just going to get higher and higher.” And Vasquez-Puente
    himself apologized to the court for illegally entering the country and promised,
    “I’m not coming back.” 3
    The record thus clarifies that the district court intended Vasquez-Puente
    to be deported following his prison term. See, e.g., 
    Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 935
    –36 (explaining an ambiguity between oral and written sentences “can be
    clarified by viewing the written record”). We therefore cannot say that the
    condition that Vasquez-Puente surrender to immigration officials “broadens
    the restrictions or requirements of supervised release from [the] oral
    pronouncement.” 
    Mudd, 685 F.3d at 480
    (quoting 
    Mireles, 471 F.3d at 558
    ). To
    the contrary, the oral and written sentences are “reconcilable in this respect.”
    
    Mireles, 471 F.3d at 558
    . To be sure, it would have been better had the district
    court expressly enumerated the surrender condition at Vasquez-Puente’s
    sentencing hearing. Based on this record, however, we cannot find that the
    3 Our conclusion is not changed by the district court’s statement that “[i]f [Vasquez-
    Puente is] deported, it will be without active supervision.” That comment “creates, if
    anything, an ambiguity” which we resolve by examining the overall record to find “the intent
    of the sentencing court.” 
    Warden, 291 F.3d at 365
    . As explained, the record shows the court
    plainly told Vasquez-Puente he could not legally remain in, or return to, the country after
    serving his sentence. See also, e.g., United States v. Nunez, 78 F. App’x 989, 991 (5th Cir.
    2003) (per curiam) (explaining that this phrase means that “active supervision is suspended
    upon [defendant’s] deportation and the actual term of supervised release will continue to run”
    (citing United States v. Brown, 
    54 F.3d 234
    , 237–39 (5th Cir. 1995))).
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    court abused its discretion by including the surrender condition in Vasquez-
    Puente’s written judgment.
    B.
    We turn to the no-reentry condition—namely that, following deportation,
    Vasquez-Puente “must remain outside the United States unless legally
    authorized to reenter.” We disagree with Vasquez-Puente that inclusion of this
    special condition in the written judgment creates a conflict with the district
    court’s oral pronouncement. The no-reentry condition merely restated the
    mandatory condition that Vasquez-Puente “must not commit another federal
    . . . crime.” We have held that “the [written] judgment’s inclusion of conditions
    that are mandatory, standard, or recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines
    does not create a conflict with the oral pronouncement.” 
    Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 938
    . The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by
    including a special condition duplicating the mandatory condition that
    Vasquez-Puente “not break the law by entering the country illegally.” Cepeda-
    Olguin, 736 F. App’x at 491; see also Alvarez, 
    2019 WL 919809
    , at *2 (no-
    reentry condition does not conflict with oral sentence “because it is duplicative
    of the mandatory condition that [defendant] is prohibited from violating the
    law if and when he reenters the United States” (citations omitted)).
    AFFIRMED
    8