United States v. Villarreal-Contreras ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40930
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ERNESTO VILLARREAL-CONTRERAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. L-99-CR-131-1
--------------------
July 20, 2000
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ernesto Villarreal-Contreras (“Villarreal”) appeals his
conviction on a plea of guilty, arguing that the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in an
allegedly unlawful stop of Villarreal’s vehicle.
As a threshold issue, the Government argued that Villarreal
had waived his right to appeal when he signed an unconditional
guilty plea. A review of the record reveals that Villarreal
fulfilled the spirit of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) by clearly
indicating his intention to plead guilty on the condition that he
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-40930
-2-
preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. See United States v. Wise, 179 F.3d 184, 187
(5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, Villarreal did not waive his right
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Proceeding to the merits, when the district court makes
factual findings following a pre-trial hearing on a motion to
suppress, this court reviews such findings for clear error, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that
prevailed in the district court. United States v. Inocencio, 40
F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1994). This court reviews de novo the
district court’s legal conclusion that officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop a vehicle. Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 721.
Stops at permanent checkpoints may be made in the absence of
any individualized suspicion. United States v. Fontecha, 576 F.2d
601, 602 (5th Cir. 1978)(internal citation and quotation omitted).
Where the stop does not occur right at the checkpoint because a
defendant has taken some action to evade the checkpoint, this court
will conclude that the stop did begin at the checkpoint. See
United States v. Ramirez-Lujan, 976 F.2d 930, 933 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Hassette, 898 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1990)(per
curiam); see Fontecha, 576 F.2d at 602. This court has extended
this line of reasoning to stops at temporary checkpoints.
Hassette, 898 F.2d at 995; United States v. Venegas-Sapien, 762
F.2d 417, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1985).
We find no clear error in the district court’s findings of
fact or error of law in the district court’s reasoning. In its
order the district court stated:
No. 99-40930
-3-
Inasmuch as Villarreal’s stop on the side of the
road, when no outlets between his stopping place and the
checkpoint existed, was tantamount to a stop at the
checkpoint itself, no additional reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity was required for the seizure initiated
by Ramirez. Furthermore, at the actual checkpoint,
reasonable suspicion was not required as a prerequisite
to the dog sniff, see United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d
1102, 1106 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 853 (1993),
and the fact that the dog alerted provided probable cause
to search Villarreal’s vehicle. See United States v.
Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1182 (1996). Consequently, neither the seizure
of Villarreal nor the search of his vehicle violated
Villarreal’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures.
For these and the other reasons assigned by the district
court, the judgment of that court is AFFIRMED.