Joseph Ward v. John Hellerstedt ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-50899      Document: 00514683288         Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/16/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT     United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 16, 2018
    No. 17-50899
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    JOSEPH WARD, by his next friend Frances Bourliot; MICHAEL
    ANDERSON, by his next friend Phil Campbell; ISAAC LEMELLE, by his
    next friend Mark Westenhover; CECIL ADICKES, by his next friend Elsie
    Craven; MICHAEL GIBSON, by his next friend Mark Westenhover; MARC
    LAWSON, by his next friend Krista Chacona; JENNIFER LAMPKIN, by her
    next friend Elsie Craven,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees
    v.
    DR. JOHN HELLERSTEDT, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
    Texas Department of State Health Services,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:16-CV-917
    Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The defendant-appellant, Dr. John Hellerstedt, in his official capacity as
    Commissioner       of   the   Texas     Department       of   State   Health     Services,
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 17-50899       Document: 00514683288          Page: 2     Date Filed: 10/16/2018
    No. 17-50899
    (“Defendant”) 1 challenges on appeal the propriety of the class certification
    order issued by the district court. In its order, the district court certified two
    classes of plaintiffs—one including individuals charged with Texas crimes but
    adjudged to be incompetent to stand trial under Texas law; and the other
    including individuals acquitted of Texas crimes because they were determined
    to be insane under Texas law. Because the district court failed to conduct a
    sufficiently rigorous analysis of whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)’s
    requirements are met, its class certification order is deficient. Accordingly, we
    vacate the class certification order and remand to the district court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    BACKGROUND
    Under Texas law, criminal defendants adjudged incompetent to stand
    trial 2 and individuals acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity 3 may, under
    certain circumstances specified by statute, be committed to facilities for
    1  On September 29, 2017, while Defendant’s request under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s class certification order was
    pending, the named plaintiffs in this matter filed their third amended complaint, which,
    among other things, substituted Charles Smith, in his official capacity as Executive
    Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“HHSC”), as the
    defendant. This was due to a reorganization of the State’s health and human services system
    that granted control of state hospitals to HHSC on September 1, 2017. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
    §§ 531.001(2), 531.0011(a)(2), 531.0201(a)(2)(C); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1001.004,
    1001.072.
    2 A criminal defendant is considered incompetent to stand trial under Texas law if he
    or she does not have “sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a
    reasonable degree of rational understanding” or “a rational as well as factual understanding
    of the proceedings against the person.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a)(1)&(2)
    (West 2004).
    3 An individual charged with a crime is considered not guilty of that crime by reason
    of insanity if: “(1) the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged
    conduct constituting the offense was committed; and (2) the defense has established by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was insane at the time of the alleged
    conduct.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.153(a) (West 2004). A criminal defendant
    who is found not guilty by reason of insanity “stands acquitted of the offense charged and
    may not be considered a person charged with an offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    46C.155(a) (West 2004).
    2
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    inpatient mental health treatment, restoration services, evaluation and/or
    observation. 4 The State of Texas does not have enough beds in its hospitals,
    which generally operate at full capacity, to accommodate at once all persons
    who have been committed for inpatient services. 5                    To equitably allocate
    available hospital beds, the State generally uses a “first-come, first-served”
    approach. Individuals who are awaiting admission to a state hospital are
    generally detained in county jails pending their transfer, 6 sometimes for
    months. 7
    4 See e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46B.071, 46B.073 (West 2004); TEX. CODE
    CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46C.201, 46C.251, 46C.256, 46C.261 (West 2005).
    5 According to the uncontradicted declaration of Timothy E. Bray, the Director of State
    Hospitals for the Texas Department of State Health Services at the time this suit was filed,
    Texas has nine state hospitals that offer inpatient services to criminal defendants found
    incompetent to stand trial and individuals acquitted of criminal charges on insanity grounds.
    Such hospitals also serve individuals who are civilly committed for services and persons who
    admit themselves voluntarily. Those hospitals are funded to operate 2,385 inpatient beds.
    Two of the hospitals are equipped as maximum security units (“MSU”) and operate a total of
    314 inpatient beds. The State contracts with two private psychiatric hospitals for competency
    restoration services, which provide an additional 114 beds.
    6 Texas law does not specifically address under all circumstances where and for how
    long to hold incompetent criminal defendants and individuals acquitted of criminal charges
    on insanity grounds pending transfer to an inpatient mental health facility. However, Texas
    law does require a court that commits a criminal defendant for inpatient competency
    restoration to place that defendant “in the custody of the sheriff or sheriff’s deputy for
    transportation to the facility or program.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.075 (West
    2004). Texas courts are also specifically allowed to order individuals acquitted of crimes by
    reason of insanity detained in jail or another “suitable place” for up to 14 days pending further
    proceedings. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46C.160 (West 2005). Additionally, with
    respect to a “non-dangerous” individual acquitted due to insanity, if there is evidence to
    support a finding of mental illness or mental retardation, then a Texas court may order such
    person detained in jail or another “suitable place” pending “prompt initiation and
    prosecution” of required civil commitment proceedings. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    46C.201 (West 2005).
    7 In 2017, the average wait time for incompetent criminal defendants and insanity
    acquittees to be transferred from a county jail to a non-MSU hospital was 16 days, while the
    average wait time for transfer into an MSU hospital was 147 days.
    3
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    Joseph Ward, Michael Anderson, and Isaac Lemelle, the original
    plaintiffs in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, 8 amended their complaint twice, adding
    Marc Lawson, Jennifer Lampkin, Cecil Adickes, and Michael Gibson as
    plaintiffs. 9 (Each of the foregoing individuals shall be collectively referred to
    herein as “Plaintiffs.”)        In Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, Ward,
    Anderson, Lemelle, Lawson and Lampkin allege that, though they had been
    ordered committed for inpatient competency restoration services by Texas
    courts, they had been detained in county jails awaiting admission to state
    hospitals for periods ranging from 15 to 27 weeks. Adickes and Gibson allege
    that, though they had been acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity
    and ordered committed to maximum security unit (“MSU”) facilities for
    evaluation and treatment, they had been detained in county jails awaiting
    admission to such facilities for two weeks and ten weeks, respectively.
    Plaintiffs claim that Defendant has violated their Fourteenth Amendment due
    process rights by confining them in county jails for unreasonable periods of
    time without criminal convictions and failing to provide them with the
    appropriate mental health treatment and/or services during their confinement.
    They have further requested that the court certify two classes of similarly
    situated plaintiffs; issue an order declaring that Defendant has violated their
    Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; and issue preliminary and
    permanent injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from violating such rights.
    On November 28, 2016, Plaintiffs moved for class certification.
    Defendant initially opposed Plaintiffs’ motion under Rule 23 of the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”). On February 27, 2017, the district court
    8 Disability Rights of Texas was also an original party to the suit but was later dropped
    as a plaintiff in the first amended complaint.
    9 Alexander Soto and Morgan Areschchenko were added as plaintiffs in the first
    amended complaint but were then removed from the suit in the second amended complaint.
    4
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    entered a scheduling order setting a deadline of May 1, 2017 for the parties to
    file all amended or supplemental pleadings and to join new parties. On August
    17, 2017, Defendant filed an “Advisory to the Court” indicating that Plaintiffs’
    claims were moot since each of them had been admitted to state hospitals and
    that, because no class had yet been certified, the class claims were also moot.
    Plaintiffs disagreed, asserting that the “inherently transitory” nature of their
    claims saved them from mootness. Plaintiffs further offered to provide the
    district court with briefing on this argument or, alternatively, amend their
    complaint to add new plaintiffs who were still being detained in county jails.
    
    Id. Without responding
    to Plaintiffs’ request for guidance on how to proceed,
    on September 1, 2017, over nine months after Plaintiffs filed their motion for
    class certification, the district court entered an order purporting to certify the
    following two classes of plaintiffs:
    (1) All persons who are now, or will be in the future, charged with
    a crime in the State of Texas, and (a) who are ordered to a Texas
    Department of State Health Services facility where they are to
    receive competency[]restoration services; and (b) for whom the
    Texas Department of State Health Services receives the court
    order; but (c) who remain detained in a Texas county jail
    [(“Incompetent Detainee(s)”)]; 10 and
    (2) All persons who are now, or will be in the future, charged with
    a crime in the State of Texas and who are found not guilty by
    reason of insanity, and (a) who are ordered to receive
    evaluation-and-treatment services at a Texas Department of
    State Health Services facility; (b) for whom the Texas
    Department of State Health Services receives the court order;
    but (c) who remain detained in a Texas county jail for more than
    14 days [(“Insanity Acquittee(s)”)].
    10 In addition to challenging the district court’s class certification order on Rule 23
    grounds, Defendant argues on appeal that the district court lacked jurisdiction to certify the
    Incompetent Detainee class because such class includes individuals who lack standing to
    assert claims in this matter. We need not reach the merits of such argument since we vacate
    the class certification order on other grounds.
    5
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    The district court did not, however, explicitly appoint the named plaintiffs as
    class representatives as they had requested.            Instead, the court ordered
    Plaintiffs to file yet another amended complaint including “named plaintiffs to
    be appointed as class representatives for the two classes.”
    On September 29, 2017, while Defendant’s Rule 23(f) request for
    permission to appeal the district court’s class certification order was pending,
    Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, in which they added the
    following named plaintiffs: Kenneth Jones, a criminal defendant adjudged to
    be incompetent to withstand trial; and Mary Sapp, who had been acquitted of
    criminal charges due to insanity. 11 On October 17, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a
    motion requesting that the district court appoint not only Jones and Sapp as
    class representatives, but also Lawson, Lampkin, Adickes, and Gibson, which
    Defendant opposed. On the same date, Defendant requested that the district
    court stay proceedings pending his appeal of the class certification order.
    Plaintiffs agreed to the stay request with the “understanding . . . that the Court
    should rule on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Appoint Class Representatives before
    ruling on [the] motion for stay.” On November 2, 2017, without ruling on
    Plaintiffs’ motion to appoint class representatives, the district court entered an
    order staying all proceedings.
    While Defendant appeals the district court’s class certification order on
    multiple grounds, his primary arguments are that (1) the district court lacked
    jurisdiction to enter its class certification order because Plaintiffs’ claims, and
    therefore, this entire action, became moot prior to the district court entering
    such order; and (2) even if this case is not moot, the district court’s class
    certification order is deficient under Rule 23. For the reasons set forth below,
    11 In the third amended complaint, the original named plaintiffs also acknowledged
    that they had all been admitted to state hospitals.
    6
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    we reject Defendant’s mootness argument and vacate the district court’s
    certification order on Rule 23 grounds.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Mootness and standing are issues of law that we review de novo.
    Fontenot v. McCraw, 
    777 F.3d 741
    , 746 (5th Cir. 2015). Likewise, “whether the
    district court applied the correct legal standards” in certifying a class is
    reviewed de novo. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 
    675 F.3d 832
    , 836 (5th Cir.
    2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the district court has
    applied the correct legal standard, we then review its analysis and order
    certifying a class for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. “A trial
    court abuses its
    discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly
    erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Yates v. Collier, 
    868 F.3d 354
    , 359 (5th
    Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, if the district
    court’s “account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
    entirety,” we may not reverse.            
    Id. at 363
    (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted). This deference is a result of “the essentially factual basis of
    the certification inquiry and of the district court's inherent power to manage
    and control pending litigation.” 
    Id. at 360
    (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted).
    DISCUSSION
    Mootness
    a. General Mootness Rule
    Given that mootness is a jurisdictional inquiry, 12 we preliminarily turn
    our attention to Defendant’s mootness argument.                     As a general rule, “a
    12 See U.S. v. Sanchez-Gomez, 
    138 S. Ct. 1532
    , 1537 (2018) (acknowledging that “[a]
    case that becomes moot at any point during the proceedings is no longer a ‘Case’ or
    ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III, and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts”
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
    7
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    purported class action becomes moot when the personal claims of all named
    plaintiffs” have been satisfied prior to certification of a class, since, under such
    circumstances, there is no longer an Article III “case or controversy” for the
    court to resolve. Murray v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., 
    594 F.3d 419
    , 421 (5th Cir.
    2010) (internal citations omitted); see also Sosna v. Iowa, 
    419 U.S. 393
    , 402
    (1975) (noting that “[t]here must . . . be a named plaintiff who has [an Article
    III] case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed” and “at the time the
    class is certified by the [d]istrict [c]ourt,” as well as on review). 13                  It is
    undisputed that each of the Plaintiffs were transferred from county jails to
    state hospitals at least 6 weeks prior to the district court entering its class
    certification order. Considering Plaintiffs’ allegations and the relief requested,
    each Plaintiff’s claim seemingly was satisfied upon his or her transfer. Thus,
    unless Plaintiffs’ claims fall within an exception to the general rule, this matter
    became moot on July 20, 2017 when the last Plaintiff remaining in a county
    jail was transferred to a state hospital.
    b. Inherently Transitory Exception to Mootness
    Potential class actions involving claims that are “inherently transitory”
    fall within an exception to the general mootness rule, since such claims would
    otherwise likely evade review. See Genesis Healthcare v. Symczyk, 
    569 U.S. 66
    , 76 (2013) (quoting Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 
    500 U.S. 44
    , 52 (1991))
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, in these cases it is
    likely that “the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion
    for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest
    expires.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted). Therefore, in
    13  Where, however, the named plaintiff’s claims become moot after a class has been
    properly certified in a matter, the expiration of the named plaintiff’s claims does not have the
    effect of mooting the entire action since “the class of unnamed persons described in the
    certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named
    plaintiff].” 
    Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399
    .
    8
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    cases involving such claims, a class certification order is deemed to relate back
    to the time of the filing of the original complaint. See 
    McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52
    (citing Swisher v. Brady, 
    438 U.S. 204
    , 213-214, n.11 (1978)).
    While neither the Supreme Court nor this court has provided detailed
    guidance as to what makes a claim “inherently transitory,” Supreme Court
    jurisprudence suggests that the following factors are pertinent to such a
    determination: the challenged conduct giving rise to the claim is of a fleeting
    or temporary nature; uncertainty exists at the outset as to the duration of each
    plaintiff’s exposure to the allegedly harmful conduct; it is unlikely that any
    given individual plaintiff could see his claim to fruition prior to the claim
    becoming moot; and there exists a constant group of people suffering the harm
    alleged by the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Genesis 
    Healthcare, 569 U.S. at 76
    ; Gerstein
    v. Pugh, 
    420 U.S. 103
    , 110, n.11 (1975).
    Considering the foregoing, as well as the application of the doctrine by
    other courts in the prison context, 14 we believe that Plaintiffs’ claims in this
    case qualify as “inherently transitory.” First, the putative plaintiffs’ allegedly
    unlawful detention is of a fleeting or temporary nature, lasting anywhere from
    days to months. Additionally, there is uncertainty at the inception of each
    14 See, e.g., 
    Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110
    , n.11 (finding that the claims of pretrial detainees
    who argued that they were entitled to a probable cause hearing “belong[] . . . to that narrow
    class of cases in which the termination of a class representative’s claim does not moot the
    claims of the unnamed members of the class”); Amador v. Andrews, 
    655 F.3d 89
    , 100-01 (2d
    Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “[w]hether claims are inherently transitory is an inquiry that
    must be made with reference to the claims of the class as a whole as opposed to any one
    individual claim for relief” and finding the claims of the plaintiffs, female inmates in New
    York prisons, to be inherently transitory given that “the odds of a[ plaintiff] being able to
    complete the [state’s] grievance procedure [with respect to a sexual assault and/or
    harassment claim] and litigate a class action while still incarcerated [were] rather small”);
    Olson v. v. Brown, 
    594 F.3d 577
    , 583 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasizing that the named plaintiff
    who was an inmate at a temporary detention center “did not know when his claim would
    become moot” since “[t]he duration of his claim was at the discretion of the [state]
    [d]epartment of [c]orrection”).
    9
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    potential plaintiff’s claim regarding how long he or she will remain detained in
    a county jail prior to being transferred to a state hospital. Thus, although there
    are potential class members whose claims would not expire within the time it
    would take to obtain a class certification order, there is no way for Plaintiffs to
    ensure that any named plaintiff added to their complaint will be that
    individual. Additionally, even if an individual plaintiff were to maintain a live
    claim at the time of class certification, it is highly unlikely that such plaintiff’s
    claims would remain live throughout the entirety of this lawsuit. Finally,
    regardless of the status of any individual named plaintiff’s claim, there exists
    a constant group of people being subjected to Defendant’s “first-come, first-
    served” policy complained of by Plaintiffs. Indeed, by way of analogy, such
    policy operates similarly to a revolving door. These characteristics of Plaintiffs’
    claims make them likely to evade review if they do not fall within an exception
    to the general mootness rule. See 
    Genesis, 569 U.S. at 76
    .
    Because of the inherently transitory nature of the claims in this matter,
    the expiration of all of Plaintiffs’ claims prior to the district court entering its
    class certification order did not have the effect of mooting this action as a
    whole. Moreover, should the district court find it appropriate on remand to
    certify one or more classes of plaintiffs, its certification order would relate back
    to the filing of Plaintiffs’ complaint. See 
    McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52
    (citing
    
    Swisher, 438 U.S. at 213-214
    , n.11).             In so finding, we acknowledge the
    narrowness of the inherently transitory exception 15 but also recognize the
    “flexible character of the [Article] III mootness doctrine.” U.S. Parole Comm’n
    v. Geraghty, 
    445 U.S. 388
    , 400 (1980).
    15 See Rocky v. King, 
    900 F.2d 864
    , 870 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing the narrow scope
    of the inherently transitory exception).
    10
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    Rule 23
    Having satisfied ourselves of both our and the district court’s jurisdiction
    over this matter, we now turn to the propriety of the district court’s class
    certification order from a procedural standpoint. To obtain class certification,
    parties must satisfy the following Rule 23(a) requirements: (1) numerosity—
    “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”; (2)
    commonality—“there are questions of law or fact common to the class”; (3)
    typicality—“the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
    the claims or defenses of the class”; and (4) adequacy of representation—“the
    representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
    class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
    564 U.S. 338
    , 345 (2011); Ibe v. Jones, 
    836 F.3d 516
    , 528 (5th Cir. 2016). In addition to
    each of the Rule 23(a) requirements, one Rule 23(b) requirement must be met
    for a class to be certified. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); 
    Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 345
    .
    Here, Plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which is satisfied if
    “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
    generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
    declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV.
    P. 23(b)(2).
    A party seeking class certification has the burden of establishing that all
    of Rule 23’s requirements are met. See 
    Ibe, 836 F.3d at 528
    (internal citation
    omitted); see also 
    Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350
    (noting that “Rule 23 does not set
    forth a mere pleading standard” and that “[a] party seeking class certification
    must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule”). Thus, such a
    party must “be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous
    parties, common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or defenses, and
    adequacy of representation” and to satisfy at least one of Rule 23(b)’s
    11
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    provisions “through evidentiary proof.” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 
    569 U.S. 27
    , 33 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Additionally, before certifying a class, a district court “must conduct a
    rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 prerequisites,” which requires it to “look
    beyond the pleadings to understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and
    applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the
    certification issues.” 
    Yates, 868 F.3d at 362
    (quoting 
    Perry, 675 F.3d at 837
    and 
    Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350
    -51) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). In light of this imperative, this court has held that “when certifying
    a class a district court must detail with sufficient specificity how the plaintiff
    has met the requirements of Rule 23.” Vizena v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
    360 F.3d 496
    , 503 (2004). Notably, the obligation of a district court to conduct a rigorous
    analysis of Rule 23’s requirements, as evidenced by written reasons for
    certification, is not dispensed with by the parties’ stipulation to certification or
    failure to contest one or more of Rule 23’s requirements, since “the court [is]
    bound to conduct its own thorough . . . inquiry.” Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 
    280 F.3d 554
    , 563 n.7 (2002) (emphasis added). Such independent analysis is
    necessary to “protect unknown or unnamed potential class members [who], . .
    . by definition . . . do not and cannot participate in any stipulations concocted
    by the named parties.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    However, merits questions may only be considered to the extent “that they are
    relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class
    certification are satisfied.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 
    568 U.S. 455
    , 466 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
    12
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    Not disputing satisfaction of the numerosity requirement, 16 Defendant
    argues that the district court erred by failing to conduct a rigorous analysis of
    whether the commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation
    requirements, as well as Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirements for class-wide injunctive
    relief, are met here. We agree.
    a. Rule 23(a)
    1. Commonality
    To satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement, “the putative class
    members’ claims must depend upon a common contention,” which “must be of
    such a nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution.” 
    Yates, 868 F.3d at 361
    (quoting 
    Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350
    ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In other words, determining whether such “common contention” is true or false
    must allow for “resol[ution of] an issue that is central to the validity of each
    16   Though Defendant does not challenge satisfaction of Rule 23(a)’s numerosity
    requirement on appeal, we are compelled to point out the inadequacy of the district court’s
    numerosity analysis, which was contained within a footnote of its class certification order.
    Specifically, the district court stated that “Hellerstedt does not challenge the requirement[]
    of numerosity” and that, “[h]aving reviewed the pleadings and all supporting evidence
    presented by the parties,” it concluded that “Plaintiffs[] have met the burden of establishing
    numerosity.” While we make no comment as to whether numerosity in fact exists in this
    case, we note that the district court’s superficial discussion demonstrates that it did not
    undertake the necessary “rigorous analysis” of such requirement to independently confirm
    its fulfilment. See 
    Yates, 868 F.3d at 362
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
    see also 
    Vizena, 360 F.3d at 503
    (recognizing that district courts must state in detail how each
    of the Rule 23 requirements are met); 
    Stirman, 280 F.3d at 563
    , n.7 (acknowledging the
    obligation of district courts to independently analyze each of the Rule 23 requirements).
    While a lengthy discussion regarding numerosity was likely not necessary given the
    Defendant’s apparent concession on this point, the district court was obliged at a minimum
    to identify the approximate number of potential class members in this matter and other
    factors, if any, that bear on a determination of numerosity, as well as to explain the effect of
    those factors on its conclusion. See 
    Ibe, 836 F.3d at 528
    (recognizing that to establish
    numerosity, “[a] plaintiff must ordinarily demonstrate some evidence or reasonable estimate
    of the number of purported class members” and that such factors as “geographical dispersion
    of the class, the ease with which class members may be identified, the nature of the action,
    and the size of each plaintiff’s claim” may be relevant to a numerosity analysis) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted)). It erred in failing to do so.
    13
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    No. 17-50899
    one of the claims in one stroke.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citation
    omitted).   Accordingly, what is significant with respect to a commonality
    determination is “not the raising of common questions—even in droves—but,
    rather the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt
    to drive the resolution of the litigation.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and
    citation omitted). Indeed, a single common question of law or fact is sufficient
    if it meets the foregoing criteria. 
    Ibe, 836 F.3d at 528
    (citing 
    Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350
    ). Further, to establish commonality, the plaintiff(s) must show
    that “the class members have suffered the same injury.” 
    Id. (quoting Wal-
    Mart, 564 U.S. at 349
    ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While
    the term “injury” is generally tied to the concept of damages, this court has
    recognized that “an instance of injurious conduct, which would usually relate
    more directly to the defendant’s liability . . . , may constitute ‘the same injury’”
    for purposes of commonality. In re Deepwater Horizon, 
    739 F.3d 790
    , 810-11
    (5th Cir. 2014). Thus, commonality may exist even where the plaintiffs’ alleged
    damages are diverse. 
    Id. The district
    court’s discussion of whether the requirement of
    commonality is satisfied in this case includes excerpts from various federal
    court cases and an acknowledgement that it had “reviewed the pleadings and
    all supporting evidence in this case[] and look[ed] beyond the pleadings to
    understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive
    law.” With no further stated analysis, the court concluded that Plaintiffs have
    satisfied the commonality requirement by asserting the following common
    questions of fact in this case:
    whether incompetent detainees and insanity acquittees who are
    committed to the custody of Hellerstedt’s Department for
    restoration of their mental capacity so they may be tried or
    committed for evaluation to determine if they can continue to be
    confined, spend extended periods of time in county jails without
    14
    Case: 17-50899        Document: 00514683288           Page: 15     Date Filed: 10/16/2018
    No. 17-50899
    receiving restoration or evaluation services; and, if so, whether
    Hellerstedt uses a policy or procedure to ensure that any resulting
    delay in the implementation of such services and the place and
    manner in the implementation of those services are the product of
    the judgment rendered by a qualified professional.
    The Court further found that “[t]he answers to these questions of fact may
    implicate a common question of law,” namely:
    whether Hellerstedt violates the substantive due[]process rights of
    incompetent detainees and insanity acquittees to be free from
    conditions or restrictions of confinement that amount to
    punishment absent criminal conviction by keeping such
    individuals in county jail for extended periods of time while they
    wait to receive restoration and evaluation services that are the
    product of professional judgment.
    Notably, however, the district court did not explain at all, much less with
    specificity, how the determination of such questions would “resolve an issue
    that is central to the validity of each one of the [putative class member’s] claims
    in one stroke.” 
    Yates, 868 F.3d at 361
    (quoting 
    Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350
    )
    (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
    Perry, 675 F.3d at 841
    (finding
    error in the district court’s failure to explain why the common questions
    identified were sufficient); 
    Vizena, 360 F.3d at 503
    . Moreover, it is difficult to
    appreciate from a plain reading of the common questions identified by the
    district court how such questions are even capable of being resolved on a class-
    wide basis.     The district court’s use of the phrase “extended periods of time”
    as an integral part of its stated common questions is particularly problematic,
    as such phrase is ambiguous. Not only is it unclear what period of time the
    district court considers to be “extended,” but also whether a time period is
    “extended” could vary in different circumstances. 17
    17We also note, incidentally, that the common questions identified by the district court
    contain no specific reference to the “first-come, first-served” policy to which Plaintiffs contend
    all purported class members are subject. This is puzzling given that, as we understand
    15
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    No. 17-50899
    The district court’s failure to substantively address actual or potential
    differences in purported class members’ individual circumstances and claims
    is also troublesome, since considering dissimilarities among claimants is
    essential to determining whether even a single common question exists. 18 See
    
    Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 358
    . While we do not take a position at this juncture on
    whether critical disparities among putative plaintiffs exist here, we note that
    it is incumbent on the district court to consider and discuss the facts of this
    case, as well as the elements of Plaintiffs’ claims, prior to rejecting Defendant’s
    argument      that    dissimilarities     among       individual     claimants     obviate
    commonality. See 
    Perry, 675 F.3d at 843-44
    (stating that where a district court
    rejects an argument that the merits of each purported class member’s claims
    involve individualized inquiries that defeat commonality, it “must do so with
    reference to the elements and defenses and requisite proof for each of the
    proposed class claims”).
    Considering the foregoing, although we recognize that adequate common
    questions of law or fact may well exist in this case, we find that the district
    court failed to conduct the necessary rigorous analysis to properly determine
    whether the requirement of commonality is satisfied and further that the
    common questions identified by the district court, as currently worded, are
    insufficient to establish commonality.
    2. Typicality and Adequacy of Representation
    The    Rule    23(a)    requirements      of    typicality    and   adequacy      of
    representation are “closely related” in that “demanding typicality on the part
    Plaintiffs’ allegations, it is such commonly applied policy and its effects that Plaintiffs
    challenge.
    18 In its class certification order, the district court’s treatment of Defendant’s
    argument in this regard was limited to quoting portions of cases from various federal courts
    that indicate that the presence of some variations among class members does not necessarily
    render class certification inappropriate.
    16
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    of the representative helps ensure his adequacy as a representative.” Horton
    v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    690 F.2d 470
    , 485 n.27 (5th Cir. 1982). To
    demonstrate typicality, the parties seeking certification need not show “a
    complete identity of claims.” 
    Stirman, 280 F.3d at 562
    (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Rather, “the
    critical inquiry is whether the class representative’s claims have the same
    essential characteristics of those of the putative class.” 
    Id. Moreover, the
    typicality inquiry is not concerned so much with the “strengths of the named
    and unnamed plaintiffs’ cases” as with the “similarity of legal and remedial
    theories behind their claims.” 
    Ibe, 836 F.3d at 528
    -29 (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Thus, if the claims of the named plaintiffs and
    putative class members “arise from a similar course of conduct and share the
    same legal theory,” typicality will not be defeated by factual differences.
    
    Stirman, 280 F.3d at 562
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Adequacy, in the Rule 23(a) context, concerns “class representatives,
    their counsel, and the relationship between the two.” 
    Stirman, 280 F.3d at 563
    (quoting Berger v. Compaq Comput. Corp., 
    257 F.3d 475
    , 479 (5th Cir. 2001))
    (internal quotation marks omitted). More specifically, adequacy encompasses
    the following three inquiries:       “(1) the zeal and competence of the
    representatives’ counsel; (2) the willingness and ability of the representatives
    to take an active role in and control the litigation and to protect the interests
    of absentees; and (3) the risk of conflicts of interest between the named
    plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent.” Slade v. Progressive Sec. Ins.
    Co., 
    856 F.3d 408
    , 412 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,
    
    429 F.3d 125
    , 130 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). Since “absent class members are conclusively bound by the judgment
    in any class action brought on their behalf, the court must be especially vigilant
    to ensure that the due process rights of all class members are safeguarded
    17
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    No. 17-50899
    through adequate representation at all times.” 
    Berger, 257 F.3d at 480
    (citing
    Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
    472 U.S. 797
    , 812 (1985)). Thus, to satisfy
    the adequacy of representation requirement, “the class representatives [must]
    possess a sufficient level of knowledge and understanding to be capable of
    ‘controlling’ or ‘prosecuting’ the litigation.”         
    Ibe, 836 F.3d at 529
    (quoting
    
    Berger, 257 F.3d at 482-83
    ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    As with numerosity, the district court conducted no analysis regarding
    typicality or adequacy of representation, noting that Defendant had not
    challenged such requirements. Nevertheless, the court indicated that it “[had]
    reviewed the pleadings and all supporting evidence presented by the parties”
    and concluded that “Plaintiffs[] have met the burden of establishing” typicality
    and adequacy of representation. That the court found these requirements
    satisfied is concerning given that it did not explicitly certify or recognize any
    particular class representatives in its class certification order. Rather, the
    court ordered Plaintiffs to “file an amended complaint on or before October 2,
    2017, which shall include named plaintiffs to be appointed as class
    representatives for the two classes.” 19
    Plaintiffs maintain that “[b]ecause commonality is satisfied in this case
    . . . the district court’s order effectively found that any class member’s claims
    would be typical of all other class members.” Similarly, they contend that
    “[b]ecause all class members are alleging that Defendant’s same common
    19The district court presumably took such action because the named plaintiffs had
    each been transferred to state hospitals at the time the district court ruled on Plaintiffs’
    motion for class certification. We acknowledge that the brief duration of the purported class
    claims may throw some complexity into the district court’s Rule 23(a) analysis. This,
    however, does not excuse the court from conducting such analysis with respect to specific
    class representatives identified by the court. While a purported class claim’s inherently
    transitory nature may save it from mootness, we are aware of no authority suggesting that
    this characteristic absolves such claim or the action that encompasses it from full compliance
    with Rule 23(a).
    18
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    No. 17-50899
    policy results in unconstitutional detention, the district court necessarily found
    that any of them can adequately represent the interests of the class.” Such
    arguments are without merit. While we recognize that there often is overlap
    among the requirements of commonality, typicality and adequacy of
    representation, 20 it does not follow that the latter two are necessarily satisfied
    if the former is satisfied—which, at this point, has not been properly
    determined.     In other words, a finding of commonality does not excuse a
    district court from appropriately analyzing whether typicality and adequacy of
    representation exist. Moreover, such analysis must be conducted not with
    respect to any potential claimant, but with respect to “the representative
    parties.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). Indeed, a district court
    can only appropriately assess such factors as “the willingness and ability of the
    representatives to . . . control the litigation and to protect the interests of
    absentees” 21 with reference to one or more specific claimants, as opposed to any
    claimant that could fall within the putative class.
    Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the district court’s ability to amend its existing
    certification order to approve new class representatives saves the order from
    its deficiencies is likewise without merit. Rule 23 makes clear that a class
    action may proceed “only if” each of the Rule 23(a) requirements and at least
    one Rule 23(b) requirement is satisfied. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Baker
    v. Washington Mut. Fin. Grp., L.L.C., 193 F. App’x 294, 296 (5th Cir. 2006)
    (recognizing that “[a] class can be certified only if it meets each of the
    requirements outlined in Rule 23(a)” (emphasis added)). Further, nothing in
    Rule 23(c), which allows for the amendment of an order granting or denying
    class certification, relieves plaintiffs seeking class certification from complying
    20See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 
    457 U.S. 147
    , 157 n.13 (1982).
    21See 
    Slade, 856 F.3d at 412
    (quoting 
    Feder, 429 F.3d at 130
    ) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted).
    19
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    No. 17-50899
    with, or a court certifying a class from finding satisfaction of, the requirements
    of Rule 23(a) prior to a class initially being certified. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
    Accordingly, we find that the district court’s unsupported conclusion that
    typicality and adequacy are satisfied, coupled with its failure to identify
    specific class representatives and meaningfully analyze their fitness to serve
    in such capacity, defies the mandate to conduct a rigorous Rule 23(a) analysis
    including detailed written reasons that reference the facts and claims at hand.
    See 
    Yates, 868 F.3d at 362
    ; 
    Vizena, 360 F.3d at 503
    ; 
    Stirman, 280 F.3d at 563
    ,
    n.7.     Thus, the district court erred on this basis also in certifying the
    Incompetent Detainee and Insanity Acquittee classes.
    b. Rule 23(b)(2)
    In addition to satisfying the four Rule 23(a) prerequisites, to have a class
    properly certified, the party seeking certification must show that one of the
    three Rule 23(b) requirements is fulfilled.                See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
    Satisfaction of any of the Rule 23(b) requirements is contingent on satisfaction
    of each of the Rule 23(a) requirements in that a criterion for maintaining a
    class action under any of the Rule 23(b) requirements is compliance with Rule
    23(a). See 
    id. (providing that
    “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a)
    is satisfied” and if one of the three Rule 23(b) requirements is met). The district
    court determined that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) 22 are satisfied here.
    In light of our finding that the district court failed to conduct a rigorous
    analysis of the Rule 23(a) requirements and, as a result, erred in certifying
    both purported classes of plaintiffs, it would be premature at this juncture for
    us to address the merits of whether Rule 23(b)(2)’s strictures are met.
    As stated above, to obtain class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), the party seeking
    22
    certification must establish that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
    grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
    declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
    20
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    No. 17-50899
    Given the current posture of this case, however, we take this opportunity
    to briefly discuss what is required to comply with Rule 23(b)(2), the key to
    which is “the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy
    warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or
    declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.”
    
    Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Rule 23(b)(2) certification is warranted if the following three requirements are
    satisfied: “(1) class members must have been harmed in essentially the same
    way; (2) injunctive relief must predominate over monetary damage claims; and
    (3) the injunctive relief sought must be specific.” 
    Yates, 868 F.3d at 366-67
    (quoting Maldanado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 
    493 F.3d 521
    , 524 (5th Cir.
    2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We note that satisfaction of these
    requirements is premised on “common behavior by the defendant toward the
    class,” as opposed to the presence of common issues. 
    Id. at 366
    (quoting In re
    Rodriguez, 
    695 F.3d 360
    , 365 (5th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Thus, this court has found purported class members to have been
    “harmed in essentially the same way” where they have each been subject to
    the same allegedly wrongful policy, despite variations in the degree of damages
    suffered by each. See 
    Yates, 868 F.3d at 367-68
    (finding that state prisoners
    who were “subject to the same policy on climate control” were “harmed in
    essentially the same way,” i.e., “by exposure to a substantial risk of serious
    harm because of exposure to excessive heat”).
    With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) requirement that the injunctive relief
    sought be specific, we have recognized that plaintiffs must “give content to the
    injunctive relief they seek so that final injunctive relief may be crafted to
    describe in reasonable detail the acts required.” 
    Yates, 868 F.3d at 367
    (quoting
    
    Perry, 675 F.3d at 848
    ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
    (emphasis added). While plaintiffs seeking class certification are not required
    21
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    No. 17-50899
    to spell out “every jot and tittle of injunctive relief” at the class certification
    stage, 
    id. at 368,
    they must be able to explain “how a court could define or
    enforce meaningful injunctive relief.” 
    Maldonado, 493 F.3d at 525
    . We note,
    therefore, that to comply with Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs will, at minimum, have
    to describe in some kind of detail from what actions or inactions Defendant
    should be restrained. A general request that Defendant be restrained from
    violating Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment protections is insufficient. 23
    CONCLUSION
    The district court failed to conduct a rigorous analysis of any of the Rule
    23(a) factors and, therefore, erred in certifying the Incompetent Detainee and
    Insanity Acquittee classes. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s class
    certification order and REMAND this matter to the district court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    23 Here, in their “Prayer for Relief,” Plaintiffs request that the District Court “[i]ssue
    preliminary and permanent injunctive relief restraining Defendant from violating the
    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in relation to the confinement of
    individuals awaiting competency restoration treatment and the confinement of persons found
    not guilty by reason of insanity and awaiting evaluation and/or treatment services.” In turn,
    the district court held that “[i]f Plaintiffs can establish that Hellerstedt violates the due-
    process rights of the proposed class members, the court may render an injunction that will
    state with specificity the acts to be restrained or required without the need for specific relief
    tailored to each class member.”
    22