Unique Properties v. Terrebonne Prsh Govt ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    REVISED DECEMBER 8, 2005
    October 4, 2005
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 04-30650
    ____________
    UNIQUE PROPERTIES LLC, Unique Properties LLC; CHARLES D CHAUVIN, II,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    TERREBONNE PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT; ET AL,
    Defendants,
    TERREBONNE PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT; HOUMA TERREBONNE
    REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 4:01-CV-3503-I
    Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Unique Properties LLC (“Unique”) and Charles D. Chauvin, II, appeal the district court’s
    orders granting Defendants’ motion for JMOL and denying various Plaintiffs’ motions. On appeal,
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
    published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Chauvin and Unique claim that (1) the defendants failed to preserve the post-trial JMOL grounds
    improperly accepted by the district court; (2) JMOL was inappropriate because there was sufficient
    evidence of unequal treatment; (3) they are entitled to a new trial or additur because of the district
    court’s improper jury charge, its failure to permit evidence of a failed settlement, the Defendants’
    misconduct in discovery, evidence that an appraiser withheld evidence, and the “compromise” verdict
    of the jury; and (4) they are entitled to injunctive relief and an award of costs and attorney’s fees.
    Chauvin and Unique sought approval from the Houma-Terrebonne Regional Planning
    Commission (“HTRPC”) to subdivide a tract of land. The application lacked drainage plans. After
    HTRPC granted conceptual and preliminary approval, Unique requested a waiver of engineering.
    Concerned about heavy flooding and lack of drainage plans, the HTRPC denied Unique’s request.
    Plaintiffs filed a 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action, asserting, inter alia, that they were denied equal
    protection with the denial of their request for a waiver of engineering. The jury returned a verdict
    against HTRPC. The Defendants then renewed their motion for JMOL. Plaintiffs filed numerous
    motions for, inter alia, a new trial and costs. The district court denied the Plaintiffs’ motions and
    granted the Defendants’ renewed JMOL motion.
    The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants failed to preserve the grounds for their post-trial
    motion for JMOL. A motion for judgment as a matter of law filed post-verdict cannot assert a ground
    that was not included in the motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of the evidence.
    Morante v. American Gen. Fin. Ctr., 
    157 F.3d 1006
    , 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court granted
    Defendants’ JMOL motion, finding that the Plaintiffs were not similarly situated to other developers
    who obtained HTRPC approval. The Defendants’ pre-verdict JMOL motion addressed this issue;
    thus, the Defendants properly preserved the grounds for their post-trial motion for JMOL.
    2
    The Plaintiffs contend that there was legally sufficient evidence for the jury to reach its verdict
    in their favor and, thus, that JMOL was inappropriate. “As a prerequi site to [an equal protection]
    claim, the plaintiff must prove that similarly situated individuals were treated differently.” Beeler v.
    Rounsavall, 
    328 F.3d 813
    , 816 (5th Cir. 2003), citing Wheeler v. Miller, 
    168 F.3d 241
    , 252 (5th Cir.
    1999). Chauvin and Unique do not allege disparity in treatment due to a suspect classification but
    contend that they are in a “class of one.” In “class of one” cases, the plaintiff must show that she was
    intentionally treated differently than those similarly situated without a rational basis for the distinction.
    Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
    528 U.S. 562
    , 564 (2000). Land use classifications have a rational
    basis if they are “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”                 Jackson Court
    Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 
    874 F.2d 1070
    , 1079 (5th Cir. 1989). The district court
    correctly found that the Plaintiffs were not similarly situated to other applicants and that drainage and
    street flooding issues are related to a legitimate government interest. Thus, the denial of the
    application was properly granted.
    Having fully considered the arguments of counsel addressing the Plaintiffs’ various motions,
    we find that the district court properly denied them.
    The orders are, accordingly, AFFIRMED.
    3