Bank of Louisiana v. FDIC ( 2022 )

Case: 21-30494 Document: 00516321679 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/17/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 17, 2022
No. 21-30494 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Bank of Louisiana, and Affiliated Parties; G. Harrison
Scott; Johnny C. Crow,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Defendant—Appellee,
______________________________
Bank of Louisiana; G. Harrison Scott; Johnny C. Crow,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC Nos. 2:21-cv-779, 2:21-cv-1247, and 2:21-cv-1248
Case: 21-30494 Document: 00516321679 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/17/2022
No. 21-30494
Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Costa and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Gregg Costa, Circuit Judge:
The Bank of Louisiana and two of its directors appeal the district
court’s dismissal of their complaints against the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). The district court ruled that the complaints rehashed
allegations that it had repeatedly held it lacked jurisdiction to consider. We
affirmed those jurisdictional dismissals. The question is whether those
earlier jurisdictional rulings have preclusive effect.
This appeal marks the Bank’s latest attempt to overturn a series of
orders by the FDIC penalizing the Bank for violating federal banking laws. In
2019, the Bank petitioned this court for direct review of those orders under a
provision of the banking code which vests federal circuit courts with
“exclusive” jurisdiction to review final orders by the Board. 12 U.S.C. §
1818(h)(2). We had jurisdiction over those direct appeals but remanded so
the agency could consider an intervening Supreme Court ruling. Bank of La.
v. FDIC, 919 F.3d 916, 920–21 (5th Cir. 2019) (describing the procedural
history). Meanwhile, the Bank had sued the FDIC in district court, alleging
several constitutional issues arising out of the same enforcement
proceedings. The district court dismissed that suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and we affirmed. Id. at 921. We explained that the Bank’s
constitutional claims were intertwined with the enforcement proceedings
themselves and thus could not be brought in district court. Id. at 928.
One year later, the Bank filed another complaint against the FDIC in
district court asserting the same constitutional violations. The Bank also
twice requested that we transfer its direct appeals from the enforcement
proceedings—both of which raised the same issues—to the district court.
On all three occasions, we reiterated that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to hear the Bank’s claims. See Bank of La. v. FDIC, 807 F. App’x 360, 362
(5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished); Bank of La. v. FDIC, 832 F. App’x 323, 324
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No. 21-30494
(5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished); Bank of La. v. FDIC, 841 F. App’x 735, 736
(5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (“We have already held that the district court
properly dismissed the Bank's claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. . . . The Bank makes no attempt to grapple with our decision in
Bank of Louisiana and it raises the very same arguments now as it did before
us in that case.”).
Undeterred by these rulings, the Bank filed three more complaints
against the FDIC in district court. The court consolidated all three cases and
dismissed them—this time, under the doctrine of claim preclusion. The bank
appeals this latest dismissal, arguing that the prior jurisdictional rulings do
not have preclusive effect.
But cases dismissed on jurisdictional grounds can have preclusive
effect. “It has long been the rule that principles of res judicata apply to
jurisdictional determinations.” Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie Des
Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982); see also Boone v. Kurtz, 617
F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s sua
sponte dismissal, on the basis of res judicata, of claims that were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction in a prior case).
We have sometimes used the terms “claim preclusion” or “true res
judicata” to describe the preclusive effect of jurisdictional rulings. See, e.g.,
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 466, 469 (5th Cir. 2013). But
“issue preclusion” is the better framing. See 18A Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4436 (3d
ed. 2022) (“Although a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar a second
action as a matter of claim preclusion, it does preclude relitigation of the
issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction question.”). Issue preclusion
makes more sense for jurisdictional rulings because the dismissal of a
complaint for lack of jurisdiction does not “make the case res judicata on the
substance of the asserted claim.” Boone, 617 F.2d at 436; see also Petro-Hunt,
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No. 21-30494
L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 2004) (requiring a “final
judgment on the merits” in the earlier suit for claim preclusion (emphasis
added)). If the jurisdictional problem is later fixed, the suit can be refiled.
Wright et al. § 4436 (recognizing that a claim dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds does not bar “a second action on the same claim that
corrects the deficiency found in the first action”); see Lopez v. Pompeo, 923
F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “when this court dismisses a case
due to failure of one particular jurisdictional element, and the party later
cures that jurisdictional defect and brings a new suit, res judicata does not bar
the second suit”); cf. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 600
(2016) (explaining that a judgment, “which rests on the prematurity of the
action or on the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy a precondition to suit, does not
bar another action by the plaintiff” once those issues are resolved (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Judgements § 20 cmt. k (1980)). For
example, a suit over which a federal court lacks jurisdiction because of an
insufficient amount-in-controversy can later be filed in state court. See
Ansari v. Bella Auto. Grp., Inc., 145 F.3d 1270, 1272 (11th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam). Or a case dismissed as premature may later ripen. Cf. DM Arbor
Ct., Ltd. v. City of Houston, 988 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 2021) (reinstating a
case that the district court properly dismissed as unripe because it ripened
during appeal). That is why jurisdictional dismissals are without prejudice to
refiling. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Preclusion principles do, however, bar relitigation of the same
jurisdictional issue decided in a prior case. Boone, 617 F.2d at 436; Comer, 718
F.3d at 469. The Bank’s new complaints aim to do just that. Once again, the
Bank contends there is district court jurisdiction over its constitutional claims
against the FDIC. That is the same issue we decided against the Bank in the
prior suits. The new complaints thus repeat rather than remedy the
jurisdictional problem that warranted the earlier dismissals. As a result, the
previous rulings preclude these latest suits.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
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