Rabo Agrifinance, Inc. v. Veigel Farm Partners ( 2009 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    May 15, 2009
    No. 08-10817                      Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Summary Calendar                            Clerk
    RABO AGRIFINANCE, INC, an Iowa Corporation.
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    VEIGEL FARM PARTNERS D/B/A VEIGEL PARTNERS, VEIGEL FARMS,
    INC., TERRA XXI, LTD., GRAIN CENTRAL STATION, INC., D/B/A VEIGEL
    GRAIN COMPANY, VEIGEL-KIRK, INC., BOB VEIGEL, INC., BOB
    VEIGEL, INDIVIDUALLY A/K/A ROBERT WAYNE VEIGEL, STEVE
    VEIGEL, INC., STEVE VEIGEL, INDIVIDUALLY, VICKI VEIGEL, INC.,
    AND VEIGEL CATTLE CO.
    Defendants-Appellants
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:05-CV-00243
    Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Between 1997 and 1998 Ag Services of America, Inc. (“ASA), Appellee’s
    predecessor-in-interest, made a series of loans totalling $1.8 million to entities
    run by members of the Veigel family (which entities and individuals are
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 08-10817
    Appellants in this case) (“the Veigels”). All of the Veigels named as defendants
    signed as makers or guarantors of these loans. The debt was secured by, inter
    alia, a second lien on certain property in Deaf Smith County, Texas: this “Second
    Lien Debt” is the loan at issue in this case.
    In August 2000 two of the Veigel entities filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
    and bankruptcy plans (“the Bankruptcy Plans”) were confirmed in December
    2001. The Bankruptcy Plans specifically preserved the Second Lien Debt, in the
    amount of $1,621,550.00. Further litigation produced a 2002 settlement (“the
    Settlement Agreement”), which was clarified in August 2003 and which reduced
    the Second Lien Debt to $1.5 million. But the Veigels failed to repay the Second
    Lien Debt, and Appellee foreclosed on the property in Deaf Smith County on
    September 2, 2003. The property was at that time still encumbered by a first lien
    for $3 million, and so the foreclosure on the property produced only $20,000
    towards the Second Lien Debt.
    The Veigels filed suit in state court challenging the foreclosure, but were
    denied relief. While that case was pending, Appellee filed suit in federal district
    court to recover the remaining balance due under the Second Lien Debt. The
    district court stayed the proceedings until the state court case was resolved;
    after the state court upheld the foreclosure, the district court granted summary
    judgment for Appellee and found the Veigels liable for the deficiency on the loan.
    The Veigels failed to file a timely appeal, and instead brought an F.R.C.P.
    60(b)(4) motion arguing that the judgment was void because it allowed recovery
    based on “promissory notes” that were discharged in bankruptcy. The district
    court denied the motion on the grounds that the Second Lien Debt was
    specifically preserved in the Bankruptcy Plans and that res judicata barred the
    extinguishment defense because the state court had denied relief on this ground.
    Our review of a 60(b)(4) motion is effectively de novo. Jackson v. Fie Corp.,
    
    302 F.3d 515
    , 521-22 (5th Cir. 2002). On appeal, the Veigels argue, as they did
    2
    No. 08-10817
    below, that the Second Lien Debt was extinguished by the Bankruptcy
    Plans/Settlement Agreement and that the $1.5 million owed under the
    Settlement Agreement is a new obligation, making any judgment upholding a
    foreclosure based on the Second Lien Debt void. We disagree.
    Section 1141(d)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy code, on which the Veigels rely,
    provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or
    in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan discharges the
    debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation.” 11 U.S.C.
    § 1141(d)(1)(A). The Veigels strenuously insist that pre-confirmation debts are
    not enforceable under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan. In re Page, 
    118 B.R. 456
    ,
    460 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990). This is clearly true as a general matter. But the
    statute explicitly allows for the preservation of obligations in such a plan, and
    those obligations are not replaced or discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A). As
    the district court correctly noted, the Bankruptcy Plans in this case specifically
    provided for the preservation of the Second Lien Debt. See also Rabo Agrifinance
    v. Terra XXI, Ltd., 257 Fed. Appx. 732 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a similar
    extinguishment argument by the Veigels in a related case between the same
    parties arising out of another set of debts covered by the same Bankruptcy Plans
    and Settlement Agreement). The Settlement Agreement reduced the amount of
    the Second Lien Debt to $1.5 million but specified that “[a]ll terms and
    covenants of [the Bankruptcy Plans and Agreed Orders] . . . are hereby
    confirmed in all respects, and shall remain in force and effect, save and except
    for” modifications including the reduction to $1.5 million. There is no support for
    the argument that these modifications constituted a new obligation as opposed
    to a clarified or modified existing obligation. The Veigels have cited no case law
    to support this interpretation and no language in the documents that supports
    it either. Because the Bankruptcy Plans and the Settlement Agreement clearly
    3
    No. 08-10817
    preserve the Second Lien Debt, we need not reach the res judicata claim. The
    judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-10817

Judges: King, Dennis, Owen

Filed Date: 5/15/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024