Gathings v. MS Dept Rehab Svc ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-60405      Document: 00516664224             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/02/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 2, 2023
    No. 22-60405                                   Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                                      Clerk
    Shondra Gathings,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Mississippi Department of Rehabilitation Services,
    Defendant—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:21-cv-709
    Before Clement, Willett, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Shondra Gathings alleges that her employer, the Mississippi
    Department of Rehabilitation Services, discriminated against her by not
    appointing her as its Director of Client Services. The district court granted
    summary judgment because Gathings failed to demonstrate a prima facie case
    in which she suffered from racial discrimination. We AFFIRM.
    *This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 22-60405       Document: 00516664224         Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/02/2023
    No. 22-60405
    I
    The Department hired Gathings, an African American woman, in
    2008. Over the years, she has earned multiple promotions and earned a
    master’s degree. When Gathings resigned from the Department in 2021, she
    served as a District Manager. Gathings demonstrated interest in further
    promotions, applying, but being rejected for, a Regional Director position
    multiple times.
    In July 2019, Kevin Bishop was promoted to Deputy Administrator
    over Workforce Programs, leaving a vacancy in his prior role, Director of
    Client Services. Bishop recommended Carol Elrod—Gathings’ white
    comparator in this litigation—for his old job. Elrod subsequently received her
    promotion to Director of Client Services. Of note, the Director of Client
    Services is an appointed government official, not a member of the state civil
    service. This classification means that the opening was non-competitive and
    did not require public posting, as is usually the case for government
    employment under Mississippi’s job advertising requirements. See 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 25-9-107
    (c)(xvi).
    Gathings filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming that the
    Department did not promote her to the Director of Client Services position
    because of her race. The U.S. Department of Justice issued a right-to-sue
    letter, and Appellant filed suit with a coworker in federal court seeking relief
    under several race discrimination theories. The district court first dismissed
    all the claims unrelated to Elrod’s promotion to the Director of Client
    Services role. Then, after discovery, it granted the Department’s motion for
    summary judgment. In its order, the district court concluded that Gathings
    could not sustain a claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
     against a state government
    agency, that she failed to establish a prima facie case that she was the victim
    of racial discrimination, or that, in the alternative, Gathings was unable to
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    show that the Department’s stated reasons for why it did not promote her
    were pretextual. On appeal, Gathings abandons her § 1981 claim and the
    claims the district court dismissed in its order granting the motion to dismiss,
    limiting her challenge to the conclusion that she has failed to demonstrate a
    prima facie case and that any reasons for the alleged discrimination were
    pretextual.
    II
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
    applying the same standard used by the district court. Nickell v. Beau View of
    Biloxi, L.L.C., 
    636 F.3d 752
    , 754 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is
    proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    We view the evidence and draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the
    nonmovant; however, “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences,
    and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for
    summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Hous., 
    337 F.3d 539
    , 541 (5th Cir.
    2003).
    III
    In suits under Title VII alleging an employer’s failure to hire or
    promote, a plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case by offering evidence
    that she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified and applied
    for a position; (3) was rejected; and (4) was passed over by the employer so
    it could promote, hire, or continue to seek a person of a non-protected class.
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802 (1973); Burrell v. Dr.
    Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 
    482 F.3d 408
    , 412 (5th Cir. 2007).
    The requirement that an employee must apply for the position
    at issue is interpreted to accommodate various situations. For
    instance, an employee does not need to apply to establish a
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    prima facie case when the position was not publicized. Instead,
    the employee must show that the company had a duty or reason
    to consider her for the position.
    Johnson v. Louisiana, 
    351 F.3d 616
    , 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
    It is undisputed that the Director of Client Services position was not
    advertised. Thus, Gathings needs only show that the Department had a
    reason or duty to consider her for that role. The district court found that
    Gathings had failed to provide evidence that such reasons or duties existed.
    Specifically, the court pointed to the absence of any communication between
    Gathings and the Department about her interest in the job. It also found that
    she had not shown any reason she should have expected to be considered for
    the director role.
    Gathings argues that the Department concealed the job opening from
    her by failing to advertise the job, that she was exceptionally well qualified for
    the role, and that, regardless, she could not have communicated interest in a
    position she did not know was available at the time. These arguments are
    correct insofar as they go. However, we agree with the district court that the
    Department’s failure to seek candidates for an appointed, policymaking, non-
    competitive, non-civil service position is not a reason it had to consider her
    as a candidate. Ultimately, the only evidence Gathings can point to is that she
    did not get considered to be an appointed government official. This alone
    does not suggest any form of racial discrimination.
    IV
    Gathings has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that she is the
    victim of racial discrimination. Therefore, we need not address whether the
    state’s explanations for its actions were a pretext for discrimination. We
    AFFIRM.
    4