Larry Brown v. Civigenics ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-50301     Document: 00511586079         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/29/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 29, 2011
    No. 10-50301
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    LARRY W BROWN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    CIVIGENICS, a Public Corporation; CORPORAL MORENO; CORRECTIONAL
    OFFICER BARRERA; CORPORAL HENRY,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 7:09-CV-23
    Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Larry W. Brown, federal prisoner # 79315-180, appeals pro se from the
    district court’s grant of summary judgment to the appellees and dismissal of his
    complaint for failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust. He argues that the
    district court erred in granting the summary judgment motion after concluding
    that he had failed to state a claim under Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents of the
    Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971), that he had not exhausted his
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-50301   Document: 00511586079      Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/29/2011
    No. 10-50301
    administrative remedies, and that he had not provided sufficient facts to support
    his Texas common law negligence claims. He further asserts that the district
    court erred in dismissing his complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
     and
    1915A.
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
    Carnaby v. City of Houston, 
    636 F.3d 183
    , 187 (5th Cir. 2011). Dismissal is
    appropriate where a prisoner files a civil rights complaint without first
    exhausting his administrative remedies. See Marsh v. Jones, 
    53 F.3d 707
    , 710
    (5th Cir. 1995). “[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary.”
    Woodford v. Ngo, 
    548 U.S. 81
    , 84 (2006).        A prisoner cannot satisfy the
    exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely grievance or appeal. 
    Id. at 83-84
    .
    The record reveals that Brown did not initiate the grievance procedure
    until February 10, 2008, although the alleged incident of which he complains
    happened in late July or early August of 2007. According to the detention
    facility’s Inmate Handbook, inmates have five days after an incident to make an
    informal complaint to staff, five days after that to file a formal, written
    complaint, and five days in which to appeal the results. Because Brown filed his
    grievance seven months late, he did not properly exhaust his administrative
    remedies. 
    Id.
    Brown’s assertions that he did not have the mental capacity to file a timely
    grievance and feared retaliation for filing a grievance are without merit. The
    Fifth Circuit has generally taken a strict approach to the exhaustion
    requirement. See, e.g., Ferrington v. La. Dep’t of Corr., 
    315 F.3d 529
    , 532 (5th
    Cir. 2002) (concluding that plaintiff’s blindness did not prevent him from filing
    a timely grievance given that he filed a civil rights complaint, appealed the
    results of a disciplinary hearing, and filed unrelated grievances). Richardson v.
    Spurlock, 
    260 F.3d 495
    , 499 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claim for failure to exhaust where prisoner incorrectly filed an
    administrative appeal instead of a disciplinary appeal). Moreover, Brown was
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    No. 10-50301
    timely informed that his grievance was too late, and nothing in the record
    indicates that the defendants intended to waive the affirmative defense of failure
    to exhaust.
    In addition, Brown’s assertion that the district court should have granted
    additional time for discovery before deciding the exhaustion issue is without
    merit.   Brown did not request a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f)
    continuance for further discovery in the district court and did not provide the
    district court with specific facts demonstrating how additional time for discovery
    would have allowed him to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
    issue of exhaustion. Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    901 F.2d 1281
    , 1285 (5th
    Cir. 1990).
    Because Brown has not demonstrated that he exhausted his
    administrative remedies, we need not consider his remaining claims.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    3