United States v. Johnson ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-30119       Document: 00516668554             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/07/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                      United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 7, 2023
    No. 22-30119                             Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Delewis Johnson, IV; Roy Lee Jones, Jr.,
    Defendants—Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:20-CR-156-1
    Before Jones, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Delewis Johnson and Roy Lee Jones were convicted of conspiracy to
    possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine or
    500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable
    amount of methamphetamine. See 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841. Johnson was also
    convicted of distributing methamphetamine. See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    . Both
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
    forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 22-30119     Document: 00516668554           Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/07/2023
    No. 22-30119
    challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for their convictions on appeal.
    Jones also challenges two sentencing enhancements applied by the district
    court. We AFFIRM.
    Appellate courts affirm on the sufficiency of the evidence if, “after
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
    rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789 (1979).
    Both defendants challenge their convictions because, they say, the
    evidence did not demonstrate they trafficked methamphetamine as opposed
    to some other controlled substance. Yet even if that were indisputably true,
    it would require resentencing rather than acquittal. The relevant statute
    prohibits trafficking in any “controlled substance.” 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).
    The specific kind of controlled substance is “not a formal element of the
    conspiracy offense.” See United States v. Daniels, 
    723 F.3d 562
    , 573 (5th Cir.
    2013). Therefore, the defendants cannot challenge their convictions on these
    grounds, but merely their sentences. 
    Id.
    Moreover, there is ample evidence that both defendants trafficked in
    methamphetamine. First, take Jones. Two street-level distributors testified
    that “Dee” (Johnson’s alias) supplied Jones with methamphetamine, who in
    turn supplied those lower on the totem pole. See United States v. Perry,
    
    35 F.4th 293
    , 317 (5th Cir. 2022) (“This Court has long held that a defendant
    may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a coconspirator who
    has accepted a plea bargain, so long as the coconspirator’s testimony is not
    incredible.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).       On an
    intercepted call, Jones told a coconspirator named Harris that Jones had
    “two” for him. In the following days, Harris let two other coconspirators
    know that Harris now had “meth” or “CDs” (slang the group used for
    2
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    No. 22-30119
    methamphetamine). On another call, Jones discussed paying “Dee” for
    “zips”—a term that a coconspirator testified referred to methamphetamine.
    Jones makes essentially two arguments as to why this evidence is
    insufficient; both fail. First, he contends that the testimony from his
    coconspirators is incredible because, according to a government expert,
    conspirators at Jones’s level in the distribution chain do not interact with
    street-level distributors. Second, he avers that his intercepted statements
    were vague and could have referred to marijuana rather than
    methamphetamine. But neither argument demonstrates that no rational trier
    of fact could have found Jones guilty. At this stage, the “evidence need not
    exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent
    with every conclusion except that of guilt, and this court will accept all
    credibility choices that tend to support the verdict.” United States v.
    Stevenson, 
    126 F.3d 662
    , 664 (5th Cir. 1997). The jury could have rationally
    concluded that the expert’s testimony was inapplicable to Jones’s situation
    and rejected alternative interpretations of his ambiguous statements.
    The evidence against Johnson is also sufficient. His counsel conceded
    that Johnson was involved in the marijuana trade with Jones and went by the
    name “Dee.” Multiple members of the conspiracy had heard that Jones got
    his methamphetamine from “Dee.” Jones acknowledged that his supply
    came from “Dee” on an intercepted call. On another call, Johnson offered
    to sell “broccoli” (which the prosecution interpreted as a reference to
    marijuana) or “the other one” to a police informant. When the informant
    ordered “the other one,” Johnson sent a shipment to a third party’s address.
    That shipment was stolen before the police could confiscate it, but shortly
    thereafter a person associated with the address was arrested with
    methamphetamine in his possession. The informant then placed a second
    order for “another one” with Johnson. Soon after, the informant received
    tracking information for the package, which was intercepted and found to
    3
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    contain a pound of methamphetamine. Like Jones, Johnson attempts to
    characterize the evidence as only supporting marijuana trafficking. He also
    denies that he sent the tracking number for the second package. But, at best,
    his counter-interpretation of the evidence merely establishes that a
    “reasonable hypothesis of innocence” is possible—not that the jury was
    irrational for rejecting that hypothesis.        Stevenson, 
    126 F.3d at 664
    .
    Consequently, both of Johnson’s convictions survive his sufficiency of the
    evidence challenge.
    Likewise, Jones’s challenges to his sentencing enhancements fail.
    The first enhancement was for acting as a manager or supervisor of a drug
    conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The second was imposed because his
    offense involved between 10,000 and 30,000 KG of Converted Drug Weight
    under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Both enhancements rest on factual findings that are
    reviewed for clear error. United States v. Warren, 
    986 F.3d 557
    , 567 (5th Cir.
    2021) (manager/supervisor enhancement); United States v. Betancourt,
    
    422 F.3d 240
    , 246 (5th Cir. 2005) (drug quantity). Therefore, the court
    should affirm if the decision below “is plausible in light of the whole record.”
    United States v. Blanco, 
    27 F.4th 375
    , 382 (5th Cir. 2022).
    Given Jones’s role in the distribution chain, the district court did not
    clearly err by applying the manager/supervisor enhancement. As mentioned
    above, the prosecution introduced evidence that Jones supplied the street-
    level distributors with methamphetamine that he obtained from Johnson.
    This position in the distribution chain gave him control over the other
    conspirators’ access to the drug.          At minimum, then, he “exercised
    management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities” of the
    enterprise. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 n. 2.
    Finally, the district court did not clearly err by applying the drug
    quantity enhancement. Jones makes several arguments to contend that his
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    No. 22-30119
    Converted Drug Weight includes drugs he never supplied. Some of his
    arguments fail for the same reasons that his sufficiency of the evidence
    argument fails. But more fundamentally, these arguments misconstrue the
    legal standard. Jones is responsible for the quantity of drugs that he “knew
    or should have known or foreseen was involved” in the conspiracy, not just
    the drugs he personally trafficked. United States v. Puma, 
    937 F.2d 151
    , 160
    (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Pofahl, 
    990 F.2d 1456
    , 1484 (5th Cir.
    1993) (“involvement in a conspiracy is presumed to continue and will not be
    terminated until the co-conspirator acts affirmatively to defeat or disavow the
    purpose of the conspiracy”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if he
    did not personally supply all of the drugs at issue, he offers no argument as to
    why he could not have known that the conspiracy would encompass the
    quantities at issue. Ergo, his challenge to this enhancement cannot succeed.
    AFFIRMED.
    5