K. v. King ( 2022 )

Case: 22-60228 Document: 00516487353 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/28/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-60228
Summary Calendar FILED
September 28, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
State Farm Life Insurance Company, Clerk
Plaintiff,
versus
C. K., care of Loshandra King, natural mother and guardian of C.K.,
Defendant—Appellee,
versus
Loshandra King,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:21-CV-50
Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 22-60228 Document: 00516487353 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/28/2022
No. 22-60228
State Farm filed an interpleader action to determine who should
receive the proceeds of Willie Earl King’s life insurance policy. In this
appeal, Appellant Loshandra King, Willie’s former wife, challenges the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee C.K., their
minor child. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I.
Willie and Loshandra married in 2004 and had a child together, C.K.
During their marriage, Willie purchased a life insurance policy from State
Farm and designated several individuals as beneficiaries, including
Loshandra and C.K. In 2011, Willie and Loshandra separated. The next year,
Willie submitted a change of beneficiary form, reducing the amount of life
insurance proceeds designated for Loshandra. Two years later, Willie and
Loshandra divorced.
In 2020, Mississippi enacted a new statute governing when an ex-
spouse may receive the life insurance benefits of a deceased. See Miss.
Code Ann. § 91-29-23. Under this provision, a pre-divorce designation of
a spouse as a beneficiary under a life insurance policy is invalid unless certain
exceptions apply. See id. Despite § 91-29-23’s enactment, Willie made no
attempt to redesignate Loshandra as his beneficiary, and he passed away later
that year.
Upon Willie’s death, Loshandra and the other beneficiaries each
submitted life insurance claims for benefits under the policy. State Farm paid
out the life insurance proceeds to the other named beneficiaries. However,
unsure of the effect of § 91-29-23, State Farm withheld payment of the
proceeds Willie had once designated for Loshandra, and then filed this
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interpleader suit. State Farm paid the remaining life insurance funds into the
court’s registry. 1
C.K. moved for summary judgment, arguing that under § 91-29-23,
Willie and Loshandra’s divorce invalidated Willie’s designation of
Loshandra as a beneficiary. The district court agreed, granting summary
judgment in favor of C.K. and denying Loshandra’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Loshandra timely appealed.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Bagley v. Albertsons, Inc., 492 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2007). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We resolve all doubts and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Cates v. Dillard Dep’t
Stores, Inc., 624 F.3d 695, 696 (5th Cir. 2010).
The primary issue on appeal is whether Willie and Loshandra’s
divorce invalidated the designation of Loshandra as a beneficiary. Under
§ 91-29-23, “a provision in [an insurance] policy in favor of the insured’s
former spouse is not effective” if the parties subsequently divorce “after an
insured has designated the insured’s spouse as a beneficiary.” Miss. Code
Ann. § 91-29-23. This general rule is subject to only a few exceptions—a
designation is still valid if: (1) the divorce “decree designates the insured’s
former spouse as the beneficiary”; (2) “[t]he insured redesignates the
former spouse” after the divorce decree; or (3) “[t]he former spouse is
designated to receive the proceeds in trust.” Id. If, however, none of the
1
The court subsequently dismissed State Farm from the suit.
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exceptions apply, a designation is deemed ineffective, and “the proceeds of
the policy are payable to . . . the estate of the insured.” Id.Applying the statute to the facts here, we agree that § 91-29-23 plainly
invalidates Loshandra as a beneficiary. It is undisputed that Willie named
Loshandra as a beneficiary in 2012 prior to their divorce. Moreover, none of
the exceptions set forth in § 91-29-23 are applicable—the divorce decree did
not redesignate Loshandra as a beneficiary, Willie took no affirmative steps
to redesignate Loshandra post-divorce, and there’s no evidence that
Loshandra was designated to receive the proceeds in trust for the benefit of a
child. See id. Because none of the exceptions apply, we agree with the district
court that the divorce rendered Willie’s prior designation of Loshandra
invalid.
Loshandra’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. She first
contends that State Farm somehow waived § 91-29-23’s requirements by
filing this interpleader action. Loshandra relies on Bell v. Parker, 563 So. 2d
594 (Miss. 1990). In Bell, an insured individual attempted to change the
beneficiary of her life insurance policy through an oral request, even though
the insurance policy clearly required such a request to be made in writing. Id.at 595–96. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the insured had
substantially complied with the policy because she (1) had demonstrated an
intent to change the beneficiary and (2) did everything within her capability
to effectuate that change. Id. at 598–99. It therefore upheld the oral
designation. Id.Nothing in Bell supports Loshandra’s argument here. For one,
although the trial court noted that the insurer may have waived the policy’s
requirements by filing the interpleader action, the appellate court did not
reach any such holding on waiver. See generally id. More importantly,
though, the issue in Bell was whether the insured individual had substantially
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complied with the requirements of the insurance policy—not, as is at issue
here, statutory requirements for designation of beneficiaries. See id. at 598.
Understandably, an insurance company can waive its own rules, but nothing
in Bell stands for the proposition that an insurance company can waive
statutory requirements for designation by filing an interpleader action. Such
a view would be illogical, and Loshandra fails to cite to any other authority
supporting such a conclusion.
Loshandra next argues that the district court erred by applying a
“strict compliance” standard, and Willie’s “substantial compliance” with
§ 91-29-23 was sufficient to preserve Loshandra’s status as beneficiary. This
argument too fails. This is not a case of strict compliance versus substantial
compliance. Rather, there’s simply no evidence at all that Willie took any
steps to redesignate Loshandra as his beneficiary following their divorce (or
even while the joint complaint for divorce that they filed which resulted in
the ultimate divorce was pending) and the enactment of § 91-29-23. Cf.
Murdock v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 714 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1983)
(concluding that there was substantial compliance when the insured “did
everything he could do to change the named beneficiary of his policy.”).
Finally, Loshandra asserts that the divorce did not invalidate the
designation because Willie designated her as a beneficiary after they
separated. This argument lacks any statutory support—nothing in § 91-29-
23 depends on the date of separation, only the date of a “decree of divorce.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 91-29-23. We must give effect to the intent of the
legislature and the plain words of the statute. See Marlow, L.L.C. v. BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc., 686 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2012). Because Willie’s
designation of Loshandra is plainly invalidated under § 91-29-23, we
conclude that summary judgment was warranted.
AFFIRMED.
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