Irma Merino Alvarado v. Jefferson Sessions, III ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 17-60193      Document: 00514536985         Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/02/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 17-60193
    FILED
    July 2, 2018
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    IRMA MERINO ALVARADO,
    Petitioner
    v.
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A200 064 078
    Before REAVLEY, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Irma Merino Alvarado, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
    review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her
    appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for withholding
    of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In her
    petition, Merino Alvarado argues that substantial evidence does not support
    the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 17-60193   Document: 00514536985     Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/02/2018
    No. 17-60193
    conclusion that Merino Alvarado failed to introduce sufficient corroborative
    evidence and that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s affirmance
    of the IJ’s alternative ruling on the merits of her application for withholding of
    removal and protection under the CAT.
    “Judicial review of a final order of removal is available only where the
    applicant has exhausted all administrative remedies of right.” Roy v. Ashcroft,
    
    389 F.3d 132
    , 137 (5th Cir. 2004); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Merino Alvarado
    did not raise the following issues before the BIA: (1) the IJ erred as a matter
    of law because he failed to afford her an opportunity to explain inconsistencies
    by soliciting explanations for them during the hearing; (2) the inconsistency
    based on whether her ex-partner beat her daughters cannot support an adverse
    credibility determination because it does not enhance her claim; and (3) the IJ
    legally erred by failing to affirmatively ask Merino Alvarado why she failed to
    produce hospital records to corroborate her testimony. As the BIA could have
    corrected the IJ’s alleged errors had Merino Alvarado raised them, this court
    lacks jurisdiction to consider those claims. See 
    Roy, 389 F.3d at 137
    . Further,
    in order to exhaust any claims relating to the BIA’s “act of decisionmaking,”
    Merino Alvarado was required to file a motion for reconsideration. Omari v.
    Holder, 
    562 F.3d 314
    , 320 (5th Cir. 2009). She did not do so, thereby depriving
    this court of jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA committed legal error (1)
    by not making an alternative finding regarding past persecution, and by
    requiring her to show that the government would be unable or unwilling to
    protect her from harm, and (2) by considering only whether the government
    was willing to protect her, but not whether it was able to do so. See 
    id. at 320-
    21.
    On petition for review of a BIA decision, this court reviews factual
    findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Lopez-Gomez
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    v. Ashcroft, 
    263 F.3d 442
    , 444 (5th Cir. 2001). This court reviews only the order
    of the BIA unless the IJ’s decision “has some impact on the BIA’s decision,”
    Mikhael v. INS, 
    115 F.3d 299
    , 302 (5th Cir. 1997), in which case it reviews the
    IJ’s decision as well, Wang v. Holder, 
    569 F.3d 531
    , 536 (5th Cir. 2009). Here,
    because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision, this court will consider both
    decisions. See 
    Wang, 569 F.3d at 536
    . Pursuant to the substantial-evidence
    standard, “this court may not overturn the BIA’s factual findings unless the
    evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 
    560 F.3d 354
    , 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Credibility determinations are factual findings that are reviewed for
    substantial evidence. See Vidal v. Gonzales, 
    491 F.3d 250
    , 254 (5th Cir. 2007).
    An adverse credibility determination “must be supported by specific and cogent
    reasons derived from the record.” 
    Wang, 569 F.3d at 537
    (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). The IJ and BIA “may rely on any inconsistency
    or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the
    totality of the circumstances establishes that an asylum applicant is not
    credible.” 
    Id. at 538
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis
    in original).
    In the instant case, the IJ and the BIA relied on specific inconsistencies
    among Merino Alvarado’s testimony, application for withholding of removal,
    and affidavits from her daughters and mother. Before this court, Merino
    Alvarado cites no evidence compelling a finding that she is credible; rather, she
    offers reinterpretations of her testimony and the evidence in an attempt to
    explain away the inconsistencies and the lack of detail identified by the IJ and
    BIA. The record does not compel a determination that Merino Alvarado was
    credible, and she has failed to show that, under the totality of the
    circumstances, no reasonable factfinder could have made the adverse
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    No. 17-60193
    credibility ruling. See 
    Wang, 569 F.3d at 538-40
    ; Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 
    78 F.3d 194
    , 197 (5th Cir. 1996). We therefore defer to the IJ’s and BIA’s adverse
    credibility determinations. See 
    Wang, 569 F.3d at 538-39
    . In light of the IJ’s
    and BIA’s adverse credibility determinations, Alvarado has failed to show that
    the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of her application for relief from
    removal. See Dayo v. Holder, 
    687 F.3d 653
    , 658-59 (5th Cir. 2012).
    Based on the foregoing, Merino Alvarado’s petition is DENIED in part
    and DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction.
    4