Taylor v. USA ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT May 17, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-51642
Summary Calendar
DAVID S. TAYLOR; TOBY C. TAYLOR,
Petitioners-Appellants,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
BANK OF AMERICA,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(1:06-CV-502)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
David and Toby Taylor challenge, pro se, the district court’s
denial of their petition to quash two summonses issued by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to Bank of America requesting their
bank records. They were issued in furtherance of the IRS’
investigating Appellants’ 2003-2005 tax liability. Appellants
assert three claims, all of which lack merit.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
First, Appellants contend the IRS lacks authority to issue
summonses for their bank records because, inter alia, “the Internal
Revenue Code is not the law”. (Emphasis added). Contrary to
Appellants’ contentions, Title 26 of the United States Code grants
the IRS expansive information-gathering authority, including the
power to issue summonses to compel disclosure. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §§
7602 (authorizing IRS to examine records, issue summonses, and take
testimony to verify tax returns and determine tax liability) and
7609 (authorizing the IRS to “compel compliance with the summons”);
see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816
(1984).
Second, Appellants contend they are not within any class of
persons to whom the IRS may issue summonses, and the summonses lack
a legitimate purpose. Section 7602(a) authorizes the IRS to issue
summonses concerning “any person for any internal revenue tax”. 26
U.S.C. § 7602(a) (emphasis added). Third-party summonses, like
those issued here, are explicitly authorized under 26 U.S.C. §
7602(a)(2). The burden on the Government to establish a prima
facie case to enforce a summons is “slight” or “minimal”. Mazurek
v. United States, 271 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal
citation omitted); see also United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48,
57-58 (1964) (identifying four factors the IRS must establish for
summons enforcement). For the reasons stated by the district
court, the IRS satisfied the Powell factors. Concomitantly,
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Appellants have not fulfilled their “heavy” burden of rebutting the
Government’s prima facie case. Mazurek, 271 F.3d at 230.
Finally, Appellants, United States citizens residing in Texas,
claim the IRS lacks jurisdiction to investigate their tax liability
or enforce tax laws. This contention is nonsensical. See, e.g.,
Powell, 379 U.S. at 50-51; Barquero v. United States, 18 F.3d 1311,
1316 (5th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED
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