United States v. Narviz-Guerra ( 1998 )


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  •                         Revised August 17, 1998
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit
    No. 97-50298
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    VERSUS
    ALVARO NARVIZ-GUERRA and LARRY AUSTIN GRANT,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    For the Western District of Texas
    July 28, 1998
    Before   DUHÉ, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    JOHN M. DUHÉ, JR., Circuit Judge:
    Defendants Alvaro Narviz-Guerra (“Narviz”) and          Larry Grant
    (“Grant”) were tried and convicted for possession of marijuana with
    the   intent   to   distribute,   conspiracy   to   possess    marijuana,
    conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, and engaging in a
    continuing criminal enterprise.        Narviz appeals his conviction
    arguing insufficiency of the evidence, lack of verdict unanimity,
    improper admission of hearsay, and double jeopardy.           Second, he
    appeals his sentence arguing that the presentence report was
    unreliable.     Third,     he   appeals   the   forfeiture    of   his    truck
    contending that it was improperly forfeited under 
    18 U.S.C. § 853
    (a)(2).    Grant appeals his conviction arguing that his right to
    a speedy trial was violated, that there was insufficient evidence
    to convict him of money laundering, and that the trial court failed
    to give a compensated witness instruction.           He also appeals his
    sentence contending that the amount of marijuana for which he was
    held   responsible   was   not   reasonably     foreseeable.       We    vacate
    Narviz’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to
    distribute on the grounds it violates double jeopardy.             We affirm
    Narviz’s other convictions and his sentence.                 We also affirm
    Grant’s conviction and sentence.
    BACKGROUND
    In early 1991, Narviz bought Las Moras Ranch, a 534 acre ranch
    which had previously been used to breed cattle and harvest pecans
    and was bordered by the Rio Grande and Las Moras Creek.                  Narviz
    made Grant foreman.      Within six months, the ranch had deteriorated
    significantly, and Narviz was running so far behind on payments
    that the seller forced Grant off the ranch.             Narviz, however,
    negotiated a settlement, and Grant returned to the ranch about a
    year later.
    Narviz and Grant used the ranch to smuggle marijuana from
    Mexico into Texas and then moved it from the ranch to distributors
    2
    for shipping throughout Texas.          In November 1993, Ricardo Perez
    (“Perez”), a fugitive who knew Narviz from past trafficking and
    still    maintained   contacts   with    American   distributors,   joined
    Narviz’s organization.      Perez contacted Narviz after meeting a
    pilot flying loads of marijuana to Narviz.             They arranged the
    marijuana transactions so that Narviz remained unknown to Perez’s
    associates.    Narviz set up the deliveries by phone from Mexico
    while Perez directed the receipt, storage, and distribution in
    Texas.    Over the next year and a half, between 12 and 18 loads of
    marijuana, weighing 200-600 pounds, were delivered to Perez’s
    associates.
    In June 1995, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) searched
    Narviz’s ranch which they found in poor condition.         The fences and
    pecan trees had deteriorated.       The two houses on the ranch were
    unlocked; they contained little furniture, had broken windows and
    trash strewn about.       Moreover, the agents found two bales of
    marijuana, marijuana residue, inner tubes, and burlap or fiberglass
    bags that had contained marijuana.
    In July, the DEA arrested one of Perez’s associates, Tony Hall
    (“Hall”), who began cooperating in the investigation.         Hall set up
    a controlled buy with another associate, Craig Hillis (“Hillis”).
    Hillis, too, was arrested and began cooperating.        Hillis consented
    to a search of his stash house where agents found about 100 pounds
    of a 400 pound load that had been delivered between August and
    October of 1994.
    3
    On September 22, 1995, Perez’s wife contacted Hall and said
    that she wanted approval to put Narviz in touch with Hall.                  Three
    days later, Grant drove Narviz to a Houston restaurant where they
    met with Hall and an undercover agent to discuss the buying and
    selling of additional loads.             On November 30, Narviz, Hall, and
    Grant met again at another restaurant near Houston.               As Narviz and
    Grant left the restaurant, they were arrested.                 Narviz was tried
    and convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with the intent to
    distribute, six counts of possession with intent to distribute,
    conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, and engaging in a
    continuing criminal enterprise.           He was sentenced to 360 months in
    prison.     Grant was tried and          convicted of conspiracy to possess
    marijuana, two counts of possession with intent to distribute and
    one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments.                He was
    sentenced    to    188   months.     Both     appeal   their    conviction   and
    sentences.
    ANALYSIS
    A. NARVIZ
    1. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
    Narviz       argues,   and    the    government    concedes,    that    his
    conviction on Count One of the indictment must be vacated.                  Count
    One charged Narviz with conspiracy to possess marijuana with the
    intent to distribute.         Because conspiracy is a lesser included
    offense of the continuing criminal enterprise charged in Count
    4
    Three, his conviction on Count One violates double jeopardy.                        See
    Rutledge v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 292
    , 307 (1996); United States
    v. Dixon, 
    132 F.3d 192
    , 196 (5th Cir. 1997).                      Though we vacate
    Narviz’s    conviction      on    Count       One,    we    do    not    remand    for
    resentencing.      Where     it    is   clear        that   the   drug    conspiracy
    conviction did not lead the district court to impose a harsher
    sentence for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”),
    there is no need to remand.          United States v. Dixon, 
    132 F.3d at 196
    .    Here, Narviz was sentenced to 360 months for Counts One and
    Three with the terms to run concurrently; thus,                   the sentence for
    the CCE is no harsher than it would have been without the drug
    conspiracy conviction.
    2. VERDICT UNANIMITY
    Because Narviz’s trial counsel did not object to the failure
    to give a specific instruction requiring unanimity, this Court
    reviews for plain error.          United States v. Harris, 
    104 F.3d 1465
    ,
    1471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    118 S. Ct. 103
     (1997).
    Narviz points out that he was charged with laundering monetary
    instruments    under   
    19 U.S.C. §§ 1956
    (a)(2)(A)       and    (h)     which
    proscribes transporting, transmitting, and transferring a monetary
    instrument or funds from or to the United States with the intent to
    carry on specified unlawful activity.                 When the judge instructed
    the jury, he told them that the prosecution had to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that two or more agreed to launder money either by
    5
    sending it from or to the United States.                 Narviz argues that this
    instruction was error because it is unclear whether Narviz was
    convicted of laundering money by sending it to or from the United
    States.      He contends that our holding in United States v. Gipson,
    
    553 F.2d 453
       (5th   Cir.   1977)       requires    a   specific   unanimity
    instruction when a jury could find a defendant guilty on a single
    count under multiple theories of liability.
    While Narviz accurately summarizes our holding in that case,
    Gipson simply does not apply here because Narviz was convicted of
    conspiracy and not the actual offense.                   Rather, we look to our
    holding United States v. Dillman, 
    15 F.3d 384
    , 391-92 (5th Cir.
    1994) which said that where an indictment alleged conspiracy to
    commit several offenses, the district court did not err in giving
    a general unanimity instruction.              The Dillman court explained that
    when twelve jurors agree that a defendant agreed to commit a crime,
    all jurors do not have to agree about which offense the defendant
    personally intended to commit.            There need be only one conspiracy
    to encompass the particular charged offense.                  
    Id. at 392
    .    Here,
    the facts fall within Dillman’s reasoning.                     The judge gave a
    general unanimity charge, and the conspiracy to launder money
    encompasses moving money both to and from the United States. Thus,
    we cannot say that the district court plainly erred in failing to
    give a specific unanimity instruction.
    3. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
    6
    Counts Four and Seven allege respectively that on or about
    October 1994 and July 20, 1995, Narviz unlawfully and knowingly
    possessed marijuana with intent to distribute.         Narviz argues that
    the record does not show that the government proved any of the
    specified conduct.        He contends that the government produced no
    evidence that Narviz possessed any marijuana on those specific
    dates.    Rather, the government produced witnesses who testified to
    the loads that they, as co-conspirators, handled over the years.
    This Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
    to, and with all reasonable inferences drawn in support of, the
    verdict.    United States v. Thompson, 
    130 F.3d 676
    , 688 (5th Cir.
    1997).     We must affirm Narviz’s conviction under these counts if
    any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
    beyond a reasonable doubt.      Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319
    (1979).
    To convict for possession with intent to distribute, the
    government must prove (1) knowing, (2) possession, (3) with intent
    to distribute.        United States v. Lopez, 
    74 F.3d 575
    , 577 (5th
    Cir.), cert. denied 
    116 S. Ct. 1867
     (1996).             Possession may be
    joint. United States v. Skipper, 
    74 F.3d 608
    , 611 (5th Cir. 1996).
    A party to a conspiracy may be held responsible for a substantive
    offense    that   a   co-conspirator   commits   in   furtherance   of   the
    conspiracy even if the party did not participate in or have any
    knowledge of that offense.       Pinkerton v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 640
    , 647 (1946).       Thus, once the conspiracy and the defendant’s
    7
    knowing participation therein is proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
    a   defendant   is   guilty   of   the       substantive   acts   his   partners
    committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.                 United States v.
    Garcia, 
    917 F.2d 1370
    , 1377 (5th Cir. 1990).           Here, the evidence is
    sufficient under these theories.
    DEA agents searched a stash house Craig Hillis used and seized
    97 pounds of marijuana from a freezer in the garage.              The marijuana
    was part of a load that Narviz supplied and had delivered to Hillis
    between August and October 1994.               Hillis, as a co-conspirator,
    continuously possessed the 97 pounds. Thus, Narviz’s conviction on
    Count Four stands.
    For the same reasons, Narviz’s conviction on Count Seven also
    stands.   At trial, the government showed that DEA agents searched
    another stash house and seized 183 pounds of marijuana on July 20,
    1995.   On July 14, Tony Hall had received 300 pounds of marijuana
    that Narviz had sent through a co-defendant and took it to that
    same stash house. We hold, therefore, that the jury had sufficient
    evidence to convict Narviz of possessing marijuana on or about July
    20, 1995.
    4. HEARSAY TESTIMONY
    We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
    discretion.     United States v. Parks, 
    68 F.3d 860
    , 867 (5th Cir.
    1995), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 825
     (1996).
    The district court permitted three witnesses, Perez, Agent
    8
    Hildreth, and Agent Boyette, to testify over Narviz’s hearsay
    objection concluding the testimony fell within the co-conspirator
    exception to the hearsay rule.    FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) states “a
    statement is not hearsay if. . . the statement is offered against
    a party and is. . . a statement by a co-conspirator of a party
    during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”      For the
    Rule to apply, the proponent of the testimony must show: 1) the
    conspiracy existed; 2) the statement was made during the course of
    and in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 3) the co-conspirator and
    the defendant are members of the conspiracy.        United States v.
    Asibor, 
    109 F.3d 1023
    , 1032 (5th Cir. 1997).      The proponent must
    establish these elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
    Bourjaily v. United States, 
    483 U.S. 171
    , 175 (1987).     Further, in
    the case of a non-testifying con-conspirator, the proponent must
    adduce independent evidence of a concert of action in which the
    defendant was a participant.     Asibor, 
    109 F.3d at 1033
    .
    a. Perez
    Narviz complains Perez made two statements which he argues are
    objectionable. First, Perez testified that he was arrested in 1987
    with 75 pounds of marijuana that a co-conspirator, Tim McCaskill,
    supplied.   When the government asked about the origin of the 75
    pounds, Perez testified that it had come from Narviz.         Second,
    Perez testified that he met a pilot who said that he was flying
    marijuana from Mexico’s interior for Narviz.      Narviz argues that
    9
    the government failed to show that either McCaskill or the pilot
    belonged to the same conspiracy as Narviz. Narviz further objected
    to Perez’s testimony concerning McCaskill on the grounds that Perez
    had no personal knowledge.1
    A court may evaluate the testimony itself to determine whether
    the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule has been met.
    United States v. Burton, 
    126 F.3d 666
    , 671 (5th Cir. 1997).    Here,
    we look to Perez’s testimony to determine if it falls within the
    exception.   We hold that it does.    Perez testified that before his
    1987 arrest, he met twice with Narviz in McCaskill’s presence to
    buy marijuana McCaskill was holding for Narviz.      Thus, McCaskill
    and Narviz are members of the same conspiracy2 and the admitted
    statements were made in furtherance of that conspiracy.
    As for the pilot, we again examine the testimony itself to
    determine whether it was properly admitted.     We conclude that the
    pilot and Narviz were members of the same conspiracy because the
    pilot was flying marijuana for Narviz.        Moreover, the pilot’s
    statement was made in furtherance of that conspiracy.      Thus, the
    testimony was admissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
    b. Agents Hildreth and Boyette
    1
    We do not address this objection because the testimony is
    admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
    2
    We point out that for the co-conspirator exception to apply,
    “same conspiracy” does not have to be the same conspiracy as
    charged n the indictment. United States v. Arce, 
    997 F.2d 1123
    ,
    1128 (5th Cir. 1993).
    10
    DEA Agent Hildreth testified that he got a break in his
    investigation when Tony Hall, who was then an informant, received
    a call from Perez’s wife asking for help.                 Narviz argues that the
    co-conspirator exception does not apply because neither Perez’s
    wife nor Hall were co-conspirators. Hall, at the time Perez’s wife
    telephoned, was a cooperating witness, and Perez’s wife was never
    shown to be a member of the conspiracy.
    We   agree   with   the    government      that     the   testimony    is    not
    hearsay.    A statement is hearsay only if it is being offered to
    prove the truth of the matter.            FED. R. EVID. 801(c).        Here, Agent
    Hildreth’s testimony was not given to show the truth of what
    Perez’s wife said; rather, the purpose of the testimony was to show
    why Hildreth resumed his investigation.                 Thus, the court did not
    abuse its discretion in permitting Hildreth to testify.
    Finally, Narviz objects to two allegedly hearsay statements
    Agent Boyette made.         Boyette testified that he told Grant that
    Customs,    during    a   three      year       investigation,     had      received
    information    that   Narviz      was    involved    in    narcotics     smuggling.
    Boyette also testified that after arresting and debriefing four
    people, investigators were led to Narviz’s ranch.                  Again, we find
    that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
    the   testimony.      The       arrest    and    debriefing      statement,       like
    Hildreth’s testimony, is not hearsay because it is not offered to
    prove the truth of the arrests and debriefings.                     Instead, the
    testimony is used to explain why investigators went to Narviz’s
    11
    ranch.    As for Boyette’s warning to Grant, the testimony was
    offered to refute Grant’s implication at trial that he knew nothing
    about Narviz’s illegal activities.             While Boyette’s testimony may
    have been prejudicial3, Narviz only argues that the testimony was
    inappropriate because it was hearsay. The testimony is not hearsay
    because the testimony was offered to show what Grant knew not
    whether Customs was actually investigating Narviz.                     Again, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either
    Hildreth’s or Boyette’s testimony.
    5. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
    This Court reviews the district court’s factual findings as to
    the   relevant    quantity   of    drugs     under     the   clearly    erroneous
    standard.    United States v. Montes, 
    976 F.2d 235
    , 240 (5th Cir.
    1992).
    In making sentencing determinations, a district court may
    consider a wide range of evidence and must be afforded wide
    discretion in the sources of information it uses.               United States v.
    Kimbrough,   
    69 F.3d 723
    ,     734   (5th    Cir.   1995).     However,    the
    information upon which a judge relies must have “a sufficient
    indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”                    U.S.
    SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §6A1.3(a) (1995).          While a PSR generally
    bears sufficient indicia of reliability, United States v. Alfaro,
    3
    We do not address whether the testimony was prejudicial because
    all issues not briefed are waived. Cinel v. Connick, 
    15 F.3d 1338
    ,
    1345 (5th Cir. 1994).
    12
    
    919 F.2d 962
    , 966, “[b]ald, conclusionary statements do not acquire
    the patina of reliability by mere inclusion in the PSR.”        United
    States v. Elwood, 
    999 F.2d 814
    , 817-18 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Narviz’s presentence report (“PSR”) holds him responsible for
    10,074 kilograms of marijuana. The probation officer states in the
    PSR that the total is based primarily on information contained in
    various debriefings, recorded meetings and telephone calls, and on
    the amount of marijuana seized in the different arrests of the co-
    conspirators.   She further states that “[a]lthough the Government
    has information from cooperating individuals that the defendant was
    involved in narcotics trafficking activities. . . over a period. .
    . of years, this information has not been corroborated with any
    specificity.    Therefore, the defendant is accountable for only
    those amounts of drugs that have been substantiated[.]”       However,
    as Narviz points out, the debriefings, recorded meetings, and
    telephone calls upon which the probation officer relied are not
    attached to the PSR.   Nor is there an explanation of how the PSR
    was corroborated.   In short, there is no way for this Court to know
    whether the PSR contains sufficient indicia of reliability.
    We hold, though, that even if the PSR is unreliable, the
    resulting error is harmless.      Assuming arguendo that Narviz’s
    sentence were based only on the amounts proven at trial, his
    sentence would not change.    The PSR holds Narviz responsible for
    10,074 kilograms of marijuana, which results in a offense level of
    40.   See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.5 (1995).     Narviz
    13
    concedes that the government proved that he was responsible for
    4,802 kilograms at trial.              That amount, however, would give him an
    offense level of 38, which is a two point reduction.                          Id.     What
    Narviz ignores is that his offense level was raised two points for
    obstruction          of     justice.      Narviz    does   not    appeal   the      upward
    adjustment for obstruction of justice, and all issues not briefed
    are waived.          Cinel, 
    15 F.3d at 1345
    .         Thus, even with the two point
    reduction, Narviz’s offense level is 40, which would have resulted
    in a sentence of 292-365 months.4                    See      U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
    MANUAL Ch. 5 Pt. A (1995).               Because Narviz’s sentence falls within
    this range, any error resulting from reliance on the PSR is
    harmless.           See United States v. Misher, 
    99 F.3d 664
    , 671 (5th Cir.
    1996), cert. denied sub nom, Cobb v. United States, 
    118 S. Ct. 73
    (1997).
    6. FORFEITURE
    
    21 U.S.C. § 853
     permits the forfeiture of a person’s property
    if       he   has    been    convicted    of   a    federal    drug   crime   which    is
    punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment.                         Here, the jury
    found Narviz’s truck was forfeit because it was “used, or intended
    to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
    commission of, [a drug crime]”, 
    21 U.S.C. § 853
    (a)(2), and because
    it afforded Narviz control over a continuing criminal enterprise,
    
    21 U.S.C. § 853
    (a)(3).                   On appeal, Narviz only contests the
    4
    This sentence applies to a defendant with an offense level of
    40 and a criminal history that falls within category I.
    14
    forfeiture under (a)(2).        Because the forfeiture is sufficient
    under § 853(a)(3), we affirm.
    B. GRANT
    1. COMPENSATED WITNESSES
    Grant argues that the government’s case against him was based
    largely on three compensated witnesses, who were paid either in
    terms of travel expenses or in lenient sentence recommendations.
    As a result, he was entitled to a compensated witness instruction;
    however, the trial court only generally instructed the jury on the
    effect of a plea agreement.       Because Grant failed to raise this
    claim at trial, this Court reviews for plain error.            United States
    v. Lopez, 
    923 F.2d 47
    , 49 (5th Cir. 1991).
    For a compensated witness’ testimony to be admissible, it must
    meet four requirements:     1) the government may not encourage or
    deliberately   use   perjured    testimony;    2)    the   government   must
    completely and timely disclose to the accused the fee arrangement
    it made with the informant; 3) the accused must have an adequate
    opportunity to cross-examine the informant and government agents
    about any compensation agreement; and 4) the trial court must give
    a careful instruction to the jury pointing out the compensated
    witness’ suspect credibility. United States v. Rizk, 
    833 F.2d 523
    ,
    525 (5th Cir. 1987).
    While the judge did not give an instruction pointing out the
    witnesses’   suspect   credibility,     he   did    instruct   the   jury   to
    15
    carefully, cautiously weigh the testimony of those who have entered
    into a plea agreement.5        It is up to the jury to evaluate the
    credibility of compensated witnesses, United States v. Garcia
    Abrego,   
    141 F.3d 142
    ,   151   (5th   Cir.   1998),   and   the   judge’s
    instruction allowed the jury to do so.        Any error, then, in failing
    to give a specific instruction does not rise to the level of plain
    error.
    2. SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
    This Court reviews the factual findings supporting a Speedy
    Trial Act ruling for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo.
    United States v. Grosz, 
    76 F.3d 1318
    , 1323 (5th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    117 S. Ct. 167
     (1996); United States v. Tannehill, 
    49 F.3d 1049
    , 1051 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    116 S. Ct. 167
     (1995).
    Under the Speedy Trial Act (“the Act”), a defendant must be
    tried within seventy days of indictment or of the day the defendant
    first appears before the judge or magistrate, whichever is later.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    (c)(1).         If more than seventy days pass, the
    indictment is dismissed upon the defendant’s motion.             
    18 U.S.C. § 3162
    (a)(2).     Delay resulting from any pretrial motion through the
    conclusion of the hearing or other prompt disposition of the motion
    is excluded from calculation.        
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    (h)(1)(F).        All the
    5
    The judge instructed that “[t]he testimony of one who provides
    evidence against a defendant as an informer pursuant to the terms
    of a plea agreement, or for personal advantage or vindication, must
    always be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care and
    caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses.”
    16
    time between filing the motion and concluding the hearing is
    excluded    whether    or   not    a    delay    in    holding   the   hearing    is
    reasonably necessary.        Henderson v. United States, 
    476 U.S. 321
    ,
    330 (1986).
    Grant argues that ninety non-excludable days elapsed between
    the time he was indicted (December 5, 1995) and the time he moved
    to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the Act (November 26, 1996).
    Thus, the trial court should have dismissed his indictment.                       We
    disagree.
    As    stated   above,    the      Act    begins    counting   seventy      non-
    excludable days from the day of indictment or the day the defendant
    first appears in court, whichever is later.                      While Grant was
    indicted December 5, 1995, he did not make his first appearance
    until January 5, 1996. Because his first appearance was later than
    the indictment, Grant’s calculation includes more than twenty
    improperly counted days.          Thus, fewer than seventy excludable days
    elapsed.
    3. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
    Grant    argues   that   he       was    improperly   convicted     of    money
    laundering.    For the government to convict him, it must prove that
    he transferred money to or from the United States with the intent
    of promoting or carrying on of marijuana distribution.                        See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(2). He concedes that he asked another to transfer
    money from Mexico to the U.S. to pay for the ranch; however, he
    17
    contends that there is insufficient evidence showing that he knew
    that ranch was being used for illegal activity.
    This Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable
    to, and with all reasonable inferences drawn in support of, the
    verdict.   United States v. Thompson, 
    130 F.3d 676
    , 688 (5th Cir.
    1997). We must affirm Grant’s conviction under these counts if any
    rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
    beyond a reasonable doubt.    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319
    (1979).
    Because Grant admits that he directed ranch payments to be
    transferred from Mexico to the U.S., the only question is whether
    there is sufficient evidence to show that Grant knew of the ranch’s
    illegal purpose.   He contends that the evidence is insufficient.
    Six months after Grant became ranch foreman in 1991, he was kicked
    off because the buyer6 had not made regular payments. He did not
    return until early 1993.   Moreover, the first direct event linking
    the ranch to marijuana distribution occurred in October 19947 after
    Grant ceased to be foreman.
    Grant’s argument fails because he does not point this Court to
    6
    The government alleges that Narviz used a straw man, Francisco
    Garcia, to purchase the ranch. The evidence showed, though, that
    Narviz made the payments.
    7
    In October 1994, an potential buyer unexpectedly stopped by the
    ranch.   He testified that he could smell marijuana and that he
    observed eight Hispanic men with backpacks and bedding in the ranch
    house.
    18
    any evidence which would contradict the government’s evidence that
    he was connected with marijuana distribution.   For instance, while
    Grant claims he was not the foreman in October 1994, he fails to
    substantiate his argument with evidence in the record.   Nor does he
    point this Court to any evidence that would show that his sole
    capacity at the ranch was foreman.        On the other hand, the
    government’s evidence shows that six months after Grant became
    foreman, all the cattle were gone and the trees showed signs of
    neglect.   Further, routine oil changes had not been done on the
    equipment, and fences had deteriorated or been removed altogether.
    Twenty months after Grant returned, the ranch still had no pecans
    or cattle, and the stock pens, irrigation ditches, and two houses
    were neglected.
    The government also presented evidence that David Powell, a
    co-conspirator, had picked up a marijuana load at the ranch for
    Juan Martinez. Moreover, when Grant’s house was searched after his
    arrest, agents found an envelope with the name “Juan Martinez”
    penciled on it.   While this evidence is thin, we review in the
    light most favorable to the verdict.   We cannot say that a rational
    trier of fact could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Grant laundered money.
    4. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
    The district court’s finding of fact are reviewed for clear
    error, and its application of those facts to the guidelines are
    19
    reviewed de novo.        United States v. Moore, 
    997 F.2d 55
    , 60 (5th
    Cir. 1993).          Under the sentencing          guidelines, a defendant is
    accountable for all relevant conduct including the foreseeable acts
    of his co-conspirators.          United States v. Sotelo, 
    97 F.3d 782
    , 799
    (5th    Cir.    1996);     UNITED     STATES     SENTENCING   GUIDELINES    MANUAL    §
    1B1.3(a)(1)(B).        In attributing the acts of co-conspirators to a
    particular defendant, those acts must be reasonably foreseeable and
    within the scope of the criminal activity. United States v. Smith,
    
    13 F.3d 860
    , 867 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Grant argues that the 9,028 kilograms attributed to him were
    not reasonably foreseeable. He contends that there was no evidence
    that he was involved in the drug conspiracy from 1991-94.                     Rather,
    he claims involvement beginning in September 1995.                        Because 400
    pounds were delivered between September and November 1995, he
    claims responsibility only for that amount.
    Grant’s argument here is similar to his insufficiency of the
    evidence argument.        Again, he fails to present any evidence to
    support his     argument     that     he   was    not    involved    from    1991-94.
    However, we do have evidence before us that while Grant was foreman
    the    ranch   was    severely      neglected.          Further,    the    government
    presented evidence that in October 1994, a potential buyer, who had
    contracted to purchase the ranch, made an unexpected visit.                          The
    visit made him suspicious that illegal drug activity was occurring
    at the ranch.        When he reported these suspicions, Grant replied
    that he “would see about it”.              Grant, however, sued to void the
    20
    sale contract with the buyer and to bar him from the ranch.    With
    this evidence before us, and with nothing to contradict it, we hold
    that the 9,028 kilograms of marijuana was foreseeable and thus,
    affirm Grant’s sentence.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE Narviz’ CONVICTION    on
    count one.    Otherwise, we AFFIRM Narviz’s CONVICTIONS on the
    remaining counts and his SENTENCE.   As for Grant, we AFFIRM both
    his CONVICTIONS and SENTENCE.
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