Wade v. Walton ( 1998 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-40298
MELONIE WADE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
TOM WALTON; VICTORIA COLLEGE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(V-95-124)
January 15, 1998
Before WISDOM, HIGGINBOTHAM, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Melonie Wade appeals the summary judgment entered for
Defendant-Appellee Victoria College on her retaliation claim
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We
affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
Wade was employed by the College in July 1991 as the
Articulation Coordinator for the newly-formed Tech Prep program, a
federally funded, state-wide program. Wade’s immediate supervisor
was Tom Walton, who was responsible for technical education at the
College and was originally in charge of the Tech Prep program.
Walton reported to Dr. Steve Thomas, the Dean of Instruction.
Walton made remarks to Wade with implied sexual connotations
beginning just days after Wade’s employment began. On February 25,
1992, Wade confronted Walton about his inappropriate comments for
the first time and informed him that they were offensive and
unwelcome. The next morning, Walton reprimanded Wade concerning
her job performance for the first time. Over the next two days,
they had a series of heated discussions that culminated, on
February 27, 1992, in Walton screaming and pointing his finger at
Wade and Wade retreating in tears. Wade characterizes the February
disputes as retaliation for her allegations of sexual harassment,
but the College contends that the disputes centered on their
differing views about their respective authority over policy and
budget in the Tech Prep program. On February 28, 1992, Wade
complained about Walton’s inappropriate sexual comments to Dr.
Jimmy Goodson, the President of the College. In response to Wade’s
complaint, President Goodson removed Walton as Wade’s supervisor,
arranged for Wade to report directly to Thomas, and directed Wade
and Walton to communicate in writing only. Wade was also promoted
to Tech Prep Coordinator and given a raise. Wade and Walton were
2
never again alone together.
In spite of the College’s remedial action and the absence of
any further direct contact between Wade and Walton, Wade alleges
that Walton continued to retaliate against her and that the College
either failed to respond appropriately or affirmatively
participated in the retaliation. In a letter dated December 11,
1992, she resigned from her position, citing sexual harassment and
program sabotage as the motivating factors.
Wade filed suit in state court against the College alleging
sexual harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination and breach of
contract. The case was removed to federal court. The district
court granted summary judgment for defendants with respect to all
of Wade’s claims.
This court reviews the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo. Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65
(5th Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Wade was
required to present admissible evidence that (1) she engaged in
activity protected under the anti-discrimination statute; (2) an
adverse employment action occurred; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the participation in protected activity and the
adverse employment action. Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714,
3
719-20 (5th Cir. 1986).
There is no dispute that Wade engaged in activity protected by
the anti-discrimination statute when she reported Walton’s sexual
harassment to President Goodson. As to the second and third
elements, Wade contends that the adverse employment action she
suffered should be treated as a constructive discharge. To succeed
on this claim, Wade must show that the working conditions she faced
were so intolerable that a reasonable person in her shoes would
have felt compelled to resign. Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt
Co., 990 F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1993). Wade must also establish
that the actions that led to her decision to quit were tainted by
unlawful animus. See Boze3 v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th
Cir. 1990).
There is no evidence in this record that the College harbored
retaliatory intent or took any action calculated to encourage
Wade’s resignation. See Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 10 F.3d
292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). Although Wade and Walton had an
unpleasant working relationship after she reported the sexual
harassment, the summary judgment evidence does not raise a material
question of fact on Wade’s claim of constructive discharge or on
the element of causal connection.
AFFIRMED.
4